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This thesis consists of one comprehensive literature review and two empirical essays 
on shareholder activism. The literature review on shareholder activism provides a brief 
discussion on shareholder activism’s evolution, highlighting the potential of retail 
investors’ participation in tipping the balance between the activist and the firm. 
Furthermore, it provides evidence on the activist institutional investors, including the 
traditional institutional investors such as pension funds and mutual funds, and hedge 
funds as the latest emerging activists. The literature review identifies some potential 
for research areas in light of the growing interest in shareholder activism. 
This thesis further includes two empirical studies on retail investors and activist hedge 
funds, respectively. The first essay examines retail investors’ attention and 
participation during shareholder activism with the proliferation of internet from 1990s. 
This study finds a significant increase in retail investors’ attention before the annual 
general meetings, leading to a subsequent increase in retail investors’ participation in 
the voting process, especially among proposals that resonate with retail investors’ 
preferences. This increase is more pronounced for less transparent firms than 
transparent firms. Empirical evidence also suggests that retail investors’ attention has 
a more pronounced increase for proposals with a more controversial tone. Overall, this 
study provides new insights into information technology’s role in mitigating retail 
investors’ apathy issues. 
The second essay focuses on hedge fund activism, and it is the first study to document 
the impact of hedge fund activism on firm risk-taking behaviors. This study provides 
evidence that firms targeted by activist hedge funds, which tend to maximize short-
term profits, experience a significant reduction in risk-taking in the long-term. This 
reduction in risk-taking is more pronounced for myopic and opaque firms. This study 
also provides new evidence on the impact of target’s response on activism outcomes. 
Management’s hostile resistance would offset the initial effect of activism on target 
firms. Overall, this study provides important implications that activist hedge funds 
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might not fulfil the role of monitoring as suggested in existing corporate governance 
literature. The results provide new insights to academics and regulators by adding to 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
This chapter provides an introduction and overview of this dissertation. Section 1.1 
provides a background of shareholder activism. Section 1.2 discusses some problems 
during the history of shareholder activism, which motivates this research. This chapter 
identifies the aim and objectives of this research (Section 1.3) and provides key 
contributions (Section 1.4). Section 1.5 presents some research outputs from this 
thesis. This chapter concludes by providing a framework for the remainder of the 
dissertation, including a concise summary of the essays included in the thesis (Section 
1.6). 
1.1 Background 
In corporate finance, the separation of ownership and management leads to agency 
problems, especially in large public firms. Effective monitoring would reduce agency 
problems. Nevertheless, as posed by Alchian and Demsetz posed in 1972, “who will 
monitor the monitor”? In general, the board of directors oversees the management 
and is responsible for monitoring the firms. If the board of directors does not perform 
their monitoring duties, shareholders are left with three options: selling their shares, 
holding their shares passively, or becoming an activist and voicing their dissatisfaction. 
These three activities are identified as exit, loyalty, and voice (Hirschman, 1970). 
Activist shareholders choose the third option to voice their dissent and challenge 
management’s actions (Bates & Hennessy, 2010). In response to dissatisfaction with 
corporate managers’ actions regarding firm performance, risk management, and 
governance, activist shareholders generally submit a proposal for voting during annual 
general meetings. This serves as a cheaper alternative to a hostile takeover. Over the 
years, shareholder activism has received incremental attention and has become a 
dynamic corporate governance mechanism.  
Shareholder activism in the form of shareholder proposals could be traced back to 
when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted Rule 14a-8 in 1942. 
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Between the years 1943 and 1970s, shareholder activism was almost exclusively 
denominated by retail investors. Large institutional investors started to lead the 
activism in the 1980s, with public pension funds and labor unions as the most active 
institutional investors. In recent years, institutional ownership accounts for around 70% 
of U.S. equities outstanding. Over the last two decades, hedge funds have emerged as 
the latest type of institutional activists and have since become a distinct and 
prominent player in corporate governance (Denes, Karpoff, & McWillians, 2017). In 
general, shareholder proposals and shareholder participation are a useful and relevant 
means of countering managerial agency problems (Bebchuk, 2005).  
In the meanwhile, the information environment plays a vital role in an efficient capital 
market. The informational mismatch between managers and outsiders is a primary 
cause of agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). More corporate disclosure 
improves firm-level transparency (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Importantly, shareholder 
activism results in reducing informational mismatch, making additional information 
available to outside investors (Prevost, Wongchoti, & Marshall, 2016). This is 
consistent with the role of shareholder activism as an incremental tool for corporate 
governance.  
The evolution of shareholder activism and its role in corporate governance has made 
shareholder activism one of the key academic focuses. It is well acknowledged that the 
main motivation for activists’ participation during activism is to improve the 
information flow and enhance firm value. Prior studies show that the market reacts 
positively to the announcement of shareholder activism in the short term, while the 
long-term effects are relatively less studied with mixed empirical results.  
1.2 The problems and motivation of this research 
Shareholder proposals have been subject to intense academic debates in recent years. 
On one hand, prior empirical literature documents that shareholder proposals have a 
nontrivial impact on corporate governance, enhancing monitoring, and improving 
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information flow. On the other hand, there is no clear evidence of how shareholder 
activism affects firms’ operating performance, stock performance, and risk-taking 
behavior in the long-term. This is particularly relevant with the expanded scope for 
shareholder activism during the past decade. The advancement of information 
technology over the past decades, which has facilitated information flow and the 
process of shareholder activism. Moreover, different types of activists also have 
various activism demands that differentiate the driving forces and shareholder 
activism effectiveness. Specifically, this study focuses on the following research gaps. 
Firstly, in contrast to institutional investors, who are always actively involved in 
corporate governance, prior studies report an absence of retail investors from 
corporate democracy during shareholder activism. This is associated with the costs 
and benefits for retail investors to make informed decisions. Specifically, activist 
investors incur all the costs associated with such activism, while activism benefits are 
shared amongst all shareholders. Holding only small fractions of a firm’s equity, retail 
investors are traditionally considered rationally apathetic towards corporate 
governance. However, the past decade has witnessed a crucial role of retail investors’ 
participation in deciding the outcomes of activist campaigns. Meanwhile, the 
advancement in information technology has facilitated retail investors during 
shareholder activism, reducing their time and cost of being informed.  
The above motivates Essay One of this dissertation. The essay argues that it is worth 
revisiting the retail investors’ apathy issues in the wake of the digital age. This setting 
is particularly relevant for the investigation of retail investors’ behaviors during 
shareholder activism. Most importantly, retail investors are more dependent on public 
sources to make an informed decision. As a result, the advent of the internet, 
especially Google search, is expected to benefit retail investors disproportionately.   
Secondly, emerging as a prominent activist in monitoring management, hedge fund 
activism is relatively less studied in academic literature. Prior studies document a 
significant improvement in target firm value with the announcement of hedge fund 
4 
 
activism, while there is no agreement on the long-term effects of such activism on firm 
values. More importantly, this is associated with increasing concerns about whether 
hedge fund activism creates or destructs shareholder wealth in the long-term. This 
situation might be further exacerbated when little is known about how hedge fund 
activism affects firm risk-taking behaviors. Although there is growing literature that 
examines hedge fund activism, prior literature mainly focuses on activists’ role and 
their impact on target firms’ performance. Only a few existing studies consider target 
firms’ response to hedge fund activism, such as Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2015) and Boyson 
and Pichler (2019).  
Essay two of the dissertation is motivated by the research gap related to the changes 
of firm risk-taking behaviors post hedge fund interventions, especially with the 
interaction with firm-level characteristics of myopic management and information 
transparency. This research motivation is associated with the concerns that hedge 
funds are potentially engaged in short-termism.  
1.3 Aim and objectives of this research 
This research aims to explore the emerging aspects of shareholder activism in the 
digital age, with the advancement of information technology that facilitates 
information flow. Essay One and Essay Two focus on retail investors and hedge funds 
as activist shareholders, respectively.  
Essay One examines how information technology and corporate transparency affect 
retail investors’ attention and subsequent participation during shareholder activism. 
The first essay uses the Google Search Volume Index (GSVI) to explore the dynamics of 
retail investors’ attention and participation preceding annual general meetings. The 
study examines explicitly whether the sentiment (tone) of the proxy materials (namely 
shareholder proposals), the level of information transparency, and retail investors’ 
preferences affect retail investors’ attention and participation during activism. This 
study also examines the influence of E-proxy reform on retail investors’ participation. 
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Essay Two examines the relation between hedge fund activism and firm risk-taking 
behaviors up to five years following interventions. This essay examines explicitly 
whether management myopia and firm-level transparency make a difference in firms’ 
post-intervention risk-taking behaviors. Additionally, the study aims to investigate how 
management’s resistance to activism affects firm risk-taking behaviors post 
interventions. 
1.4 Contributions of this research  
This thesis contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Firstly, it provides new 
insights into the role of internet in mitigating retail investors’ apathy problems. The 
first essay highlights the use of GSVI as a proxy for retail investors’ attention, which 
captures the demand for information around shareholder activism. The advancement 
of information technology enables retail investors to collect relevant information and 
make informed decisions during shareholder activism. Specifically, this study shows 
that the negative tone in proxy materials draws greater attention from retail investors. 
Secondly, Essay One adds to the literature on the “voice” aspect of corporate 
governance in response to dissatisfaction with the management. In contrast to the 
traditional view of retail investors being rationally apathetic, the first essay provides 
new evidence that retail investors can and do engage in shareholder activism through 
the voting process, especially when it resonates with their interests and preferences. 
Thirdly, Essay One is the first paper to document how firm-level information 
transparency impacts retail investors’ attention and subsequent participation during 
shareholder activism. Less information transparent firms attract significantly higher 
attention from retail investors, further leading to substantially higher participation in 
the voting process. 
Fourthly, Essay Two is the first study to explore the link between activist hedge funds 
and firm risk-taking. Empirical findings provide direct evidence that target firms 
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experience a significant reduction in risk-taking relative to their matched peers 
following hedge fund activism. This provides evidence that activist hedge funds tend 
to engage in short-termism, so that target firms become more conservative in the long-
term. The reduction in risk-taking is more pronounced for myopic managed firms or 
opaque firms. 
Furthermore, Essay Two adds to the literature that examines the impact of target firms’ 
responses on activism outcomes. It provides new evidence that management’s hostile 
resistance to activism would offset the initial effect of hedge fund activism, leading to 
a less pronounced reduction in firm risk-taking. Overall, the essay serves as a piece of 
negative evidence on hedge fund activism by highlighting its short-termism nature.  
1.5 Research outputs from the thesis 
Essay One: 
Hafeez, B., Kabir, M.H., & Wongchoti, U. Are retail investors really passive? Shareholder 
activism in the digital age. 
 Accepted for presentation at the conference Financial Management Association 
(FMA) Annual, New York, U.S., October 2020 (Virtual Conference) 
 Accepted for presentation at the 11th conference on Financial Markets and 
Corporate Governance, La Trobe University, April 2020 (Conference canceled) 
 Accepted for presentation at the 10th conference on Financial Markets and 
Corporate Governance, Macquarie University, April 2019 
 Accepted for presentation at the 9th conference on Financial Markets and 
Corporate Governance, La Trobe University, April 2018 
 Presented at Massey University Seminar Series, Palmerston North, 2019 
Essay Two: 
Hafeez, B., Kabir, M.H., & Wongchoti, U. Hedge fund activism and firm risk-taking. 
 Presented at Massey University Seminar Series, Palmerston North, 2020 
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1.6 An outline of the dissertation 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter Two provides a review of 
existing literature on shareholder activism based on the types of activists, including 
retail investors, traditional types of institutional investors and activist hedge funds as 
the latest prominent activist.  
Chapter Three and Chapter Four are the two main empirical essays included in this 
thesis. Chapter Three (Essay One) explores the role of retail investors during 
shareholder activism under the background of the digital age, and Chapter Four (Essay 
Two) examines the impact of hedge fund activism on firm risk-taking, covering all 
hedge fund activism events in the U.S. during the period 2000-2016.   
Chapter Five concludes the thesis by summarizing the key hypotheses, major findings, 
and policy implications. It also provides with limitation of this study, along with 




Chapter Two: Literature Review on Shareholder activism 
This chapter provides a literature review on shareholder activism. Section 2.1 provides 
an overview of shareholder activism, including the history of shareholder activism and 
the major types of activists. Section 2.2 discusses the importance of retail investors as 
activists. Section 2.3 focuses on institutional investors as traditional activists, who 
serve as the most prominent activists since the 1980s. This section explicitly discusses 
the driving forces, outcomes, and shortcomings of shareholder campaigns by 
conventional types of institutional investors. Section 2.4 provides a review of the 
studies on hedge fund activism. This section discusses the unique characteristics of 
hedge funds as an emerging activist, and presents empirical evidence on hedge fund 
activism. A relevant reference list is provided at the end of this thesis. 
2.1 Overview of shareholder activism 
In modern corporations, the separation of ownership and management leads to 
agency problems that managers’ interests diverge from those of the shareholders 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The board of directors plays a significant role in controlling 
such agency problems. The demand for shareholder activism arises when the board 
fails to perform the monitoring duties. Shareholder activism, or investor activism, is 
defined as “actions taken by shareholders with the explicit intention of influencing 
corporations’ policies and practices” (Goranova & Ryan, 2014).  
The current form of shareholder activism has a relatively short history. In 1942, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a rule that granted shareholders 
an opportunity to place certain types of proposals in the corporate proxy statements, 
which paved the way for the current Rule 14a-8 (SEC, 1942). This rule allowed 
shareholders to address the agency conflict, especially at large corporations. At the 
start of shareholder activism, the activists mainly aimed at improving firm 
performance or corporate governance, while in the 1970s, a lawsuit against Dow 
Chemical successfully called attention to issues other than performance (American 
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Society of Corporate Secretaries, 1953).  
Shareholder activism was dominated by retail investors at its outset, i.e. from 1942 till 
the end of the 1970s. Institutional investors, who held only 10% of U.S. equities 
outstanding in 1953, has increased exponentially in their ownership to around 70% in 
recent years (ProxyPulse, 2020). Hence, institutional investors started to play a more 
active role in corporate governance in the 1980s, with public pension funds and labor 
unions being the most active institutional investors (Gillan & Starks, 2007).  
Institutional shareholder activism has increased over time. The current wave of 
shareholder activism is fueled by changes in the market for corporate control (Qiu & 
Yu, 2009). The increase of various anti-takeover defenses paves the way to an 
alternative approach to discipline the managers or the market for corporate influence 
(Cheffins & Armour, 2011). On the other side, events like the tech-bubble, global 
financial crises, and Principles of Responsible Investments provide opportunities for 
shareholder to target firms.  
Moreover, shareholder activism has become a dynamic force and an incremental tool 
for corporate governance. In response to dissatisfaction with management, 
Shareholders communicate their displeasure using various channels, including in-
person meetings, emails, and letters to management. If their concerns are not 
adequately addressed, the shareholders submit a shareholder proposal. Under the SEC 
Rule 14a-8, a company is obligated to include the shareholder proposal in its proxy 
material (Form DEF-14A), and present for voting at the annual general meetings. In 
addition to shareholder proposal, large institutional shareholders are able to influence 
management by acquiring more than 5% beneficial ownership, in which case the 
institutional shareholders must furnish SEC-13D filing within ten days of acquiring the 
beneficial ownership. 
Activist shareholders seek to not only alter corporate strategy and improve 
performance (Song & Szewczyk, 2003; Westphal & Bednar, 2008), but also target other 
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key areas such as social, political and environmental issues (David, Bloom, & Hillman, 
2007). In this sense, shareholder activism can be broadly divided into two categories, 
namely financial activism and social activism. Financial activism primarily focuses on 
activism relating to corporate governance and financial performance, and the main 
focus of activism is value maximization (Thomas & Cotter, 2007; Goranova & Ryan, 
2014). Financial activism is regarded as “shareholder primacy”. In contrast, social 
activism deviates the focus from the financial outcomes, and considers activism 
relating to social, environment and political issues (Gillan & Starks, 2007). Social 
activism is regarded as “stakeholder primacy”. 
On one hand, research on financial activism, especially governance-related activism, 
is mainly based on the theoretical foundation in agency theory (Greenwood & Schor, 
2009; Edmans, Fang, & Zur, 2013). The majority of literature on financial activism deals 
with activists’ concerns on the issues such as management incentives (Marler & 
Faugère, 2010), CEO pay (Ertimur, Ferri, & Muslu, 2011; Cai & Walkling, 2011), 
corporate boards (Ertimur, Ferri, & Stubben, 2010; Marquardt & Wiedman, 2016), and 
shareholder rights (Van der Elst, 2012). More recently, hedge funds as the latest 
emergence on the activism stage, have rapidly gained prominence in financial activism. 
Unlike the traditional types of institutional investors, such as pension funds or mutual 
funds, which seek to reform governance deficiencies, hedge fund activism focuses 
more specifically on firms’ financial performance. It seeks more direct and immediate 
outcomes (Cheffins & Armour, 2011), such as increased share prices, operating 
performance, and other managerial actions (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, & Thomas, 2008).  
On the other hand, research on social activism is predominately based on stakeholder 
theory (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Goranova & Ryan, 2014). Literature on social 
activism explores the effect of activism on broader corporate outcomes and 
stakeholder issues, such as corporate social responsibility (David et al., 2007; 
Neubaum & Zahra, 2006; Chen, Dong & Lin, 2020), environmental issues (Monks, 
Miller, & Cook, 2004), human and animal rights, health and safety (Grewal, Serafeim 
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& Yoon, 2016; Baloria, Klassen, & Wiedman,2019; He, Kahraman, & Lowry 2018), and 
political activities (Clark & Crawford, 2012). In practice, both financial and social 
activists aim to deter or remedy managerial deficiencies. Activism acts as an 
expression of dissatisfaction with corporate governance, firm or corporate social 
performance (Becht, Franks, Mayer, & Rossi, 2009).  
The rest of this chapter is developed based on different types of activists. Section 2.2 
discusses the importance of retail investors in corporate governance. Section 2.3 
presents the monitoring role of traditional institutional investors during shareholder 
activism. Section 2.4 focuses on hedge funds as the latest player on the stage of 
shareholder activism.  
2.2 The importance of retail investors 
Throughout the history of corporations, retail shareholders were the most dominant 
type of owners until the shape rise of institutional ownership in the 1970s. Retail 
investors at odds with management were the pioneers who raised their voice against 
corporate malfeasance.  
The earliest example of shareholder activism, which was referred to as shareowner 
advocacy in the early years, could be traced to Isaac Le Maire, who sent a letter to the 
most powerful politician in the Netherlands and highlighted the shareholder abuse by 
Dutch East India Company (Koppell, 2011). Even after the advent of modern 
corporations with separated ownership, corporate control, and conflicting interests 
between shareholders and management (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976), retail investors were still pioneers at confronting corporations, aiming to 
influence governance and address social issues. The most notable example was related 
to the Gilbert brothers, who spearheaded several campaigns decades before pension 
funds and other institutional investors began confronting corporate management 
(Gillan & Stark, 2000).  
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The importance of retail investors has increased dramatically over the years, especially 
during the voting process. Management and the board of directors exercise significant 
discretion over corporate affairs. In order to preserve shareholder supremacy, all 
major decisions regarding organization need to be approved through shareholders’ 
voting during annual general meetings1. These voting rights provide shareholders with 
the power to assert control over the management and hold them accountable 
(Apostolides, 2010). In this sense, annual general meetings have been historically 
considered as a mechanism to regulate the agency conflict, in the absent of which, 
shareholders would lack the incentive to invest in corporations (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). At the annual general meetings, the voting rights 
serve as the most imperative control right for shareholders (Zingales, 1994). 
However, despite the importance of participating in the annual general meetings, 
retail investors are mostly absent from this proxy process. Retail investors, who 
individually hold only small fractions of a firm’s equity, often have little incentive to 
monitor management, especially when considering the time and efforts in the costly 
process of collecting information to make an intelligent voting decision. Prior studies 
indicate that retail investors exercise only one-third of their voting rights (ProxyPulse, 
2016). In other words, retail investors are traditionally considered as rationally 
apathetic towards the corporate proxy fight. Indeed, retail investors’ rational apathy is 
a natural result of the dispersion of ownership and diversification of investor portfolios 
in corporations (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1983). However, retail investors play an 
important role in monitoring management, and low retail investors’ participation can 
have detrimental consequences for corporation decision-making. 
Firstly, although retail investors individually account for only small fractions of a firm’s 
equity, when a substantial number of retail investors avoid voting, the aggregate 
                                                             
1 An annual general meeting provides shareholders with information on financial performance, and 
seeks shareholders’ consent on decisions and transactions, which are beyond the discretion of 
management. The annual general meeting also acts as a platform for shareholders to interact with one 
another as well as management (Strätling, 2003).  
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absence might distort the voting outcomes. The distortion often works in favor of 
management, and the distortion in favor of management occurs when absent retail 
investors are more likely to vote against management than the proportion of investors 
who participate in elections (Gulinello, 2010; Lee & Souther, 2020). It is also possible 
that the distortion is in favor of activists.  
Secondly, the absence of retail investors would also limit shareholders’ ability to 
initiate governance changes. The SEC Rule 14a-8 allows a shareholder who meets 
certain criteria2 to submit a proposal to be voted during an annual general meeting. 
During the past decade, shareholder proposals, although usually presented in a non-
binding form, have become an important mechanism to drive governance reforms. 
However, retail investors’ apathy would hinder the implementation of corporate 
governance changes, which require more than half of the votes outstanding or 
sometimes even more stringent criteria such as supermajority (Kastiel & Nili, 2016). In 
this sense, the absence of retail investors from the voting process might lead to a 
reduced number of votes in favor of potential governance changes. 
Thirdly, the non-participation of retail investors might also lead to deadlock situations, 
in which a governance change would not pass due to non-compliance with the 
minimum shareholder turnout, even when the change is desirable to both 
management and shareholders (Kastiel & Nili, 2016). In extreme cases called “frozen 
charters”, corporations would not be able to amend their charter despite receiving 
more than 90% support owing to either low shareholder turnout or quorum 
requirement (Hirst, 2017).  
Moreover, the regulatory and governance changes over the past decade, along with 
the rise of shareholder activism, have significantly highlighted the importance of retail 
investors’ votes. With institutional shareholders voting more than 90% of their shares 
                                                             
2 The criteria includes holding at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company’s securities. 




held, the retail investor’s votes can significantly influence voting outcomes, which is 
especially important in a close proxy contest. A famous example is the proxy fight 
between DuPont Co. and Trian Fund Management LP in 2015, in which case DuPont’s 
management successfully defended its position against one of the most influential 
activist hedge funds by reaching out to its retail investors. Furthermore, proxy advisors’ 
increasing importance also leads corporations to pay closer attention to approved 
shareholder proposals. Specifically, proxy advisors recommend an “against vote” on 
the re-election of directors if management ignores approved shareholder proposals. 
This essentially transforms non-binding shareholder proposals into “quasi-binding” 
proposals (Choi, Fisch, & Kahan, 2010; Kastiel & Nili, 2016). There is also evidence that 
retail investors’ participation can make a difference even when shareholder campaigns 
are not “successful” (e.g. Ertimur, Ferri, & Muslu, 2010; Iliev, Lins, Miller, & Roth, 2015).  
Notably, the advancement of information technology in recent years has changed the 
environment of shareholder activism. The internet has emerged as a leading source of 
information on firm performance, press releases, annual reports, and other SEC 
reports (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Drake, Thornock, & Twedt, 2017; Lei, Li, & Luo, 2019), 
and it has dramatically reduced the time and cost of acquiring information especially 
for retail investors (Bimber, Flanagin, & Stohl, 2005). Hence, this affects retail investors’ 
willingness to engage in activism. The ease of gathering information has prompted 
several research studies on retail investors’ attention in recent years (e.g., Da, 
Engelberg, & Gao, 2011; Drake, Roulstone, & Thornock, 2012). 
In conclusion, retail investors’ rational apathy is primarily stemmed from dispersed 
ownership. Activist investors bear all the costs associated with monitoring, while the 
benefits are shared among all shareholders (Grossman & Hart, 1980). With small 
fractions of equity held, retail investors historically choose to be rationally apathetic. 
However, anecdotal examples have highlighted the increasing importance of retail 
investors’ participation in the proxy contest during the past decades. There are limited 
studies on retail investors’ participation in existing corporate governance literature, 
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especially regarding information technology advancement that facilitates information 
collection. 
2.3 Institutional investors as a traditional activist                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
2.3.1 The growing role of institutional investors 
Institutional activism expanded greatly in the 1980s, as mentioned in Sub-section 2.1. 
Until the recent emergence of hedge funds, public pension funds and labor unions are 
the most active institutional investors (Gillan & Starks, 2007).  
According to Hirschman (1970), in response to dissatisfaction with management, 
institutional investors have two options, either to engage with management and effect 
change (namely “voice” or direct intervention) or to sell the shares (namely “exit” or 
“voting with their feet”). The threat of exit can discipline management (e.g. Admati & 
Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009; Edmans & Manso, 2011). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
also propose that large shareholders serve as a solution to the free-rider problem, as 
indicated in Grossman and Hart (1980). Subsequently, prior studies provide substantial 
theoretical and empirical evidence on the monitoring role of institutional investors (e.g. 
Kahn & Winton, 1998; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Almazan & Suarez, 2003; Hartzell 
& Starks, 2003). 
Research on shareholder activism is a vibrantly published topic in top management, 
finance, and accounting journals in recent years. A significant strand of literature is 
developed on institutional investors as activist shareholders, focusing on their 
motivations and effects.  
2.3.2 Driving forces of shareholder activism 
Prior studies have widely examined the reasons that make a firm prone to be targeted. 
Shareholder activism is initially a response to the agency conflict in large publicly 
traded companies, and thus the demand for activism arises from managerial 
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deficiencies, mostly the firm-level characteristics. In addition, the driving forces of 
shareholder activism also consist of activist-level and environmental characteristics 
(Ryan & Schneider, 2002). Amongst these three drivers, the firm-level characteristics 
are the most commonly tested by empirical studies. 
2.3.2.1 Firm-level characteristics 
The firm-level antecedents generally include firm size, firm performance, and other 
corporate-governance oriented explanations. Traditionally, institutional investors 
usually target large firms (Ertimur et al., 2011; Cai & Walkling, 2011). This is consistent 
with the agency problem that it is more difficult for shareholders to effectively monitor 
large firms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Activists could create more value by targeting 
large firms (Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999). Alternatively, social activism also prefers to 
target large firms. Large firms are more visible (Rehbein, Waddock, & Graves, 2004), 
and thus targeting them would attract more attention from the public and media, 
leading to spillover effects to non-targeted firms (Ferri & Sandino, 2009), or attracting 
more public’s support (Rehbein et al., 2004).  
Regarding the performance of target firms, prior empirical studies find mixed results 
on the relationship between firm performance and shareholder activism. Some 
researchers find that underperforming firms are usually more attractive to shareholder 
activists (Renneboog & Szilagyi, 2011; Ertimur et al., 2011), consistent with agency 
theory. Firms with worse stock market performance are also more likely to be targeted 
(Wahal, 1996; Bradley, Brav, Goldstein, & Jiang, 2010; Renneboog & Szilagyi, 2011). 
Based on accounting measures of performance, firms with the lower return to sales, 
sales growth (Karpoff, Malatesta, & Walkling, 1996), or return on assets (Wahal, 1996; 
Ertimur et al., 2011) are more likely to be targeted by the activists. Furthermore, 
several papers indicate that firms’ cash holdings contribute to shareholder activism, 
particularly when they have lower wealth distribution (Faleye, 2004). In line with 
agency theory, managers prefer to spend cash on value-decreasing investments rather 
than distributing cash to shareholders (Jensen, 1986). In contrast, several studies find 
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an insignificant relation between stock or operating performance and shareholder 
activism (Smith, 1996; Carleton, Nelson, & Weisbach, 1998; Ferri & Sandino, 2009).  
Moreover, prior studies also find that ownership structure, executive compensation, 
and independent boards would also explain corporate governance-related activism 
targets. Consistent with agency theory, managers who have higher levels of ownership 
tend to be more responsible for their decision-making, and thus firms with higher 
managerial ownership are less likely to be targeted by shareholder activists (Carleton 
et al., 1998; Bizjak & Marquette, 1998; Faleye, 2004; Prevost & Rao, 2000). The 
misalignment between firm performance and executive compensation might also lead 
to shareholder activism (Ferri & Sandino, 2009; Ertimur et al., 2011; Cai & Walkling, 
2011). Moreover, there is also evidence of a positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and shareholder activism (Carleton et al., 1998; Bizjak & Marquette, 1998; 
Renneboog & Szilagyi, 2011). The greater shareholding by institutions lowers the cost 
of activism, and thus these firms are more prone to be targeted by the activists 
(Prevost & Rao, 2000).  
The existence of independent boards is also considered as a firm-level antecedent. 
Prior studies find mixed results regarding the relationship between independent 
boards and the agency conflict. Theoretically, more independent boards could reduce 
agency problems (Fama & Jensen, 1983), and those firms are less likely to be targeted 
(Prevost & Rao, 2000). However, empirical studies find that firms with more 
independent boards tend to be attractive to shareholder activists (Ertimur et al., 2011). 
A possible explanation could be that the activists might expect more independent 
boards to be more responsive.  
To conclude, the overall evidence suggests that large firms or firms suffering from poor 
performance are more likely to attract activists’ attention. Such activism seems to be 
motivated by attempts to improve firm performance. Moreover, other firm-level 
characteristics, such as ownership structure and executive compensation, are also 
significantly associated with shareholder activism. 
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2.3.2.2 Other characteristics 
Prior research findings suggest that activist shareholders would target firms for 
reasons other than the firm-level characteristics. Goranova and Ryan (2014) argue that 
only focusing on the firm-level characteristics would tell a partial story of shareholder 
activism at best and a misleading one at worst. Activist-level characteristics, such as 
activists’ interests, identity, concerns, and considerations, prove to be among the 
imperative factors in targeting firms (Ryan & Schneider, 2002; Sikavica & Hillman, 
2008).  
Activists’ ability and incentive to engage in shareholder activism are affected by 
activism costs. Ertimur et al. (2011) find that low-cost activism tools are positively 
associated with the frequency of compensation-related activism. The 1992 SEC proxy 
reform aims to increase investors’ communication ability during a proxy contest, and 
in turn, lowering the activism costs (Choi, 2000). Business relationships with target 
firms (Romano, 2001), investment portfolio characteristics, and investment horizons 
(Rubach & Sebora, 2009) also affect shareholders’ willingness to engage in activism.  
Stakeholder salience also contributes to the success of shareholder engagements 
(James & Gifford, 2010). Shareholders expect better returns on the activism 
investments. Hence, the shareholders are more willing to engage in activism if they 
can negotiate with corporate managers or gain support from other shareholders 
(Greenwood & Schor, 2009; Chowdhury & Wang, 2009). James and Gifford (2010) 
show that a strong business case and the values of target firms’ managers are the most 
important contributors to stakeholder salience. Activists’ interests and social identity 
can also explain why a firm is targeted (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003).  
The macro-environment can also explain the rise of shareholder activism, 
development and constraints, namely the environmental characteristics. With the 
concentration of shareholdings of U.S. corporations into institutional investors’ hands 
in the past few decades, it is expected that institutional investors can not only monitor 
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management more effectively but they are also able to seek changes in corporations’ 
social-political environment and organizational legitimacy (Davis & Thompson, 1994; 
Zajac & Westphal, 1995). The 1992 SEC proxy reform that enhances shareholders’ 
ability to communicate during a proxy contest also provides a more favorable 
environment for shareholder activism (Choi, 2000).  
2.3.3 Effectiveness of shareholder activism 
Measuring the effectiveness of shareholder activism is a difficult task. Gillan and Starks 
(2007) identify different ways of evaluating such activism’s effectiveness, including 
short-term market reactions, long-term performance, voting outcomes on 
shareholder activism, voting on management proposals, and other potential changes 
in target firms. The majority of empirical research focuses on the effects of activism on 
the firm value, which is typically measured by the changes in stock prices around the 
announcement date of the activism. 
Firstly, prior studies widely investigate the impact of shareholder activism on the firm 
value and performance. In most studies, researchers find a negative but insignificant 
abnormal stock return in a short event window around the announcement date (e.g., 
Carleton et al., 1998; Becht et al., 2009; Cai & Walking, 2011). Exceptions include 
Prevost and Rao (2000) which report a significantly negative average stock return two 
days around the proxy mailing date, and Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011) which report 
a significantly positive stock price reaction around the event window. A potential 
explanation for the equivocal findings resides in the difficulty in deciding the exact date 
when investors are being informed that a firm has been targeted by activists. Empirical 
research usually considers the proxy mailing date as the earliest release of shareholder 
proposals, while the proposals are generally negotiated between corporate managers 
and activists before their appearance in a proxy statement. The release of proposals 
thus might or might not lead to the reassessment of a firm’s value. Moreover, some 
shareholder proposals are advisory in nature, which do not necessarily lead to changes 
in the target firms’ value. Cai and Walkling (2011) show that the market reactions to 
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shareholder activism are associated with the implementation of the proposals. 
The effects of shareholder activism might also show up slowly and gradually over time. 
Prior studies also examine the long-term performance of target firms, both operating 
performance and long-term stock return, to investigate the gradual effects of such 
activism. However, prior studies cannot find consistent evidence on the improvements 
in firms’ long-term performance. Some studies find a significant improvement in firms’ 
operating and stock performance (Del Guercio, Seery, & Woidtke, 2008), while others 
find significant underperformance after the activism (Prevost & Rao, 2000). Some 
studies even find insignificant changes in firm performance (Wahal, 1996; Del Guercio 
& Hawkins, 1999; Song & Szewczyk, 2003; Gillan & Starks, 2007). A probable 
explanation is that these studies primarily focus on governance-related activism, 
which does not report a consistent relation with firms’ performance (Daily, Dalton, & 
Cannella, 2003).  
Secondly, the investigation of voting outcomes is another way to evaluate the 
effectiveness of shareholder activism. Shareholder proposals are usually voted during 
an annual general meeting or through other proxy processes, and management cannot 
adopt the proposal in the absence of the majority support. An increase in voting 
support is associated with factors, such as type of issues addressed in the proposals 
(Gordon & Pound, 1993; Bizjak & Marquette, 1998), sponsor identity (Gordon & Pound, 
1993; Haan, 2016), business ties with target firms (Davis & Kim, 2007; Calluzzo & Kedia, 
2019), insider ownership (Gordon & Pound, 1993), institutional ownership (Gordon & 
Pound, 1993), governance or management structure (Agrawal, 2012; Butler & Gurun, 
2012; Iliev et al., 2015), and past firm performance (Iliev et al., 2015). Specifically, 
proposals involving rescind poison pills and relax supermajority amendment, 
proposals sponsored by public funds, and firms’ proposals with fewer insider or worse 
firm performance are likely to get more favorable votes. Shareholder voting is an 
effective mechanism for exercising governance or sharping corporate practices 
(Thomas & Cotter, 2007; Iliev et al., 2015).  
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The third strand of literature focuses on the impact of shareholder activism, mostly 
governance-related proposals, on target firms’ corporate governance features and 
executive compensation. However, empirical results are mixed. Wu (2004) and Del 
Guercio et al. (2008) find an increase in board and management turnover following 
direct negotiation, while Karpoff et al. (1996), Smith (1996), and Del Guercio et al. 
(1999) argue that target firms do not experience a high CEO turnover following 
activism using shareholder proposals. Notably, target firms would adopt specific 
governance changes by activists, and prior literature indicates that activists achieve at 
least modest success in this regard (Denes et al., 2017).  
Regarding the impact on executive compensation, earlier studies find little effect of 
compensation-related shareholder proposals submitted under the SEC Rule 14a-8 on 
CEO pay (Thomas & Martin, 1998), while compensation-related shareholder proposals 
have changed gradually since the 1990s (Gillan & Starks, 2007). The House of 
Representatives passed the “say-on-pay” Bill in 2007, allowing shareholders to have 
an annual advisory vote on executive compensation. In adiition, “vote-no” campaigns 
that intend to obtain changes in executive pay also become more frequent. Ertimur et 
al. (2011) find a significant relationship between the “vote-no” campaigns and the 
reduction of excess CEO pay. Cai and Walkling (2011) also indicate that “say-on-pay” 
proposals create value in companies with inefficient compensation.  
Another strand of literature argues that shareholder activism can also affect firms’ 
corporate social performance. David et al. (2007) discuss two competing arguments 
on the relation between shareholder activism and corporate social performance, 
namely disciplining or signaling. From the “disciplining” perspective, activism serves a 
disciplining role to pressure the managers to improve subsequent corporate social 
performance, as implied by Johnson and Greening (1999). In contrast, from the 
“signaling” perspective, shareholder proposals essentially signal management’s 
reluctance to enhance corporate social performance (Prevost & Rao, 2000). Empirical 
results in David et al. (2007) are consistent with the “signaling” argument that 
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shareholder proposals negatively affect subsequent corporate social performance. 
Chen, Dong, and Lin (2020) also find that institutional investors can influence firms’ 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) through CSR-related proposals and that 
institutional shareholders can generate real social impact. 
Furthermore, in addition to the firm-level outcomes, prior studies also find that 
shareholder activism would affect firms’ environmental or ethical issues, mainly when 
the firms are targeted by social or environmental shareholder proposals (Reid & Toffel, 
2009). Moreover, some researchers also find that even if a particular firm is not an 
activism target itself, the shareholder activism events at peer firms might still cause a 
spillover effect, as firms tend to respond to shareholder activism at their competitors 
(Ferri & Sandino, 2009).  
To summarize, prior empirical results generally conclude that institutional investors as 
traditional activists prompt firms to adopt specific but limited governance structure 
changes. There is mixed evidence on the impact of non-hedge fund activism on firm 
value and performance.  
2.3.4 Shortcomings of institutional investors as traditional activists 
There is also evidence that institutional investors as traditional activists, might have 
constraints in their monitoring role. The incentives and capabilities for monitoring 
might differ among different types of institutional investors. On one hand, corporate 
pension funds or insurance companies are less likely to undertake activism against 
other corporations, particularly in corporations with business relations, as institutional 
investors may feel compelled to vote with management (Gillan & Starks, 2007). In 
other words, institutional investors may face potential conflicts of interest in their 
monitoring role (Romano, 1993). 
On the other hand, being one of the significant activists, public pension funds have 
been praised for their shareholders’ interest advocacy, while prior literature also 
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provides evidence that the incentives of decision-makers at public pension funds might 
not align with the value-increasing objectives (Gillan & Starks, 2007; Woidtke, Bierman, 
& Tuggle, 2003). Woidtke (2002) finds that corporate values are positively related to 
private pension fund ownership but negatively related to public pension fund 
ownership. An explanation is that the political and social influences of public pension 
fund managers might diverge from the focus on shareholder value maximization. 
In general, there is acknowledgment that institutional investors have conflicts of 
interest in acting their monitoring role as activists. This might contribute to the 
emergence of activist hedge funds, which are considered to have a less conflicting 
interest.  
2.4 Hedge funds as an emerging activist 
2.4.1 Definition of hedge fund activism 
The last two decades have seen a tremendous growth of hedge fund assets under 
management, from US$118 billion in 1997 to US$3.1 trillion in 2019 (Rudden, 2020). 
This leads to the creation of more hedge funds and a subsequent increase in hedge 
fund activism. Hedge funds have now emerged as a new class of active monitors in 
corporate management, providing shareholders with an alternative channel to 
influence managerial decisions (Denes et al., 2017).  
There is no universally accepted definition of hedge funds, with 14 different definitions 
selected by the SEC roundtable on hedge funds3. Based on these selected definitions, 
hedge funds are usually characterized in the following aspects. Firstly, hedge funds are 
pooled investment vehicle that is privately organized. Secondly, hedge funds are 
administered by professional investment managers, who are paid by performance-
based compensations. Thirdly, hedge funds are generally not widely available to the 
public. Fourthly, hedge funds operate outside the stringent regulations and restrictions 
                                                             
3 Available at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-vaughn.htm  
24 
 
as imposed on other institutional investors (Partnoy & Thomas, 2006). In other words, 
hedge funds are not subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940 by involving a 
relatively small number of sophisticated investors (Brav et al., 2008).  
Hedge fund activism has also evolved over time. During the 1980s, activist hedge funds 
started pursuing activism, mostly through hostile takeovers and tender offers, which 
are currently considered as the most expensive activism form. Over the years, instead 
of relying on tender offers, activist hedge funds mostly employ proxy contests with the 
support of other shareholders, seeking to bring about changes in target firms. In hedge 
fund activism, activist hedge funds need to file an SEC-13D within ten days to disclose 
their ownership, if the activist hedge funds acquire more than 5% beneficial ownership 
in the target firms. This serves as a first signal of activism. Evidence shows that activist 
hedge funds would be successful at influencing the target firms once acquiring 5% or 
more beneficial ownership (Brav et al., 2008). In more recent years, non-13D activism 
presents an exciting evolution of hedge fund activism. There has been a steady 
increase in campaigns during which activist hedge funds do not file the SEC-13D 
(namely ownership level of 5% or less). These non-13D filing campaigns generally 
target significantly larger firms (Bebchuk, Brav, Jiang, & Keusch, 2020). Meanwhile, the 
importance of communication has increased considerably over the years, represented 
by a continuous decline in non-publicly disclosed activism (Bebchuk et al., 2020; Kraut, 
Mukhopadhyay, Szczypula, Kiesler, & Scherlis, 1998). As activist hedge funds mostly 
rely on support from other shareholders, effective communication between activists 
and other shareholders is central to rally support from other shareholders. 
In contrast to retail investors or other types of institutional investors, activist hedge 
funds focus more on direct interventions to improve financial performance with 
immediate outcomes. The success of activist hedge funds in reshaping corporate 
democracy is attributed to their unique standing in contrast to other types of 
institutional investors, including sophisticated and professional investment 
management (Brav et al., 2008). Moreover, as hedge funds can operate outside the 
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regulations imposed on institutional investors, they can concentrate investment in 
fewer companies and expand influence using leverage. Hence, hedge fund activism 
has now been recognized as a key mechanism in the market of corporate influence. 
2.4.2 Empirical evidence of hedge fund activism  
There are several strands of the empirical literature on hedge fund activism. A 
summary of relevant research is provided in Denes et al. (2017). The first strand of 
literature, which is also the most well-established literature, examines the effects of 
hedge fund activism on target firm value. Most of the prior studies find evidence that 
hedge fund activism significantly increases target firms’ value in the short-term (Brav 
et al., 2008; Brav, Jiang, & Kim, 2015; Klein & Zur, 2009).  
However, prior literature finds mixed results regarding the long-term effects of hedge 
fund activism on firm value. Some studies show that target firms experience positive 
long-term economic consequences post activism, with significant increases in 
abnormal returns or production efficiency (e.g., Klein & Zur, 2009; Greenwood & Schor, 
2009). Other researchers find additional evidence. Clifford (2008) finds positive but 
statistically insignificant long-term returns. More recently, deHaan, Larcker, & McClure 
(2019) also find an insignificant difference in pre-and post-activism long-term returns. 
This is consistent with the argument of myopic management that short-termism tends 
to create short-term value at the expense of long-term performance. 
The second strand of literature examines the impact of hedge fund activism on other 
features of target firms, such as earning, operation, and governance features. Most 
researchers find evidence that stock performance, operating performance, or payout 
of earnings significantly improve post hedge fund intervention (Brav et al., 2008; 
Clifford, 2008; Brav, Jiang, & Kim, 2009; Boyson & Mooradian, 2011). Return on assets, 
return on sales, return on equity, and cash flows from the operation are common 
proxies for operating performance. On the contrary, some literature finds insignificant 
changes in profitability of hedge fund targets regarding return on assets or cash flows 
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from operation (Klein & Zur, 2009). Additionally, Cheng, Huang, Li, and Stanfield (2012) 
document an increase in tax avoidance post-activism. For governance features, hedge 
fund activism is associated with the highest organizational change rates than other 
types of shareholder activism (Denes et al., 2017).  
Hedge fund activism also impacts capital expenditures and corporate innovation. 
There is some evidence that target firms’ capital expenditures drop significantly post 
hedge fund activism (Greenwood & Schor, 2009; Brav et al., 2015). An explanation 
provided by Brav et al. (2015) is that capital reallocation is an essential channel for 
value creation and productivity improvement. Brav, Jiang, Ma, and Tian (2018) also 
provide evidence that target firms experience a reduction in R&D expenditures, while 
their innovation output increases significantly post activism. 
In addition to the numerous studies that document the positive impacts of hedge fund 
activism on firm-level characteristics, Chen and Jung (2016) and Flugum and Howe 
(2020) are amongst the few studies that report the negative consequences of activism. 
Chen and Jung (2016) report that target firms tend to reduce financial guidance and 
relevant information after investment by activist hedge funds, while the authors 
interpret the reduction as an unintended consequence of activism. Flugum and Howe 
(2020) focus on analyst earnings forecasts, and they show a decline in analyst forecasts’ 
accuracy and activity post activism. These results suggest an increase in analyst 
uncertainty post hedge fund intervention, limiting analysts’ ability to add value in this 
setting. 
To examine why firms get targeted, the third strand of literature focuses on firm-level 
characteristics that attract activist hedge funds. In general, activist hedge funds tend 
to target more “value” firms, typically with poor performance. Almost all the empirical 
studies, with the only exception of Klein and Zur (2009), report the finding that target 
firms have significantly lower stock performance relative to the market or control firms 
(e.g., Brav et al., 2008; Clifford, 2008; Boyson & Mooradian, 2011; Bebchuk et al., 2015). 
Proxied by book-based measures of performance, there is also consistent evidence 
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that activist hedge funds tend to target firms with a low level of sales (Brav et al., 2008; 
Brav et al., 2009; Boyson & Mooradian, 2011) or a low market-to-book ratio (Brav et 
al., 2008; Clifford, 2008; Klein & Zur, 2011). Notably, firms with higher profitability 
(return on assets or return on equity) are more likely to attract hedge fund activism 
(e.g., Brav et al., 2008; Clifford, 2008; Brav et al., 2009; Klein & Zur, 2009, 2011; Boyson 
& Mooradian, 2011; Boyson, Gantchev, & Shivdasani, 2017). 
Other firm-level characteristics also explain the reasons that firms get targeted. Prior 
studies generally agree that activist hedge funds are more likely to target smaller firms 
(measured by the book value of assets or market value of equity), firms with higher 
institutional ownership, firms with a smaller amount of R&D expenditures, or firms 
with lower dividend yield (Brav et al., 2008; Clifford, 2008; Boyson & Mooradian, 2011; 
Klein & Zur, 2009, 2011). In other words, hedge funds are less likely to acquire a 
sizeable firm, which might create massive portfolio risk even for activist hedge funds 
(Brav et al., 2008). Higher institutional ownership in target firms also provides an easier 
channel for activist hedge funds to communicate, owing to the existence of fewer but 
larger shareholders. Apart from these characteristics, Boyson et al. (2017) and Norli, 
Ostergaard, and Schindele (2015) argue that firms with higher share liquidity are more 
likely to get targeted, as the liquidity facilitates activist hedge funds’ acquisition of 
shares.  
Overall, shareholder activism has developed into a useful mechanism to “monitor the 
monitor” (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972), with hedge funds emerging as the latest activist. 
Shareholder activism as a whole makes a significant contribution to improve 
monitoring and reduce agency costs. The past few decades have seen advancement in 
relevant academic research, while there are several potentials for empirical studies. 
Retail investors and hedge funds as activist shareholders are relatively less studied in 




Chapter Three: Essay One: Are retail investors really passive? 
Shareholder activism in the digital age 
This chapter presents the first essay of the thesis, which explores the role of retail 
investors in corporate governance with the arrival of digital age. Covering all 
shareholder activism events in the U.S. between 2005 and 2016, this study examines 
the dynamics of retail investors’ attention before annual general meetings and its 
impact on subsequent participation in the voting process. A brief overview of this 
study is presented in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 overviews the literature and develops the 
hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the data and key variables used in this study. Section 
3.4 presents models and reports the core empirical results. Section 3.5 provides the 
robustness tests, and Section 3.6 concludes. An appendix to this chapter and the 






Are retail investors really passive? 
Shareholder activism in the digital age 
Abstract 
Academics traditionally view retail investors as rationally apathetic towards corporate 
proxy fights due to their higher cost of individual information gathering and the 
inability to collectively coordinate. In the wake of the digital age and social media, this 
study re-examines retail investors’ attention and their participation during the 
shareholder activism process. Using a sample covering the period 2005-2016, this 
study finds that abnormal Google Search activities (a proxy for retail investors’ 
attention in literature) on tickers of firms that receive a shareholder proposal increase 
significantly during the three weeks leading up to the voting and this increase is more 
pronounced for less transparent firms. The textual analyses of proxy statements also 
show that attention increases for proposals with more negative or controversial tone. 
Importantly, retail investors’ attention leads to higher participation in the voting 
process, especially among proposals that resonate with shareholders’ preferences and 
interests (high salience activism). This study also finds that the higher participation by 
the retail investors is positively associated with the level of institutional ownership. 
Finally, even though the overall participation did not increase, this study shows that 
investors’ sentiment resulted in higher participation for high salience proposals after 
E-proxy regulation became fully effective in 2009. Overall, this study highlights the role 
of information technology in mitigating retail investors’ apathy issues. 
Keywords: Shareholder activism, retail investors’ attention, information asymmetry, E-
proxy, rational apathy 
It has become commonplace to hear the corporate 
proxy voting system described as “broken” or 
“dysfunctional,” yet its most fundamental defect is 
mostly ignored: the absence of retail investor 
participation.  If the voters from an entire region of the 
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country – say the Southwest – did not show up at the 
polls for presidential elections, most would agree that 
there was a problem. At the very time when 
shareholders are calling for greater access to the 
corporate proxy, it is more important than ever that 
proxy voting represent the views of all shareholder 
constituencies in rough proportion to their numbers.  
– Frank G. Zarb Jr. & John Endean4  
3.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance literature typically views the non-participation of retail 
investors in the corporate proxy fight (e.g., retail investors’ apathy) as a rational lost 
cause and thus a given (e.g., Kastiel & Nili, 2016). Retail investors, who hold only small 
fractions of a firm’s equity, are traditionally considered to lack the incentive to engage 
in management. This lack of interest is attributed to the time and cost involved in 
becoming informed and the relatively small marginal benefit they could earn from 
making an informed decision. As a result, the traditional view suggests that retail 
investors choose to become rationally ignorant. Perceived as unsolvable, the corporate 
governance problems caused by rationally apathetic investors are relatively less 
studied in corporate governance literature. 
Traditionally, battle lines were drawn between incumbent management and large 
institutional shareholders. But recent evidence has shown that retail investors’ 
attention and their participation in corporate proxy fight are specifically not negligible, 
especially with the surge in competition for corporate control. For example, the proxy 
fight between Nelson Peltz and P&G, dubbed as the most expensive shareholder 
activism campaign with a cost of over 100 million dollars, was decided by a margin of 
0.0016% of votes cast (Benoit, 2017). As a premise, mutual funds, the largest of 
institutional investors, collectively own about 22% of stocks outstanding and have a 
fiduciary duty to vote (Duan & Jiao, 2016). In contrast, with a staggering 30% 
                                                             
4 Restoring Balance in Proxy Voting: The Case for “Client Directed Voting” from the Harvard Law School 





ownership in listed firms across the U.S., retail investors only exercise one third of their 
voting rights. In other words, retail investors present a massive pool of untapped 
voting power to tip the scales during shareholder activism. Over the years, the retail 
investors have taken center stage in deciding the outcomes of the most prolific activist 
campaigns. 
Hence, this study argues that it is imperative to revisit the retail investors’ apathy 
issues with the arrival of the digital age. As retail investors are less sophisticated than 
their institutional counterparts in generating relevant research, they are more likely to 
use existing and public sources to gather information to make an informed decision. 
The advancement of technology and the advent of the internet disproportionately 
benefit retail investors, significantly reducing their time and cost of making informed 
decisions. In this context, the participation of retail investors in shareholder activism 
is noteworthy. As an incremental tool for corporate governance, shareholder activism 
enables retail shareholders to express their dissatisfaction by submitting proposals for 
voting at the annual general meetings. Despite the non-binding nature of shareholder 
activism, it has emerged as a potent mechanism to influence managerial behaviors. 
This study starts the empirical investigation by exploring the role of the internet in 
alleviating retail investors’ apathy. The internet is undisputedly amongst the leading 
source of information. As Google’s search engine accounts for more than 88% of all 
internet searches originating in the U.S., this study employs the proprietary data of 
Google Trends (referred to Google Search Volume Index, or GSVI5 hereof) as a proxy 
for retail investors’ attention. Compared to proxies for retail investors’ attention such 
as news coverage, extreme returns, and trading volume, GSVI can capture the demand 
side of information6. Following Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011), Drake, Roulstone, and 
                                                             
5 GSVI is a measure which provides an index based the number of daily searches by users on a certain 
term or topic on Google’s search engine, which indicates the propensity to search for that certain 
term/topic. More details are provided in Section 3.2.1 and Section 3.3. 
6 According to Ben-Rephael et al. (2017), institutional investors usually acquire information and news 
of specific stocks on Bloomberg terminals (and other proprietary platforms like Thomson Reuters, 
FactSet etc.), and the mostly common Terminal users include portfolio/fund/investment managers, 
analysts, traders, executives, directors, presidents, and managing directors (i.e., institutional investors). 
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Thornock (2012), and Ben-Rephael, Da, and Israelsen (2017), this study argues that 
GSVI is an ideal proxy for exploring the dynamics of retail investors’ attention and their 
demand for information, especially around shareholder activism. 
Taking into account all the available shareholder activism events in the U.S. during the 
2005-2016 period, the empirical results show that firms that receive a shareholder 
proposal (i.e. target firms) have 1.5% more attention before the annual general 
meetings relative to their matched control firms (namely firms without shareholders 
proposals). Focusing on target firms only, retail investors’ attention for target firms 
increases by 1.8% before the annual general meetings, and this increase is more 
pronounced for less transparent firms, which is 2.6% higher relative to more 
transparent firms. The results are meaningful, given that Drake et al. (2012) reported 
a 1.3% increase in GASVI six days prior to an earnings announcement. Moreover, 
campaign-level characteristics also impact retail shareholders’ attention. Specifically, 
the negative tone in proxy materials results in higher retail investors’ attention. These 
findings are robust after controlling for the earnings announcement effect.  
Does attention materialize into actions? To better understand the impact of retail 
investors’ attention on their (proxy fight) participation behavior, this study uses the 
existing theories related to voter turnout in political science literature. In doing so, this 
study finds that high salience activism7 is more likely to motivate retail investors to 
participate in shareholder activism. By examining the retail investors’ non-
participation rate in the voting process, the empirical findings show that the 
incremental non-participation rate by retail investors decreases significantly (i.e. the 
participation rate increases significantly) for firms targeted with high salience 
proposals. The result is more pronounced for less transparent firms relative to 
                                                             
On the contrary, retail investors are more likely to collect information from the internet. In this sense, 
GSVI serves as a direct measure of retail investors’ attention which captures the demand of information 
from retail investors. 
7 In this paper, several types of proposals are identified as high salience proposals, namely closely 
contested governance proposals, social and environmental related proposals and governance related 
proposals for firms in financial distress. Firms that receive these types of proposals are collectively 
considered to experience high salience activism. 
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transparent firms. In other words, retail investors respond more actively to issues that 
resonate with them. This study also documents that investors’ participation in the 
voting process is significantly higher for firms with higher institutional ownership, 
implying that such participation positively correlates with the target’s institutional 
ownership during high salience activism. Lastly, this study explores whether the 
implications of E-proxy legislation and the electronic dissemination of proxy materials 
have real consequences to retail investors’ participation during shareholder activism. 
The empirical evidence indicates that the introduction of E-proxy resulted in higher 
retail investors’ attention, leading to higher participation during high salience activism, 
even though the overall participation did not increase, consistent with predictions of 
Cvijanović, Groen-Xu, and Zachariadis (2020).  
This study contributes to the existing literature in the following aspects. Firstly, this 
study adds to the literature on retail investors’ apathy and provides new evidence on 
institutional ownership of the firm targeted with high salience proposals in mitigating 
retail investors’ apathy problems. With the use of GSVI and its ability to capture the 
demand side of information, this study documents how retail investors use the 
information to make an informed decision during shareholder activism, especially if 
the targeted issues resonate with their preferences. Moreover, this study also provides 
evidence regarding the content of proxy materials. The empirical evidence suggests 
that a more controversial tone gets more attention from retail shareholders during 
shareholder activism. 
Secondly, this study adds to the literature on shareholder governance and provides 
new insights into the “voice” aspect following Hirschman’s (1970) framework of “voice 
or exit” in response to dissatisfaction with management. In other words, this study 
provides evidence that retail investors use their voting power to engage with 
management and the board when they are dissatisfied with management. More 
importantly, this study is amongst the few empirical studies that explore retail 
investors’ voting, particularly Brav, Cain, and Zytnick (2019) and Geoffary (2018), 
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providing a new lens to look at retail investors’ participation by exploring the impact 
of technological and regulatory improvements in the digital age. This study also 
highlights that shareholders’ preferences are pivotal in the voting process, consistent 
with Cvijanović et al. (2020) and Brav et al. (2019). 
Thirdly, this paper adds to the literature on corporate transparency, information flow, 
and decision making, and it is the first paper to document how firm-level information 
transparency impacts retail investors’ attention and participation during shareholder 
activism. This study finds a more significant increase in retail investors’ attention and 
subsequent participation for less informationally transparent firms. Furthermore, this 
study also provides evidence on the enabling role of E-proxy regulation as an effective 
tool to increase retail investors’ participation, even though overall participation did not 
increase. 
Overall, this study provides new evidence that stands in contrast to the traditional 
perception of retail investors as apathetic. With the advancement of information 
technology in the digital age, retail investors can and do engage in monitoring through 
the voting process. In general, this study provides implications for policymakers, 
corporations, and activist shareholders by highlighting the role of information 
technology in the digital age, providing actionable insights into retail shareholders’ 
behavior and decision-making around shareholder activism.  
The rest of this chapter’s organization is as follows. Section 3.2 reviews relevant 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the data and key 
variables used in this study. Section 3.4 and Section 3.5 report the core results and 
robustness results, respectively. Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
3.2.1 Information, attention, and retail investors 
The flow of information is a fundamental requirement for an efficient capital market, 
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and it encourages investors to make informed decisions. The differences in the level 
and quality of information between shareholders and management can lead to the 
“lemons effect,” which in extreme cases would lead to a meltdown in financial markets 
(Akerlof, 1978). The information asymmetry between shareholders and management 
is the primary cause of the agency conflict (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Hence, 
improving a firm’s information environment has important implications for monitoring 
management.  
Historically, the annual general meetings allow shareholders to have a face-to-face 
interaction with the management, communicate with them on critical issues, ask them 
relevant questions, or seek further clarifications. This serves as an essential 
mechanism to protect the interest of shareholders 8 . In the absence of such a 
mechanism, the shareholders would lack the incentive to invest in corporations (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). Shareholder activism has evolved 
recently to serve as an additional monitoring tool to the existing corporate governance 
mechanism, in which process activist shareholders can pursue changes in the target 
firms without taking control of the firms. The activist shareholders generally submit a 
proposal9 for ballots during the annual general meetings if they are dissatisfied with 
corporate managers on issues including operational performance, stock performance, 
risk management, governance, and social and environmental issues (Boyson & 
Mooradian, 2011; Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, & Thomas, 2008; Goranova & Ryan, 2014; Ma 
& Liu, 2016). In recent years, shareholder activism has not only amplified its legitimacy, 
but it has also significantly increased its potency in corporate governance.  
To make an informed voting decision, institutional investors can gather information 
                                                             
8 The key activities undertaken during an annual general meeting can be divided into three broad 
categories: firstly, inform the shareholders about financial performance and other strategic decisions, 
secondly, seek shareholders’ approval on matters that are beyond managerial discretion, and thirdly, 
serve as forum between shareholders and managers to discuss various past and future aspects relevant 
to firms (Martinez-Blasco, Garcia-Blandon, & Argiles-Bosch, 2015). 
9 According to the SEC Rule 14a-8, a shareholder proposal is a recommendation or requirement for a 
company and/or its board of directors to take actions. Once the recommendation is deemed proper, it 
would be included in the company’s proxy material, together with any supporting statements. These 
provide shareholders with relevant information. 
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from propriety resources, generate their research, or rely on the proxy advisors’ 
service (Ben-Rephael et al., 2017; Malenko & Shen, 2016). In contrast, retail investors 
have to resort to publicly available or free resources to gather information. 
Traditionally, retail investors would gather firm related information directly through 
published financial reports, news, or other public sources, and the time and cost for 
retail investors far exceeded their benefit in making an informed proxy voting decision. 
However, since the retail investors’ shareholdings are relatively small in size, they are 
expected to be rationally apathetic (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1983; Grossman & Hart, 
1980; Strätling, 2003, 2012).  
The advancement in information technology in the past decades has facilitated retail 
investors during shareholder activism. The internet has emerged as a leading source 
of information, providing efficient access to information on firm performance, press 
releases, annual reports, and other SEC reports (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Drake et al., 
2017; Lei, Li, & Luo, 2019). The internet has dramatically reduced the time and cost of 
acquiring and processing information (Bimber, Flanagin, & Stohl, 2005). Retail 
investors are disproportionate beneficiaries of this advancement. The search for 
information has become incredibly easy and efficient with the search engines, and 
shareholders from different geographical locations can interact with each other. Hence, 
the lowering cost of gathering and disseminating information is expected to impact 
the apathy issue of retail investors in corporate governance.  
Internet search volume data has been increasingly used as a proxy for retail investors’ 
attention in academic research. An early study on internet search by Mondria, Wu, and 
Zhang (2010) use America Online (AOL) search volume data as a proxy for retail 
investors’ attention. Another innovative study by Da et al. (2011) shows that GSVI is a 
better proxy for retail investors’ attention over traditional indirect proxies, such as 
advertising, extreme returns, trading volume, and news and headlines. The unique 
feature of resorting on the GSVI lies in its ability to capture the demand side of 
information, while the traditional sources of information are viewed as the supply side 
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of firm-specific information. The use of GSVI is specially advantageous in the context 
of North America, with Google’s search engine accounting for more than 88% of all 
internet search queries. Drake et al. (2012) find that GSVI (namely retail investors’ 
attention) increases before the earnings announcement and that higher GSVI results 
in greater changes in prices and volumes. Aouadi, Arouri, and Teulon (2013) and Ruan 
and Zhang (2016) find that GSVI is significantly related to stock market liquidity and 
volatility10. Several other studies (e.g., Gwilym, Kita, & Wang, 2014; Bank, Larch, & 
Peter, 2011; Joseph, Wintoki, & Zhang, 2011) also confirm that GSVI of a firm’s ticker 
symbol is a suitable proxy for retail investors’ attention. 
Specifically, retail investors are more likely to gather information on stocks they already 
own, and their interest is piqued during an attention-grabbing event such as 
shareholder activism (Barber & Odean, 2007). The non-routine nature of shareholder 
activism also makes it more likely to grab the attention of retail shareholders. Thus, 
shareholder activism serves as a natural experiment to explore the dynamics of retail 
investors’ attention. Consequently, it is expected that retail investors’ attention 
significantly increases prior to an annual general meeting, especially for firms that 
receive shareholders’ proposals. This study hypothesizes: 
Hypothesis 1: Retail investors’ attention increases for firms that receive shareholders’ 
proposals prior to the annual general meetings. 
3.2.2 Retail investors’ attention, transparency, and proxy sentiments 
The “Definitive Proxy Statement” is a mandatory statement filed by the proxy soliciting 
firms or on their behalf according to SEC Act of 1934 Section (DEF-14A). The proxy 
materials contain the activist shareholders’ proposals, supporting statements and the 
                                                             
10 GSVI is also widely used in various academic areas to predict individual level outcomes. GSVI is used 
to predict epidemics of influenza (Ginsberg, Mohebbi, & Patel, 2009; Polgreen, Chen, Pennock, Nelson, 
& Weinstein, 2008), unemployment, demand for new cars, and the destinations for vacations (Choi & 
Varian, 2012). Bimber et al. (2005) and Lindberg (2011) use Google search data to predict retail sales 
and consumption. Moat, Olivola, Chater, and Preis (2016) find that individuals use Google search data 
to complement their decision-making. GSVI is also used to explore individual choices such as smoking 
(Troelstra, Bosdriesz, De Boer, & Kunst, 2016). 
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company’s response to the activists’ demands (Bratton & McCahery, 2015). The proxy 
filings in pursuance of the SEC Rule 14a-8 are a vital source of information regarding 
the upcoming shareholder activism, as these filings, in most cases, are the first official 
communication about the shareholder activism, especially for retail investors.  
Meanwhile, managers tend to have more relevant insider information, and their views 
might also differ from those expressed by outside sources of information. Hence, the 
qualitative information in the proxy statements might influence retail investors’ 
decision making. The sentiment and tone expressed in firms’ proxy statements and 
other corporate reports convey important qualitative information in addition to 
quantitative numbers in financial statements. In particular, the sentiment and tone 
expressed in proxy filing documents would provide the incentives and perspectives of 
underlying managers and activist investors (Tudor & Vega, 2014). Furthermore, prior 
studies show that the linguistic tone in the text serves as an indicator of firms’ 
expected future performance and stock pricing (Kearney & Liu, 2014). Sometimes the 
“soft (namely qualitative) information” even explains more of the abnormal stock 
returns than the “hard (namely quantitative) information” (Brockman & Cicon, 2013). 
Managers also make use of qualitative disclosures to report bad news (Skinner, 1994).  
In recent years, the availability of listed firms’ proxy filings on the SEC-EDGAR website 
has paved the path for analyzing the “soft” information incorporated within the firms’ 
filings. Textual analysis is widely used to explore the impact of sentiment in news 
articles, SEC filings, or texts from social media. Following pioneering studies by 
Antweiler & Frank (2004), Das & Chen (2007), Tetlock (2007), and Li (2008), researchers 
have been actively examining the impact of qualitative information on stock valuations. 
Prior literature finds evidence that the words selected by managers in the disclosure 
reports and media coverage are correlated with firms’ future stock returns and 
earnings (Loughran & McDonald, 2015; Gandhi, Loughran & McDonald, 2019). The 
impact of underlying sentiment and tone is asymmetric. Edmans, Garcia, and Norli 
(2007) and De Neve, Ward, De Keulenaer, Van Landeghem, Kavetsos, and Norton (2018) 
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find evidence that the adverse events produce much larger and more consistent 
consequences than the positive events11. Loughran and McDonald (2013) also show 
that the negative sentiment embedded in the prospectus is positively associated with 
the level of underpricing. The negativity bias suggests that negative information tends 
to attract more attention from investors than comparable positive information 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Jordan, 1965).  
Such findings motivate this study to explore whether the sentiment and tone of the 
proxy statements generate any impact on retail investors’ attention during shareholder 
activism. Following the negative-positive attention asymmetry, it is expected that 
there is more attention from retail investors if the tone or sentiment is negative or 
controversial. In this context, this study hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 2a: Retail investors’ attention is positively related to a negative sentiment 
expressed in the proxy statements.  
Corporate transparency also impacts investors’ decision-making. Broadly defined as 
the extent to which there is credible disclosure of the firm-specific information, 
corporate transparency is measured by corporate transparency is measured by the 
level of information 12  supplied by the corporation to its stakeholders, and more 
information disclosure increases transparency (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Corporate 
transparency is an outcome of multi factors, including the quality of reporting 
standards and the intensity of private information acquisition and dissemination 
(Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004). Increased corporate transparency makes the 
stakeholders’ (boards of directors, managers, and shareholders) decisions more 
efficient (Firth, Wang, & Wong, 2015).  
In essence, corporate transparency lowers the agency costs, and increased 
                                                             
11 The few exceptions that provide opposite findings include Ahern & Sosyura (2014) and Huang, Zang 
& Zheng (2014).  
12 Substantial information incorporates “the relevance, clarity, completeness, accuracy, reliability and 
verifiability of information” (Rawlins, 2008).   
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transparency leads to a reduction in the demand for monitoring (Ma, Shang, & Wang, 
2017). However, the level of transparency varies across firms. Firms with a high level 
of transparency may voluntarily disclose reliable information. In contrast, firms with a 
low level of transparency would reduce the supply of firm-specific information, 
heightening information asymmetry between managers and external investors. The 
information environment thus restricts external stakeholders’ ability to learn about 
the firms and make appropriate decisions, especially when the power distribution in 
the firms is unbalanced (Firth et al., 2015). In other words, corporate transparency 
would have important implications for retail investors and minority shareholders, who 
are more reliant on information disclosed by firms.  
Moreover, a lack of corporate transparency also creates difficulties in firm valuation 
for external investors, owing to the uncertainties of the firm’s business activities and 
operating environment. To gather relevant information and facilitate the decision-
making, external investors, particularly retail investors, are expected to have a higher 
demand for information for less transparent firms, especially during shareholder 
activism. Consequently, it is expected that the increase in retail investors’ attention 
during activism would be more pronounced for less transparent firms. In this context, 
this study hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 2b: The increase of retail investors’ attention is more pronounced for less 
transparent firms. 
3.2.3 Retail investors’ attention and participation during shareholder 
activism 
The regulatory, ownership, and corporate governance environment have changed over 
the decades. Institutional ownership has seen a dramatic increase from around 10% 
of shares outstanding in 1953 to 47% in 1999, and it accounts for about 70% of U.S. 
equities outstanding in recent years. Meanwhile, retail investors collectively hold 
around 30% of shares outstanding across the U.S. listed firms (GoldmanSachs, 2013; 
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ProxyPulse, 2016). Institutional investors have a fiduciary duty to participate in proxy 
voting13 . In contrast, retail investors do not have any such compulsion, and they 
traditionally have a low participation rate in proxy voting. Hence, the institutional 
investors are traditionally considered as the solution to weak monitoring, and retail 
investors are viewed as rationally apathetic. The shift in corporate ownership will 
significantly compound this problem (Gillan & Starks, 2007).  
In 2004, the SEC implemented the mandatory disclosure of mutual fund voting 
decisions, paving the path for empirical examination of their monitoring role. The 
institutional investors also tend to vote with management (Cvijanović, Dasgupta & 
Zachariadis, 2016) or even delegate the voting decision to proxy advisor firms (Choi, 
Fisch, & Kahan, 2013). Specifically, when the firm’s executives or directors serve on the 
board of institutions, the institutions tend to overlook proxy advisors’ 
recommendations and continue to support incumbent management even if the overall 
support is low (Calluzzo & Kedia, 2019). Additionally, passive funds14 are more likely 
to leave the monitoring to the invisible hand of the market or engage in a one-size-fits-
all approach to governance. On the contrary, acting as “skin in the game”15 (Fisch, 
2017), retail shareholders would mitigate this monitoring problem, thus ensuring 
higher participation of retail investors will have important implications for corporate 
governance.  
Consequently, in recent years, activist investors have recognized the importance of 
retail investors and increased their efforts to attract and encourage more retail 
shareholders to participate in the proxy contest16. For example, in a campaign between 
                                                             
13 This is required by the SEC Investment Company Act and Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA). 
14 Passive investing has already outpaced active investing in recent years. The big three passive funds 
together (vanguard, BlackRock and State Street Global Advisers) have already been the largest 
shareholder in 88% of major U.S. firms (Lund, 2017). 
15 As retail investors own the companies directly, this acts as “skin in the game”.  
16 The SEC also conducted a roundtable in 2015 to discuss dismal situations with retail investors’ 
participation in the proxy voting process. The target was not simply to increase retail shareholders’ 
participation, but rather to increase informed participation in this proxy voting process. The roundtable 
participants also suggested latest information technology should be better incorporated in proxy voting 
process, so that shareholders were more likely to participate and make informed decisions. With 
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the activist Perishing Square Capital Management and Automatic Data Processing 
(ADP) in 2017, Perishing Square reached out to ADP’s retail investors through a letter 
stating that “they had the key to Auto Data Processing’s future” (Herbst-Bayliss, 2017). 
In a proxy fight between DuPont Co. and the activist Trian Fund Management LP in 
2015, DuPont’s management successfully defended its position against one of the 
most influential activist hedge funds by reaching out to its 33% retail investors. 
Similarly, the 2015 campaign of Starboard Value against Darden Restaurant only gained 
a landslide victory due to retail investors’ support. Another instance was the proxy 
contest between Nelson Peltz and P&G in 2016, which was considered “the most-
expensive shareholder war” by the Wall Street Journal. The outcome of the contest 
was decided by the retail investors of P&G in favor of the activist Nelson Peltz by a 
hairline margin of 0.0016% of votes cast (Benoit, 2017). More importantly, the success 
of the shareholder campaigns, despite the non-binding nature of shareholder activism, 
is significant in corporate governance, as the proxy advisory firms would essentially 
transform it into a quasi-binding on firms17.  
Moreover, retail investors’ participation also has important implications for target 
firms, even if shareholder campaigns are unsuccessful. For example, during directors’ 
elections, if a director receives a 30% dissent vote, he/she is more likely to resign (Iliev, 
Lins, Miller, & Roth, 2015). Ertimur, Ferri, and Muslu (2010) find that just receiving a 
shareholder proposal on “say on pay” results in a significant reduction in executive 
compensation. Kastiel and Nili (2016) also find that a 5% increase in retail investors’ 
participation would theoretically alter the outcomes of 15% governance-related 
proposals in case of contested elections. These studies all highlight the importance of 
retail investors’ participation during shareholder activism. Lack of retail investors’ 
participation might distort voting outcomes, limit the ability to implement governance 
                                                             
increased accessibility to information technology, shareholders can more effectively receive and 
understand information of firm performance, and better put the performance into perspective. This 
enables informed investors to participate more in the proxy voting process (SEC, 2015). 
17  The proxy advisor firms tend to vote against the re-election of directors who have failed to 
implement an approved shareholder proposal (Kastiel & Nili, 2016). 
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changes, and create a standstill situation (Kastiel & Nili, 2016).  
However, the shareholding voting literature has previously overlooked that retail 
shareholders, unlike their institutional counterparts, have a choice whether to 
participate in the corporate ballot. According to Brunswick (2015), two-thirds of retail 
investors consider shareholder activism a value-adding activity, with 82% of them 
willing to participate during shareholder activism that resonates with their preferences. 
To understand shareholder voting patterns, this study builds on established theories 
to explore the impact of retail investors’ preferences on corporate voting. 
Firstly, according to the instrumental/pivotal voting theory 18  in political science 
literature (Downs, 1957; Owen & Grofman, 1984), when majority shareholders 
support a specific proposal, discretionary voters (retail investors) with a similar 
preference would choose not to vote, since their votes are not pivotal (Cvijanović et 
al., 2020). On the contrary, retail investors are more likely to participate in corporate 
governance-related activism, especially during a contentious proxy fight, as they may 
believe that their vote is more likely to affect the outcome (Bolodeoku, 2007). Geys 
(2006) also argues that closeness is the most analyzed element in the turnout 
literature, and the probability of being decisive is determined by the individual’s 
subjective estimate of how close the candidates are in the competition. In this sense, 
this study considers contentious (i.e. “votes-for” between 40% and 60% of votes 
outstanding) corporate governance-related activisms 19  as the first type of high 
salience proposals that resonate with retail investors’ preferences. The ex post 
approach, which uses the actual election result, has become a standard measure of 
the closeness variable.  
                                                             
18 Instrumental/pivotal voting theory suggests that participation is based on the cost and degree to 
which the vote would be detrimental to the outcome (Downs, 1957; Owen & Grofman, 1984). 
19 Based on the sample of this study, there are 675 contentious corporate governance proposals (i.e. 
“votes-for” between 40% and 60% of votes outstanding), which accounts for 28.61% of corporate 
governance proposals in sample (675 out of 2,359 corporate governance proposals in total). Assuming 
that retail investors’ participation increases by 10%, the outcome of these contentious proposals would 
be different. This highlights the importance of retail investors’ participation during a contentious proxy 
voting. For more details, please refer to Table 3.1. 
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Secondly, according to the ethical/altruistic voter theory, people might choose to vote 
no matter the electoral outcome if it fulfills their self-interest by considering broader 
welfare, such as environmental and social issues. Brunswick (2015) shows that 
environmental and social issues are considered as the middle tier of important issues 
by retail investors, only following the management issues of the company. ProxyPulse 
(2016) also indicates that around 78% of all retail investors are more inclined towards 
green products and services. In this sense, this study considers environmental and 
social related proposals as the second type of high salience proposals that might 
attract retail investors’ higher participation.  
Lastly, the minimax regret theory 20  also incorporates retail investors’ presences, 
which is likely to result in increased retail investors’ participation. According to the 
National Financial Capability Study by Lin, Bumcrot, Mottola, and Walsh (2016), 
avoiding loss is the second most important motivator for retail investors to seek 
professional help, preceded by improving performance. To draw a parallel in 
shareholder activism, it is expected that retail shareholders would like to participate 
more in the wake of financial distress. In this sense, this study considers corporate-
related proposals for financially distressed firms as the third type of high salience 
proposals that might pique retail investors’ attention and subsequent participation.  
Consequently, in this study, the three types of proposals, namely contentious 
corporate governance proposals, environmental and social related proposals, and 
corporate governance-related proposals for financially distressed firms, are 
collectively referred to as high salience proposals. Higher participation of retail 
investors is expected during these high salience activism events. In this respect, this 
study hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 3a: Retail investors’ attention is positively associated with their 
participation during high salience activism that resonates with retail investors’ 
                                                             
20 According to minimax regret approach, individuals vote under uncertainty and they are likely to 
choose an outcome that would result in minimum regret in the worst-case scenario (Geys, 2006). 
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interests and preferences.  
Retail investors would monitor and engage only if they are adequately informed (Fisch, 
2017). To gather information about shareholder activism, retail investors choose to 
search online, including annual reports, research reports, broachers, newsletters, 
blogs, and websites21. In line with Hypothesis 2b, corporate transparency would be 
instrumental for retail investors, especially during shareholder activism, when the 
retail investors need to decide between an activist shareholder and incumbent 
management. Consequently, compared to firms with higher levels of transparency, it 
is expected that firms with lower levels of information transparency would have a 
more pronounced increase in retail investors’ attention and subsequent participation 
during high salience activism. In this respect, this study hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 3b: The impact of retail investors’ attention on their participation during 
high salience activism is more pronounced for less transparent firms. 
3.2.4 E-proxy reform and participation 
SEC proposed an E-proxy rule in 2005, with full implementation from January 1st, 2009. 
Before the E-proxy rule, companies were required to disseminate proxy materials 
through postal delivery. The E-proxy rule offers the companies two options for making 
the proxy materials publicly available, namely “full set delivery option” and “notice 
only option.” Under the “full set delivery option,” companies are required to send 
shareholders all proxy materials by physical mails and post proxy materials on their 
website on the same day. Under the “notice only option,” companies are only required 
to send shareholders a notice including the web address of materials along with the 
date of availability. The investors are also given a choice to continue to receive proxy 
                                                             
21 According to Brunswick (2015), 84% of retail investors would choose to conduct a search online. 
National Financial Capability Study (2018) also documents that around 75% of retail investors conduct 




materials by physical mails if the companies switch to electronic dissemination22.  
There are limited studies on the impact of E-proxy. The only existing literature on E-
proxy is Geoffroy (2018), which finds a negative effect of E-proxy on retail shareholders’ 
participation, arguing that retail investors would treat electronic communications less 
important because electronic dissemination of proxy documents is cheaper.  
However, in this context, it is expected that the introduction of E-proxy would facilitate 
retail shareholders to access proxy materials online, extract relevant information, and 
communicate and share information through the internet. Investors can also co-
ordinate their efforts to conduct further research and analysis on proxy materials with 
the availability of online documents (Kraut, Mukhopadhyay, Szczypula, Kiesler, & 
Scherlis, 1998; Wagenhofer, 2007). Consequently, given the convenience of 
information collection and sharing, which would facilitate retail investors’ attention 
and participation (based on Hypotheses 1 and 3a), it is expected that there would be 
a further increase in retail investors’ participation during high salience activism after 
the introduction of E-proxy. In this respect, this study hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 4: Retail investors’ participation during high salience activism is facilitated 
by E-proxy. 
3.3 Data and variable descriptions 
3.3.1 Sample description 
This study uses Google’s Proprietary Trends dataset to explore retail investors’ 
attention. As the Google Trends data is only available from 2004 onwards, the sample 
period is 2005-2016. The shareholder activism data is obtained from the FactSet 
SharkRepellent dataset, which provides all shareholder activism events in the U.S.  
                                                             
22 However, according to SEC, only 1% investors choose to return by physical delivery. 
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The sample period consists of a total of 8,786 shareholder proposals. This study first 
excludes 1,195 shareholder proposals for utilities, banking, insurance, and other 
financial firms due to their different reporting and regulatory requirements. This study 
further excludes 976 shareholder proposals with missing voting outcome data, 
pending results, or never voted on. Another 980 shareholder proposals are excluded 
due to their generic ticker symbols23, such as “AN,” “ASH,” and “BIG.” In addition to 
valid search volume24, this study also requires the firm’s coverage in the COMPUSTAT, 
CRSP, and FactSet ownership dataset. Thus, the final sample ends with up 4,022 
shareholder proposals. 
Table 3.1 provides information on the sample proposals. Panel A shows the temporal 
distribution of shareholder activism over the sample period. Across all years, sample 
firms received the largest number of proposals in 2009 (390 proposals or 9.70%) and 
2015 (395 proposals or 9.82%), mostly owing to the increasing number of corporate 
governance proposals. Firms received the least amount of proposals in 2012 (189 
proposals or 4.70%).  
Panel B shows the subcategories of proposals, i.e. social and environmental proposals, 
corporate governance proposals, and other types of proposals. This study further 
distinguishes corporate governance proposals that are related to close voting or firms 
in financial distress25. Overall, more proposals are related to corporate governance 
(2,359 proposals), accounting for 58.66% of total proposals, while there are 1,307 
social and environmental proposals (32.49%). The high salience proposals (namely 
social and environmental proposals, and governance proposals related to close voting 
or for firms in distress) account for almost 56.84% of the sample proposals. Panel C 
reports the major proponents of the sample proposals. 23.69% of the proposals come 
                                                             
23 Following the prior literature, most notably Da et al. (2011), Drake et al. (2012) and Ben-Rephael et 
al. (2017), this study also makes use of stock ticker symbols to source the Google Trends data. 
24 Firms that have zero search volume throughout the sample period are considered as invalid SVI. 
25 In this study, firms whose z-score is below 1.83 are considered as financially distressed firms. 
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from retail investors, followed by labor unions (19.42%), other stakeholders (15.89%), 
and public pension funds (12.53%). 
Table 3.1 Overview of shareholder activism 
This table provides an overview of shareholder activism events in this study. The full sample 
consists of 4,022 shareholder proposals covering the period of 2005-2016. 
Panel A: Temporal distribution   
Year No. of Proposals Proportion 
2005 308 7.66% 
2006 332 8.25% 
2007 368 9.15% 
2008 351 8.73% 
2009 390 9.70% 
2010 348 8.65% 
2011 263 6.54% 
2012 189 4.70% 
2013 345 8.58% 
2014 354 8.80% 
2015 395 9.82% 
2016 379 9.42% 
Sum 4,022 100% 
Panel B: Proposal subcategory   
Social and environmental proposals   
Social issues  961 23.89% 
Environmental issues 346 8.60% 
Corporate governance (CG) proposals    
Close CG voting 675 16.78% 
CG for financially distressed firm 414* 10.29% 
Remaining CG proposals 1380 34.31% 
All other proposals  356 8.85% 
Panel C: Proponent type   
Corporation 35 0.87% 
Hedge fund company 222 5.52% 
Individual 953 23.69% 
Investment adviser 245 6.09% 
Labor unions 781 19.42% 
Named stockholder group 7 0.17% 
Other institutions 108 2.69% 
Other stakeholders 639 15.89% 
Public pension funds 504 12.53% 
Religious groups 321 7.98% 




3.3.2 Variables description 
3.3.2.1 Google Search Volume 
As retail shareholders lack resources and time to generate their research, they are 
more likely to rely on external sources, especially the internet. Google search volume 
provides an index, namely the Google Search Volume Index (GSVI), based on the 
number of searches for a term or topic on a specific day on Google’s search engine. In 
this study, a geographical limit of the U.S. is imposed further to fine-tune the proxy for 
retail investors’ attention. In this way, GSVI around annual general meetings is used to 
capture the dynamics of retail investors’ attention. The daily26 raw GSVI is gathered 
using Google’s Application Programming Interface (API) around each annual general 
meeting. Raw GSVI is standardized using fixed scaling. In this study, the raw GSVI is 
scaled in such a way so that the average value of GSVI is one27. Standardizing the raw 
GSVI is advantageous, as it benchmarks the search volume with a scalar, which 
facilitates the interpretation of the results and allows for comparisons within and 
across firms.  
After computing the standardized GSVI, this study computes the Abnormal Google 
Search Volume Index (GASVI), a more direct measure of retail investors’ attention. The 
GASVI captures any abnormal changes in GSVI by comparing it to the benchmark. It 
thus controls for the average level of search volume and improves predictive ability. 
The GASVI also reduces the possibility that an omitted variable that happens to be 
correlated with GSVI would cause confounding results (Ben-Rephael et al., 2017; Da et 
al., 2011; Drake et al., 2012).  
Following Drake et al. (2012), GASVI is calculated as GSVI for firm “j” at time “t” (𝐺𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑗𝑡) 
minus the average of GSVI for the same day over the past ten weeks, scaled by the 
                                                             
26 According to Drake et al. (2012), the daily GSVI is considered to be better than the weekly GSVI, as 
it can better isolate the dynamic of search behaviors of investors. 
27 According to Da et al. (2011), any constant scaling can be applied as long as the same constant scaling 
is used for each stock. The choice of scalar has no impact on the analysis. 
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average GSVI for the same day over the past ten weeks. The Drake et al.’s (2012) 
method is advantageous, as it controls the day-of-the-week effect of the retail 




                                  Equation 1 
where 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐺𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑗𝑡 =




                               Equation 2 
This study further constructs Cumulative Abnormal Search Volume (CGASVI) for the 
window [-22, 0] (i.e. from 22 days before annual general meetings till the meeting 
date29) using the following equation30: 
𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22]𝑗 = ln (1 +  




)                            Equation 3   
3.3.2.2 Non-participation rate 
Retail investors’ participation cannot be directly measured. Instead, this study 
measures retail investors’ participation using a non-participation rate. There are 
several reasons for using the non-participation ratio instead of the participation ratio. 
Firstly, institutional investors hold around 70% of outstanding equity holdings, and 
legislation (e.g. Investment Act 1940, ERISA 1974) makes it fiduciary duty of 
institutional investors to participate during proxy voting. In other words, they have an 
obligation to vote. According to ProxyPulse (2016), institutional investors tend to vote 
                                                             
28 The retail investors search patterns vary over the days of the week. 
29 The 23-day window (i.e. [-22, 0]) is used because firms usually require retail investors to furnish their 
completed proxy cards between 2 and 7 days prior to annual general meetings, if they are not going to 
cast their vote in person at the meeting. Some brokers also require the completed proxy instructions 
to be received around 10 days prior to annual general meetings. Thus, the day of 22 is selected by 
adding 15 days on the most conservative deadline required by firms, i.e. 7 days. A longer event window 
enables this study to incorporate the behavior of a vast majority of retail investors.  
30 It is notable that there is still an overlap for the first two days. Specifically the meeting day (day 0) is 
included in the event window, because retail investors can still search on the day of the meeting and 
vote physically by attending the meeting. Hence, including the meeting day in the event window does 
not work against the results. However, to make sure the results are robust, this study further adjust the 




more than 93% of the shares held. This leads to a dominant percentage of the overall 
participation from institutional investors. Secondly, contrary to institutional investors, 
retail investors do not have any obligations to vote, and retail investors’ participation 
is, on average, around 30% of their collective voting rights (ProxyPulse, 2016). In this 
sense, the non-participation during proxy voting predominately comes from retail 
investors. Thirdly, with the “non-routine” nature of shareholder activism, brokers 
cannot cast discretionary votes, and the non-participation is more likely to be a direct 
consequence of retail investors’ inactivity during shareholder activism. In short, the 
non-participation rate serves as a relevant proxy to understand the dynamics of retail 
investors’ voting patterns.  





                                       Equation 4 
𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 –  𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛      Equation 5 
where 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝐹𝑜𝑟 +  𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝐴𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 +  𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑  Equation 6 
To address the possible endogeneity issues arising from unobserved heterogeneity, 
this study further follows Aggarwal, Dahiya, and Prabhala (2018) to control for 
unobservables that vary across firms and years, and also unobservables that are 
unique to a firm and year by comparing overall non-participation relative to firm-level 
non-participation. After accounting for these differences, the remaining non-
participation rate would potentially address endogeneity issues. In other words, this 
would only reflect the non-participation rate related to the specific proposal under 
consideration.  
Voting outcome data for each shareholder proposal are collected from the FactSet 
SharkRepellent database. The dataset source provides detailed information on the 
52 
 
final tally of votes on each shareholder proposal. Relevant information includes 
outstanding votes, votes for, votes against, votes abstained, and broker non-votes31. 
3.3.2.3 L-M Tone 
To extract sentiment from the proxy filings, this study downloads all the filings for 
respective shareholder proposals from the SEC-EDGAR website. Following the process 
designed by Li (2008), this study prepares each of the documents for textual analysis. 
To identify the sentiment in the text, this study creates a measure of tone using a 
dictionary created by Loughran and McDonald (2011). This dictionary provides a 
comprehensive and exhaustive list of the most commonly used words in accounting 
and finance, and it also reclassifies several words to reflect their connotation. This 
study processes the proxy materials and collates the number of words included in 
Loughran and McDonald’s list of positive and negative words32. There is a total of 2,355 
negative words and 354 positive words. 
After deriving the count of positive and negative words, this study transforms them as 
percentages using total words in the respective proxy filing documents. Following 
Loughran and McDonald (2015), the LM-Tone for firm “j” at time “t” is calculated as 
the difference between the percentage of positive words and the percentage of 
negative words in the proxy filings for firm “j” at time “t,” as follows:  
LM − Tone𝑗,𝑡  = %𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑗,𝑡 − %𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑗,𝑡       Equation 7  
When %𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠  exceeds %𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 , the L-M tone becomes 
negative. This is what is defined as the negative sentiment expressed in the proxy 
statement. Based on Hypothesis 2a, the negative sentiment is expected to drive higher 
retail investors’ attention.   
                                                             
31 If the tally of votes is “votes against”, and votes abstained and broker non-votes are unavailable, 
the votes are assumed to be zero. 




3.3.2.4 Firm-level Transparency 
This study measures firm-level transparency following Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and 
Wang (2002) (LMSW hereafter) model. Stock return autocorrelation conditional on 
trading volume serves as a proxy for firm-level transparency. Specifically, this measure 
is constructed from the following regression estimated for each firm-year: 
𝑟𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑗 + 𝛾𝑗𝑟𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜗𝑦𝑟𝑗,𝑡−1𝑉𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑗,𝑡                          Equation 8                                                     
where 𝑟𝑗,𝑡  and 𝑟𝑗,𝑡−1 are contemporaneous and lagged weekly stock returns, 
respectively, and 𝑉𝑗,𝑡−1 is lagged log turnover detrended by subtracting the moving 
average of logged turnover over the prior 26 weeks. The key estimate is the coefficient 
of the interaction term, namely 𝜗𝑦, which reflects the amount of information-based 
trading. 
According to Llorente et al. (2002), firms with less transparency should have a positive 
value of 𝜗𝑦  due to partial adjustments to the prices, whereas firms with higher 
transparency would have a negative value of 𝜗𝑦 due to return reversal. Hence, this 
study creates a dummy variable, LMSW, which takes the value of one if 𝜗𝑦> 0, and 
zero otherwise. This dummy variable helps isolate the impact of transparency on retail 
investors’ participation in the voting process.  
3.3.2.5 Other control variables 
This study includes a comprehensive set of control variables known in the literature to 
ensure that omitted variable issues do not plague the empirical findings. A list of 
variables, including their definitions, is presented in Table 3.2. #News is constructed as 
the natural logarithm of one plus the number of news articles mentioning the target 
firm within a 10-day window preceding the annual general meetings, where the 
number of news articles is collected by searching for the name of the respective target 
firms in the Factiva database. Institutional ownership (InstOwn) is sourced from the 
FactSet ownership dataset. The analyst following (Analyst) data comes from the 
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I/B/E/S dataset. Stock returns, turnover, and firm age data are collected from CRSP. 
The data for all the remaining control variables are gathered from COMPUSTAT, 
including market capitalization (Mcap), Tobin’s Q (TobinQ), preceding three years stock 
return (3yrReturns), number of employees (#Employees), advertising expense 
(Advertising), and Z-score.  
This study further calculates absolute abnormal return and turnover. Abnormal 
turnover (AbTV) for firm “j” at time “t” is calculated as the difference between the 
trading volume for firm “j” at time “t” and the average trading volume for the same 
firm “j” averaged over the past 100 days. The average trading volume scales the 
difference over the same period. 
𝐴𝑏𝑇𝑉𝑗,𝑡 =
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑗,𝑡–𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑗,𝑡
                   Equation 9 
where 






                Equation 11 
Absolute abnormal return (AbsRet) for firm “j” at time “t” is calculated as the 
difference between the return of firm “j” at time “t” and CRSP value-weighted index 
at time “t.”  




Table 3.2 Variables description 
This table lists the variables used in this study, together with their definitions. Abnormal 
Google Search Volume Index (GASVI) and Cumulative Abnormal Search Volume (CGASVI) are 
used to capture the dynamics of retail investors’ attention. The non-participation rate is used 
to measure retail investors’ participation during high salience activism. A set of control 
variables are also included. 
Variables  Description  
Pre[22]   A dummy variable that assumes the value of one if the 
respective day is within the 22 days prior to the annual 
general meetings, and zero otherwise.  
GASVI Abnormal Google Search Volume Index following Drake et al. 
(2012); calculated as the average value of raw Google Search 
Volume Index (GSVI) for a given day t minus the average GSVI 
of the days over the past ten weeks, scaled by the average 
SVI for the same weekdays over the past ten weeks. 
CGASVI[22] Cumulative Abnormal Google Search Volume for the window 
[-22, 0], which is calculated as the natural logarithm of (1+ 
average value of 𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑗,𝑡), estimated over 23 days (22 days 
prior to the annual general meetings to the meeting date). 
LMSW A measure of information transparency suggested by 
Llorente et al. (2002), which is calculated using stock return 
autocorrelation conditional on trading volume. LMSW 
assumes the value of one if the firm is less transparent and 
zero otherwise. 
LM-Tone The tone of proxy documents following Loughran & 
McDonald (2015), which is calculated as the difference 
between the percentage of positive words and negative 
words identified by Loughran & McDonald (2011) dictionary.  
NPR Non-participation rate following Geoffroy (2018), which is 
calculated as the ratio of non-participation to total votes 
outstanding. Non-participation is calculated from the 
difference between outstanding votes and the participating 
votes (for, against, and withholding). 
Highsal A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm 
receives a proposal related to environmental or social issues, 
or a proposal related to contentious (i.e. votes-for” between 
40% and 60% of votes outstanding) corporate governance, or 
if the firm receives corporate governance-related proposal 
and the firm is in financial distress (Z-score below 1.83), zero 
otherwise.  
Eproxy  A dummy variable that assumes the value of one for the years 
after the full implementation of E-proxy legislation (i.e. 
2009), and zero otherwise.  
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#News The number of news articles, which is calculated as the 
natural logarithm of (1+ number of news articles published 
within 10 days preceding the annual general meetings); data 
extracted from Factiva.  
Advertising Advertising expense, which is calculated as (Advertising 
expense)/Sales; data extracted from COMPUSTAT. 
Mcap Market capitalization, which is calculated as the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization; data extracted from 
COMPUSTAT. 
TobinQ Tobin’s Q, which is calculated as (Total Assets + Market 
Capitalization - Ordinary Equity)/Total Asset; data extracted 
from COMPUSTAT.  
InstOwn Institutional ownership, the percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors; data extracted from the FactSet.  
3yrReturns Stock returns three years preceding annual general 
meetings; data extracted from COMPUSTAT/CRSP. 
#Employees The number of employees, which is calculated as the natural 
logarithm of (1+ number of employees); data extracted from 
COMPUSTAT. 
FirmAge Age of the firm the time of activism, which is calculated as 
the difference between the time of the annual general 
meeting and when CRSP first started reporting the firm’s 
stock prices.  
Analyst The number of Analyst following, which is calculated as the 
natural logarithm of (1+ number of analyst following). 
Analyst following is the number of analysts who provide a 
one-year EPS guide for the firm in I/B/E/S dataset. 
Tangibility The ratio of tangible assets to total assets; data extracted 
from COMPUSTAT. 
AbsRet Absolute abnormal return, which is calculated as a firm’s 
excess return over CRSP value-weighted index.  
AbTV Abnormal turnover, calculated from the ratio of value-
weighted turnover for the day to an average of value-
weighted turnover over the past 100 days.  
Spread Bid-Ask spread following Corwin & Schultz (2012), which is 
calculated as the bid-ask spread from high and low prices. 
3.4 Core results 
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical 
investigations. The mean value of cumulative abnormal SVI (CGASVI[22]) is 0.036, which 
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indicates that the cumulative investor search volume is 3.60% higher during the 
window [-22, 0] preceding the annual general meetings. On average, the non-
participation rate (NPR) is 27.245%, which is close to the median value of 24.649%. 
The mean (median) of the LM-tone is -0.130 (-0.127). The negative mean value of LM-
tone implies that, on average, there are 0.13% more negative words in the sample 
proposals. In other words, the negative sentiment is widely expressed in the proxy 
proposals.  
Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics 
The table provides descriptive statistics for Google Search Volume, tone of proxy materials, 
non-participation rate, and other control variables. The sample consists of 4,022 shareholder 
proposals during the period 2005-2016. The variable definitions are provided in Table 3.2. All 
variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables Mean Std.dev. p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
        
CGASVI[22] 0.036 0.178 -0.131 -0.053 0.010 0.098 0.248 
NPR 27.245 13.611 14.721 18.459 24.649 32.245 40.556 
LM-Tone -0.130 0.051 -0.199 -0.161 -0.127 -0.095 -0.067 
#News 1.285 1.682 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.944 4.043 
Mcap 9.667 2.039 6.915 8.423 9.935 11.085 12.151 
Advertising 0.013 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.039 
TobinQ 1.948 0.978 1.077 1.314 1.690 2.203 3.161 
InstOwn 75.394 17.646 52.181 65.380 78.039 87.193 94.911 
Tangibility 0.307 0.238 0.054 0.110 0.235 0.503 0.673 
3yrReturns 8.228 18.802 -14.520 -1.915 7.581 19.730 30.613 
#Employees 3.521 1.559 1.318 2.427 3.738 4.540 5.446 
FirmAge 3.505 0.778 2.460 2.984 3.622 4.238 4.424 
Analyst 2.142 1.411 0.000 0.000 2.890 3.219 3.434 
        
N 4,022               
Table 3.4 reports the Pearson correlation matrix. The correlations among variables are 
generally low, except for a few cases. Market capitalization (Mcap) has a relatively high 
correlation with the number of employees (#Employees), firm age (FirmAge), and the 




Table 3.4 Correlation matrix 
This table provides a correlation for all firm-specific variables. The sample size is based on 4,022 shareholder proposals received during the period 2005-2016. 
The variable definitions are provided in Table 3.2. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. 
 
  Variables   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   (13) 
 (1) NPR 1.000 
 (2) CGASVI[22] 0.003 1.000 
 (3 LM-Tone -0.067 -0.053 1.000 
 (4) #News 0.043 0.015 -0.066 1.000 
 (5) Mcap -0.089 -0.095 -0.056 0.232 1.000 
 (6) Advertising -0.004 -0.004 0.132 0.096 0.031 1.000 
 (7) TobinQ -0.038 0.063 0.071 0.041 0.213 0.228 1.000 
 (8) InstOwn -0.235 0.038 0.230 -0.062 -0.219 0.046 -0.012 1.000 
 (9) Tangibility 0.065 -0.016 -0.149 -0.044 0.017 -0.157 -0.199 -0.063 1.000 
 (10) 3yrReturns -0.088 -0.011 0.086 0.005 0.300 0.056 0.411 0.041 -0.055 1.000 
 (11) #Employees -0.085 -0.106 -0.062 0.147 0.706 0.010 -0.040 -0.216 0.074 0.124 1.000 
 (12) FirmAge 0.082 -0.057 -0.056 0.264 0.405 -0.082 -0.083 -0.209 0.021 0.013 0.403 1.000 
 (13) Analyst -0.103 -0.070 0.092 0.077 0.444 0.011 0.081 0.007 0.061 0.056 0.305 0.174 1.000 
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3.4.2 Propensity Score Matching 
In order to explore how retail investors’ attention changes prior to annual general 
meetings, this study first identifies matching control firms that do not receive 
shareholder proposals using the Propensity Score Matching 33 . Following the 
specification of Prevost, Wongchoti, & Marshall (2016), Da et al. (2011), and Drake et 
al. (2012), this study matches the control firms based on firm-specific characteristics, 
including institutional ownership, market capitalization, Tobin’s Q, tangibility, 
advertising expenses, the number of employees, and firm age, as shown in the 
following regression: 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛽53𝑦𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽7#𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑 +
𝑒𝑗,𝑡                                                           Equation 13  
where 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡 takes the value of one if the firm receives a shareholder proposal in 
a certain year, and zero otherwise. 𝛿𝑡 and 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑 are year and industry fixed effects. 
All the variables are defined in the table in Table 3.2, and all continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. Table 3.5 reports results based on the probit 
regression indicating the firm-specific characteristics of the target firms. Firms with 
higher market capitalization, higher tangibility ratio, lower institutional ownership, and 
worse stock performance are more likely to be targeted during shareholder activism. 
The number of employees and firm age are also positively associated with the 
likelihood of a firm being targeted.  
  
                                                             
33 The target firms are matched with control firms from the same year and same industry, which is 
based on Fama French 17 industry classification. 
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Table 3.5 Probit regression of Propensity Score Matching 
This table reports results of Propensity Score Matching based on the following probit 
regression: 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛽53𝑦𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽7#𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝑒𝑗,𝑡, which 
includes the firm-level characteristics of institutional ownership, market capitalization, Tobin’s 
Q, tangibility ratio, three-year stock returns, advertising expenses, the number of employees, 
and firm age. The variable definitions are provided in Table 3.2. Standard errors are provided 
below in the parentheses. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * 
represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1)  
Variables Target  
Mcap 0.256***  
 (0.011)  
Advertising -0.054  
 (0.466)  
TobinQ -0.006  
 (0.007)  
InstOwn -0.002***  
 (0.001)  
Tangibility 0.199***  
 (0.066)  
3yrReturns -0.239***  
 (0.019)  
#Employees 0.193***  
 (0.015)  
FirmAge 0.282***  
 (0.022)  
Constant -4.953***  
 (0.127)  
   
Observations 35,081  
Year Fixed Effect Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  
Pseudo R-squared 0.313  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3.6 reports the balance test of the Propensity Score Matching. The matching 
procedures identify 1,903 control firms without any shareholders’ proposals during 
the annual general meetings. Although the Propensity Score Matching reduces the 
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sample size34, the procedure ensures firms matched in the same propensity categories 
also have a similar average of the covariates.  
Table 3.6 Balance test of Propensity Score Matching 
This table provides the balance test of Propensity Score Matching. The control sample is 
formed by matching each event firm to a non-event control firm from the same year and the 
same industry (following the Fama-French 17 industry classifications) with the closest 
propensity score. The propensity score is estimated based on firms’ institutional ownership, 
market capitalization, Tobin’s Q, tangibility ratio, advertising expenses, the number of 
employees, and firm age. The variable definitions are provided in Table 3.2. 
Variables Target Matched Obs. Target Obs. Matched Diff. 
Mcap 9.020 8.124 2,034  1,903  -0.896*** 
Advertising 0.0120 0.0140 2,034  1,903  0.00100 
TobinQ 2.039 3.186 2,034  1,903  1.147*** 
InstOwn 78.63 72.22 2,034  1,903  -6.401*** 
Tangibility 0.288 0.280 2,034  1,903  -0.00700 
3yrReturns 9.097 11.00 2,034  1,903  1.900** 
#Employees 3.084 2.684 2,034  1,903  -0.399*** 
FirmAge 3.355 3.304 2,034  1,903  -0.051** 
3.4.3 Does shareholder activism increase retail investors’ attention? 
This study first explores whether retail investors’ attention increases before the annual 
general meetings for firms that receive shareholder proposals (i.e. target firms) 
(Hypothesis 1). After identifying appropriate control firms, this study first plots the 
trends of Abnormal Search Volume (GASVI) for target and matched firms over the 
window [-50, +20] around annual general meetings. The figure is presented in Figure 
3.1. The figure clearly shows that target firms have a greater increase in GASVI (retail 
investors’ attention) prior to annual general meetings compared to matched firms.  
                                                             
34 This study has one-to-one match for each target and control firm to make more precise comparisons. 
However, it should also be noticed that the significant difference between the target and control firms, 
as shown in Table 3.6, is not an indicator of an unbalanced match. Instead, the targets and their 
matched peers are identical in all firm-level characteristics before taking GSVI into consideration. Firms 
that do not receive shareholder proposals might attract low or even no attention from retail investors 
(i.e. zero GSVI), leading to the exclusion of these firms from the sample. Results reported in Table 3.6 




Figure 3.1 Trends of GASVI around annual general meetings 
This figure plots the time-varying trends of Abnormal Search Volume (GASVI) for target and 
matched firms over the window [-50, +20] around annual general meetings 
In the next step, this study sets up multivariate analyses to explore the differences in 
retail investors’ attention between the target and control firms before the annual 
general meetings:  
𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] × 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡)𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑃𝑟𝑒[22])𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡)𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑋𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝑒𝑗,𝑡                                      Equation 14  
where 𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑗,𝑡  is the Abnormal Google Search Volume Index as calculated by 
Equation 1. 𝑃𝑟𝑒[22]  is a dummy variable representing the observation windows. 
𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] assumes the value one if the respective day is within 22 days prior to the 
annual general meetings, and zero otherwise. The variable of interest is the interaction 
term (𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] × 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡) following Hypothesis 1, and 𝛽1 is expected to have a positive 
sign, indicating higher retail investors’ attention for the target firms relative to the 
control firms before the annual general meetings. A series of control variables (𝑋𝑗,𝑡) 
are included in the regression, including advertising expense, market capitalization, 
Tobin’s Q, institutional ownership, tangibility ratio, three-year stock returns, and the 
number of employees, as defined in Section 3.3.2.5 and Table 3.2. 𝛿𝑡 and 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑 are 
year and industry fixed effects.  
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Table 3.7 reports the estimated results of Equation 14. Column (1) shows that the 
coefficient of 𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] × 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 is 0.015, implying that the target firms receive 1.5% 
higher attention from retail investors relative to the control firms 22 days preceding 
the annual general meetings. The coefficient of 𝑃𝑟𝑒[22]  shows retail investors’ 
attention for the control firms. The insignificant relationship between 𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] and 
𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼 indicates that retail investors’ attention does not increase significantly prior to 
the annual general meetings if the firms do not receive a shareholders’ proposal35.  
Moreover, for the target firms (𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡 taking the value of one), the coefficient of 
𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] becomes (𝛽1 + 𝛽2), with an estimate of 0.012, which is statistical significance 
at 5% level (F-stat = 5.82, p-value = 0.02). This implies that the target firms as a whole 
receive 1.2% higher attention from retail investors as measured by GASVI. To put into 
context in terms of significance, these results can be compared with the findings of 
Drake et al. (2012). Drake et al. (2012) report a surge in the abnormal search volume 
before corporate events, with the highest increase in the abnormal search volume of 
1.3% six days before an earnings announcement and only a 0.3% increase before 
analyst forecast.  
Column (2) reports the subsample results of the target firms that receive a high 
salience proposal along with their respective control firms. The estimate of the 
coefficient of 𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] × 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 in this case is 0.019, with statistical significance at 5% 
level. In other words, the firms with high salience proposals receive 1.9% higher 
attention compared to the control firms. This finding is much stronger compared to 
the whole sample of the target firms. 
In addition, Drake et al. (2012) find that abnormal Google search significantly increases 
before the earnings announcements. To control the effect of earnings announcements, 
this study further removes all the firms, both target and control, that have earnings 
                                                             
35 Different event windows (19, 20, 21 and 23 days) are applied for robustness checks. This study has 
also tried other various fixed effects (year, industry, etc.) and clustering of standard errors on various 
dimensions (meeting, firm, industry). The results do not change significantly. More information is 
provided in Section 3.5.  
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announcements 45 days around the annual general meetings. The regression results 
of this subsample are reported in Column (3). The coefficient of 𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] × 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 
becomes 0.027, with statistical significance at 5% level, which is higher than the results 
in Column (1). Such findings suggest that the results based on all the target firms 
capture the lower boundary of attention while keeping statistical significance at a 
reasonable level. 
Table 3.7 Retail investors’ attention during shareholder activism 
This table provides the incremental retail investors’ attention before the annual general 
meetings compared to a set of control firms identified through the Propensity Score Matching. 
The dependent variable is Google Abnormal Search Volume (GASVI). The estimates are based 
on the following regression equation: 𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] × 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡)𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛽2(𝑃𝑟𝑒[22])𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡)𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑋𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝑒𝑗,𝑡 , where 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡  takes the value 
of one if the firm receives a shareholder proposal in a certain year, and zero otherwise; 
𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] assumes the value of one if the respective day is within 22 days prior to the annual 
general meetings, and zero otherwise.  𝑋𝑗,𝑡  represents a set of control variables, including 
market capitalization, advertising expenses, Tobin’s Q, institutional ownership, tangibility ratio, 
three-year stock returns, and the number of employees. The variable definitions are provided 
in Table 3.2. Robust standard errors are provided below in the parentheses and are clustered 
at the firm level. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 All firms High salience firms 
Firms with no earning 
announcements 
Variables GASVI GASVI GASVI 
Pre[22]×Target 0.015** 0.019** 0.027** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) 
Pre[22] -0.003 -0.001 -0.011 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
Target -0.008* -0.008 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Mcap 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Advertising -0.035 -0.116 -0.058 
 (0.118) (0.143) (0.160) 
TobinQ -0.002** -0.004*** -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
InstOwnX 0.066*** 0.071*** 0.052*** 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.016) 
Tangibility 0.023 0.032** 0.007 
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 (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) 
3yrReturnsX -0.005 -0.018 0.012 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.014) 
#Employees -0.005 -0.009** -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
FirmAge -0.001 0.005 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant -0.132*** -0.153*** -0.087*** 
 (0.025) (0.035) (0.027) 
    
Observations 405,747 212,145 188,640 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.002 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The variables with the superscript (X) mean that the estimates of their coefficients are 
multiplied by 100. The note for the superscript is applicable throughout all the tables in this 
thesis. 
3.4.4 Do proxy sentiments and transparency impact retail investors’ 
attention? 
After establishing the fact that the target firms generally receive greater attention from 
retail investors before the annual general meetings more than the matched firms, this 
study further restricts the sample to the target firms only (i.e. there are no matching 
firms in the sample) to examine whether firm-level and campaign-level factors would 
facilitate retail investors’ attention36. To explore how much retail investors’ attention 
is related to the sentiment revealed in the proxy statements (Hypothesis 2a), this study 
employs the following equation: 
𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1(𝑃𝑟𝑒[22])𝑗,𝑡+𝛽2(𝐿𝑀 − 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒)𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] × 𝐿𝑀 − 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒)𝑗,𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑋𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝑒𝑗,𝑡                                        Equation 15                                                                                          
where the variable LM-tone captures the sentiment revealed in the proxy statements. 
A positive (negative) value of the LM-tone implies the dominance of positive (negative) 
                                                             
36 Since LM-tone is the measure of sentiment expressed in the proxy statements, the control firms are 
excluded here, as the control firms do not receive shareholders’ proposals. 
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words or sentiment over negative (positive) words or sentiment in the proxy 
statements. Based on Hypothesis 2a, 𝛽2  is expected to be negatively significant, 
indicating that the negative sentiment grabs more retail investors’ attention before the 
annual general meetings. 𝛽1 is expected to be positive, as 𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] has been found 
significantly positive following Hypothesis 1. The interaction term (𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] × 𝐿𝑀 −
𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒) captures the incremental effect of the sentiment in the proxy statements (LM-
tone) on retail investors’ attention prior to the annual general meetings. 𝑋𝑗,𝑡 
represents a comprehensive set of control variables indicating firms’ information 
environment and financial situation. These control variables include advertising 
expense, market capitalization, Tobin’s Q, institutional ownership, tangibility ratio, 
three-year stock returns, the number of employees, the number of news articles, the 
number of analyst following, bid-ask spread, abnormal turnover, and abnormal return, 
as defined in Section 3.3.2.5 and Table 3.2. 𝛿𝑡 and 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑  are year and industry fixed 
effects. 
To explore the impact of firm-level information transparency on retail investors’ 
attention (Hypothesis 2b), this study further adds the variable LMSW in the 
multiplicative form with 𝑃𝑟𝑒[22]  in the regression, as shown in the following 
equation: 
𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1(𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] × 𝐿𝑀𝑆𝑊)𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑃𝑟𝑒[22])𝑗,𝑡+ 𝛽3(𝐿𝑀 − 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 )𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐿𝑀𝑆𝑊𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑋𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝑒𝑗,𝑡                         Equation 16 
where the variable LMSW captures the firm-level transparency, and it takes the value 
of one if 𝜗𝑦> 0 (when the firm is less transparent) and zero otherwise. 𝑋𝑗,𝑡 represents 
the same set of control variables as in Equation 15. 𝛿𝑡 and 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑 are year and industry 
fixed effects. Based on Hypothesis 2b, 𝛽1  is expected to be positively significant, 
capturing the incremental effect of retail investors’ attention for the less transparent 
firms, given that the coefficient of 𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] (i.e. 𝛽2) is positive. The LM-tone variable 
is also kept in the regression, allowing it to be an additional control. 
67 
 
Table 3.8 reports results of Hypotheses 2a and 2b, based on Equations 15 and 16, 
respectively. Column (1) starts with the regression without the interaction term, and 
Column (2) adds the interaction term into the regression which captures the 
incremental effect. Column (1) shows that the estimate of the coefficient of LM-tone 
is -0.137, statistically significant at 5% level, implying that the positive sentiment 
expressed in the shareholder proposals lowers retail investors’ attention. In other 
words, the negative sentiment increases the abnormal search by the retail investors, 
supporting Hypothesis 2a. This finding is consistent with prior studies that markets 
react more aggressively to bad news than good news (Glosten, Jagannathan, & Runkle, 
1993), and the negative sentiment generally has a stronger pull on attention than the 
positive sentiment (Baumeister et al., 2001). The coefficient of 𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] is positively 
and significantly related to 𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼, with the value of 0.018, indicating that the increase 
in abnormal search (i.e. retail investors’ attention) is significant before the annual 
general meetings. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1 that firms experience an 
increase in retail investors’ attention before the annual general meetings if they 
receive a shareholder proposal.  
Similarly, Column (2) also shows a negative estimate of the coefficient of 𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] ×
𝐿𝑀 − 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒  with the value -0.265, statistically significant at 5% level. Firms whose 
proxy materials are dominated by the negative sentiment attract 26.5% higher retail 
investors’ attention relative to firms whose proxy materials are dominated by the 
positive sentiment. These results provide further evidence on Hypothesis 2a that the 
negative sentiment increases retail investors’ attention during shareholder activism. 
For other control variables, higher values of firms’ Tobin’s Q, institutional ownership, 
tangibility ratio, or abnormal turnover also increase retail investors’ attention. On the 
contrary, the number of news, firms’ stock returns during the past three years, and the 
number of employees are negatively related to the abnormal search. 
Columns (3) and (4) show the impact of information transparency on retail investors’ 
attention (Hypothesis 2b), based on the regressions with or without the interaction 
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terms respectively. Column (3) supports the Hypotheses 1 and 2a that retail investors’ 
attention increases significantly by 1.8% before the annual general meetings and the 
negative sentiment attracts more attention, as indicated by the positive coefficient of 
𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] and negative coefficient of LM-tone. However, the estimate of the coefficient 
of LMSW is insignificant, implying that in general firm-level information transparency 
does not significantly affect retail investors’ search for information.  
More importantly, the key variable of interest in Column (4) is the interaction term 
𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] × 𝐿𝑀𝑆𝑊, which captures the incremental effect of information transparency 
on retail investors’ attention. The estimate of the coefficient of 𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] × 𝐿𝑀𝑆𝑊 is 
positively significant at 5% level with a value of 0.026, indicating that retail investors’ 
attention is 2.6% higher if the target firms are less transparent in their information 
dissemination relative to the target firms that are more transparent. The estimate of 
the coefficient of LM-tone is -0.134, statistically significant at 5% level, which is 
consistent with the results reported in Column (1). This supports Hypothesis 2b that 
the increase of retail investors’ attention is more pronounced for firms with lower 
information transparency even after controlling for the sentiment expressed in the 
proposals. These results align with prior studies that information flow improves 
information acquisition (Goldstein & Yang, 2015). The improvement is more 




Table 3.8 Impact of proxy sentiments and transparency on attention 
This table provides the results of Hypotheses 2a and 2b. Column (1) reports the impact of 
proxy sentiment on retail investors’ attention within 22 days before the annual general 
meetings. The analysis is developed on the following regression: 𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +
 𝛽1(𝑃𝑟𝑒[22])𝑗,𝑡+𝛽2(𝐿𝑀 − 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒)𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑋𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝑒𝑗,𝑡 , where the variable LM-tone 
captures the sentiment revealed in the proxy statements. Column (2) adds the interaction term 
𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] × 𝐿𝑀 − 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 into the regression which captures the incremental effect. Column (3) 
examines the impact of information transparency on retail investors’ attention before the 
annual general meetings based on the regression: 𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽2(𝑃𝑟𝑒[22])𝑗,𝑡+ 𝛽3(𝐿𝑀 −
𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 )𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑀𝑆𝑊𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑋𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝑒𝑗,𝑡 , where the variable LMSW captures the 
firm-level transparency. Column (4) adds the interaction term  𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] × 𝐿𝑀𝑆𝑊  into the 
regression, which provides the incremental effect of information transparency on the changes 
in retail investors’ attention. 𝑋𝑗,𝑡  represents a set of control variables, including market 
capitalization, advertising expenses, Tobin’s Q, institutional ownership, tangibility ratio, three-
year stock returns, and the number of employees. The variable definitions are provided in 
Table 3.2. Robust standard errors are provided below in the parentheses and are clustered at 
the firm level. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full Sample Full Sample Less transparency Less transparency 
Variables GASVI GASVI GASVI GASVI 
Pre[22]×LMSW    0.026** 
 
   (0.012) 
Pre[22]×LM-Tone  -0.265**   
 
 (0.125)   
Pre[22] 0.018*** -0.014 0.018*** 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.006) (0.008) 
LM-Tone -0.137** -0.078 -0.135** -0.134** 
 (0.058) (0.060) (0.057) (0.057) 
LMSW   -0.004 -0.010* 
 
  (0.005) (0.006) 
#News -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Mcap -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Advertising -0.035 -0.035 -0.034 -0.034 
 (0.121) (0.121) (0.120) (0.120) 
TobinQ 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
InstOwnX 0.044*** 0.0447*** 0.000*** 0.044*** 
 (0.016) (0.0169) (0.000) (0.016) 
Tangibility 0.028* 0.028* 0.028* 0.028* 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
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3yrReturnsX -0.037** -0.0372** -0.000** -0.036** 
 (0.015) (0.0158) (0.000) (0.015) 
#Employees -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
FirmAge -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Analyst -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
AbsRet 0.046 0.047 0.043 0.043 
 (0.190) (0.190) (0.190) (0.190) 
AbTV 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Spread 0.020 0.018 0.020 0.021 
 (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) 
Constant 0.022 0.029 0.025 0.028 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
 
    
Observations 209,432 209,432 209,432 209,432 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
To ensure that the impact of the abnormal Google search volume prior to the earnings 
announcement does not contaminate the results, this study separate firms that have 
no earnings announcement 45 days around the annual general meetings following 
Drake et al. (2012). However, this results in an exclusion of 1,710 activism events. 
The regression results are reported in Table 3.9. Column (1) shows that the estimate 
of the coefficient of LM-tone is -0.256, compared to -0.137 as reported in Table 3.8 
(Column (1)). Column (2) also indicates that the increase in retail investors’ attention 
is 5.3% higher if the firms have less transparency. In fact, the comparison between the 
Column (2) of Table 3.9 and Column (2) of Table 3.8 shows that the attention is higher 
for less transparent firms with no earnings announcements. These findings confirm 




Table 3.9 Impact of earnings announcements on retail investors’ attention 
This table provides the results of Hypotheses 2a and 2b by excluding the firms with earnings 
announcements 45 days around annual general meetings. Column (1) reports the impact of 
proxy sentiments on retail investors’ attention 22 days prior to annual general meetings, and 
Column (2) provides the incremental effect of information transparency (represented by 
LMSW) on the changes of retail investors’ attention. The regression models are identical to the 
ones in Table 3.8. The variable definitions are provided in Table 3.2. Robust standard errors are 
provided below in the parentheses and are clustered at the firm level. All variables are 
winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
 Full Sample Less Transparency 
Variables GASVI GASVI 
Pre[22]×LMSW  0.053** 
  (0.021) 
Pre[22] 0.020* -0.009 
 (0.011) (0.014) 
LM-Tone -0.256** -0.248** 
 (0.112) (0.111) 
LMSW  -0.024** 
  (0.010) 
#News -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Mcap -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Advertising -0.071 -0.067 
 (0.218) (0.218) 
TobinQ 0.016** 0.015** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
InstOwnX 0.0099 0.011 
 (0.029) (0.029) 
TangibilityX 0.006 0.007 
 (0.026) (0.026) 
3yrReturnsX -0.037 -0.034 
 (0.024) (0.025) 
#EmployeesX 0.0047 -0.016 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
FirmAgeX -0.059 0.003 
 (0.717) (0.715) 
Analyst -0.010** -0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
AbsRet -0.031 -0.037 
 (0.329) (0.328) 
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AbTV 0.029*** 0.029*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
Spread 0.003 0.002 
 (0.210) (0.210) 
Constant 0.023 0.037 
 (0.054) (0.054) 
   
Observations 80,301 80,301 
R-squared 0.004 0.004 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3.4.5 Does retail investors’ attention impact on participation? 
To examine Hypothesis 3a, this study explores whether a pre-meeting increase in retail 
investors’ attention increases participation (or reduces non-participation) during high 
salience activism. In doing so, the non-participation rate (𝑁𝑃𝑅) is regressed on the 
Cumulative Abnormal Search Volume during the 22-day window before the annual 
general meetings (𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22]), along with LM-tone and other firm-specific control 
variables around the annual general meetings. The cross-sectional regression model is 
shown as follows: 
𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙 × 𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22])𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22])𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑠𝑎𝑙)𝑗𝑡 +
𝛽4(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙 × 𝐿𝑀 − 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒)𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝐿𝑀 − 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒)𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑋𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝑒𝑗,𝑡     
Equation 17 
where 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙  is the dummy variable indicating high salience proposals, which 
assumes the value of one for high salience activism and zero otherwise. The coefficient 
of (𝛽1 + 𝛽2) captures the effect of retail investors’ attention on their participation in 
the voting process for high salience proposals (when  𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑠𝑎𝑙  = 1), while the 
coefficient of the interaction term, 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙 × 𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22] , or 𝛽1  captures the 
incremental effect of the attention for the high salience proposals on participation. To 
avoid potential endogeneity issues, 𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑗,𝑡 is the standardized non-participation rate, 
following Aggarwal et al. (2018). 𝛽1 is expected to have a negative sign, indicating an 
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incremental decrease (increase) in non-participation (participation) due to an increase 
in retail investors’ attention for high salience proposals. The coefficient of 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑠𝑎𝑙, 
𝛽3 captures the non-participation rate for high salience proposals compared to other 
proposals. Furthermore, to examine the impact of firm-level transparency on retail 
investors’ participation (Hypothesis 3b), this study uses a subsample that only includes 
firms with the positive 𝜗𝑦 , that is, the less transparent firms. Relevant results are 
reported in Table 3.10. Table 3.10 starts the regressions with a simple model without 
interaction terms, as reported in Column (1). The interactions term are then added 
into the regressions, as reported in Column (2). Column (3) reports the results of 
Hypothesis 3b.  
Column (1) shows that firms receiving high salience proposals have 13.6% lower non-
participation rate (higher participation rate) in annual general meetings, while the LM-
tone has no direct impact on the non-participation rate. It means that the LM-tone 
significantly affects retail investors’ attention (Hypothesis 2a), which indirectly affects 
retail investors’ participation.  
Column (2) shows the incremental effect of the pre-meeting increase in retail investors’ 
attention on non-participation rate. The estimate of the coefficient of 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑠𝑎𝑙 (𝛽3) is 
-0.231, statistically significant at 1% level, implying that the non-participation rate of 
retail investors is significantly lower for firms with high salience proposals when 
compared to the non-participation rate of firms with other types of proposals. The 
coefficient of (𝛽1 + 𝛽2) is -0.134, which means retail investors’ attention results in 
13.4% lower non-participation (higher participation) in the voting process for the high 
salience proposals relative to non-salience proposals. More importantly, the 
incremental effect of the high salience proposals on retail investors’ non-participation 
is reflected by the coefficient of 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙 × 𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22], with the value of -0.283 and 
statistically significant at 5% level. This suggests that 28.3% reduction in retail investors’ 
non-participation rate during high salience activism can be explained by the increase 
of retail investors’ attention. These findings align with prior studies on voting that retail 
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shareholders’ turnout is higher for closely contested proposals (Lee & Souther, 2020) 
or proxy contests related to advanced social responsibility (Cvijanović et al., 2020). 
Since the coefficient of LM-tone is no longer significant, it seems that the negative 
sentiment expressed in the proxy statements does not directly influence retail 
investors’ participation. Instead, it significantly increases retail investors’ attention, as 
proved in Hypothesis 2a, and the high attention translates into high participation 
indirectly. 
Column (3) and (4) report the results of the subsample of the less transparent firms, 
based on the regressions with or without interaction terms respectively. Column (3) 
shows that retail investors’ attention during high salience activism also significantly 
reduces non-participation rate by 12.7% for less transparent firms. In Column (4), the 
interaction term 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙 × 𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22]  is negatively associated with firms’ non-
participation rate, statistically significant at 5% level, while the estimate of the 
coefficient has a larger absolute value compared to the estimates in Column (1). In 
other words, for firms that receive high salience proposals but are less informationally 
transparent, the decrease in non-participation rate (or increase in participation rate) 
is more pronounced. These results provide supportive evidence for Hypotheses 3a and 
3b, and these findings fill in the research gap on the relation between information 
transparency and voting preference of retail investors. It is also notable that the results 
are not driven by the participation of large account retail shareholders, as shown in 
Brav et al. (2019) that small account retail shareholders tend to support shareholder 
proposals more during shareholder activism than the large account shareholders. 
For other control variables, institutional ownership, tangibility ratio, the number of 
employees, and firm age are also significantly related to the non-participation rate. 
Retail investors are more likely to participate if the firm has higher institutional holding 
or more employees. On the contrary, firms with a long history or higher tangibility ratio 




Table 3.10 Retail investors’ attention and non-participation rate 
This table provides the results of Hypotheses 3a and 3b. Column (1) reports the effect of retail 
investors’ attention on the non-participation rates during high salience activism using a simple 
model without interaction terms. Column (2) reports the incremental effect based on the 
following cross-sectional regression:  𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙 × 𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22])𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛽2(𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22])𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑠𝑎𝑙)𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙 × 𝐿𝑀 − 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒)𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝐿𝑀 − 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒)𝑗,𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑋𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝑒𝑗,𝑡, where 𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑗,𝑡 is the standardized non-participation rate, following 
Aggarwal et al. (2018). 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙  is the dummy variable indicating high salience activism, 
which takes the value of one for high salience activism and zero otherwise; 𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22] is the 
Cumulative Abnormal Google Search Volume for the window [-22, 0]; and 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙 ×
𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22]  is the incremental effect of the attention for the high salience proposals on 
participation. LM-tone is the sentiment revealed in the proxy statements, and 𝑋𝑗,𝑡  represents 
a set of control variables, including market capitalization, advertising expenses, Tobin’s Q, 
institutional ownership, tangibility ratio, three-year stock returns, and the number of 
employees. The variable definitions are provided in Table 3.2. Column (3) provides the 
regression estimated for the sub-sample of less transparent firms using the simple model 
without interaction terms. Column (4) adds the interaction terms into the regression. Robust 
standard errors are provided below in the parentheses and are clustered at the firm level. All 
variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 










HighSal×CGASVI[22]  -0.283**  
 -0.358** 
 
 (0.113)  
 (0.164) 
Highsal×Tone  -0.827  
 -0.734 
 
 (0.587)  
 (0.909) 
Highsal -0.136*** -0.231***  -0.127*** -0.204* 
 (0.025) (0.075)  (0.032) (0.108) 
CGASVI[22] 0.000 0.149  0.058 0.247 
 (0.060) (0.102)  (0.090) (0.151) 
LM-Tone -0.159 0.282  -0.060 0.328 
 (0.332) (0.590)  (0.505) (0.888) 
#News 0.013 0.013  0.014 0.014 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.012) (0.012) 
McapX -0.002 -0.034  -0.021 -1.941 
 (0.014) (1.376)  (0.019) (1.902) 
Advertising 0.312 0.284  -0.184 -0.159 
 (0.687) (0.672)  (1.140) (1.102) 
TobinQ -0.014 -0.014  -0.031 -0.031 
 (0.017) (0.017)  (0.021) (0.020) 
InstOwn -0.007*** -0.007***  -0.006*** -0.007*** 
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 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Tangibility 0.158* 0.157*  0.262** 0.254** 
 (0.090) (0.090)  (0.127) (0.127) 
3yrReturns -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
#Employees -0.054*** -0.057***  -0.052** -0.055** 
 (0.017) (0.016)  (0.023) (0.023) 
FirmAge 0.083*** 0.085***  0.099*** 0.099*** 
 (0.018) (0.018)  (0.028) (0.028) 
Analyst -0.020 -0.020  0.015 0.014 
 (0.014) (0.014)  (0.016) (0.017) 
Constant 1.426*** 1.464***  1.537*** 1.581*** 





Observations 4,022 4,022  2,107 2,107 
R-squared 0.153 0.157  0.166 0.171 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3.4.6 Endogeneity issues 
Results in Table 3.10 are subject to two types of endogeneity issues. Firstly, there is 
reverse causality between retail investors’ attention and their participation. Secondly, 
high salience activism endogenously leads to higher retail investors’ attention and 
subsequent participation. To check the robustness of our results in Table 3.10, this 
study addresses these two endogeneity issues. 
To address the first type of endogeneity concern whether there is reverse causality 
between retail investors’ attention and their participation, this study employs the 
instrumental variable (IV) approach to extract the exogenous component from retail 
investors’ attention. The industry-year median of retail investors’ attention is 
employed as an instrumental variable, which is strongly correlated with firm-level 
retail investors’ attention but uncorrelated with firm-level non-participation rate. 
Using the two-stage least square (2SLS) panel regressions, this study first regresses 
𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22]𝑗,𝑡  on the instrumental variable, i.e. the industry-year median of retail 
investors’ attention, along with the same set of control variables. This study also 
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controls for industry and year fixed effects as in the baseline regressions (Equation 17). 
In the second stage, the fitted value of the Cumulative Abnormal Search Volume, 
namely (𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼_𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑗,𝑡 , is used as the explanatory variable. Formally, the 2SLS 
regressions are presented as follows: 
First stage 
𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22]𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑗,𝑡𝑘 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝑒𝑗,𝑡  
Equation 18 
Second stage  
𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙 × 𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼_𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼_𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛽3(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑠𝑎𝑙)𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙 × 𝐿𝑀 − 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒)𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝐿𝑀 − 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒)𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑋𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 +
𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝑒𝑗,𝑡                                                  Equation 19 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡  is the industry-year median of retail investors’ 
attention, and (𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼_𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑗,𝑡 is the fitted value of 𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22]𝑗,𝑡 from the first-
stage regression. The results of the 2SLS regressions are reported in Table 3.11.  
Column (1) reports the results of the first-stage regression, where the dependent 
variable is firm-level retail investors’ attention. Consistent with the rationale behind 
the instrument, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡  (industry-year median of retail investors’ 
attention) is positively correlated with the firm-level retail investors’ attention with 
statistical significance at 1% level. This implies that the chosen instrument variable is 
valid. Moreover, the F-statistics is high for the first-stage regression (F-statistics=14.04), 
showing that the instrument is not weak. Columns (2) and (3) report the results of the 
second-stage regression, where the dependent variable is the non-participation rate. 
To correct the standard errors in the second-stage regression, bootstrapping is used 
and the standard errors reported in both columns are calculated using 200 repetitions. 
The key variable of interest is the interaction term Highsal x CGASVI_Fitted, the 
estimates of which are significant at 1% level in both Columns (2) and (3), showing a 
negative effect of retail investors’ attention on the non-participation rate. This 
supports Hypotheses 3a and 3b. 
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Table 3.11 Retail investors’ attention and non-participation rate: IV estimator 
This table presents estimates using the instrumental variable method based on two-stage least 
square (2SLS) panel regressions. Column (1) reports the results of the first-stage regression 
where the dependent variable is firm-level retail investors’ attention. The instrument variable 
is the industry-year median of retail investors’ attention. Columns (2) and (3) report the results 
of the second-stage regression, based on the full sample and the subsample of less transparent 
firms respectively, respectively. The dependent variable is the non-participation rate. The key 
variable of interest is the interaction term with the predicted values of retail investors’ 
attention from the first-stage regression into high salience dummy. The same set of control 
variables, industry, and year fixed effects as Equation 17 are included. Robust standard errors 
are provided below in the parentheses and are clustered at the firm level. All variables are 
winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1)  (2) (3) 
 First stage  Second stage 
 CGASVI[22]  NPR NPR 
Variables Full Sample  Full Sample Less Transparency 
Instrumental _Attention 0.812***    
 (0.057)    
HighsalxCGASVI_Fitted    -0.964*** -0.954* 
   (0.345) (0.519) 
Highsal×Tone   -0.947*** -0.753 
   (0.355) (0.513) 
Highsal   -0.222*** -0.186*** 
   (0.046) (0.061) 
CGASVI_Fitted   0.418 0.283 
   (0.278) (0.423) 
LM-Tone -0.128**  0.340 0.299 
 (0.057)  (0.331) (0.448) 
#News 0.005***  0.014*** 0.015** 
 (0.002)  (0.005) (0.007) 
Mcap -0.006*  -0.001 -0.021 
 (0.003)  (0.009) (0.013) 
Advertising -0.347***  0.240 -0.200 
 (0.130)  (0.403) (0.637) 
TobinQ 0.012***  -0.014 -0.028** 
 (0.004)  (0.011) (0.013) 
InstOwn 0.000***  -0.007*** -0.006*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility 0.038**  0.160*** 0.267*** 
 (0.016)  (0.048) (0.080) 
3yrReturns -0.000  -0.001** -0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) 
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#Employees -0.012***  -0.057*** -0.056*** 
 (0.004)  (0.011) (0.015) 
FirmAge -0.001  0.084*** 0.099*** 
 (0.004)  (0.011) (0.018) 
Analyst 0.009***  -0.020*** 0.015 
 (0.003)  (0.008) (0.010) 
Constant 0.104***  1.468*** 1.591*** 
 (0.034)  (0.111) (0.168) 
     
Observations 4,022  4,022 2,107 
F-Stats 14.05***    
Bootstrap reps   200 200 
R-squared 0.115  0.157 0.169 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
To address the second type of endogeneity concerning whether high salience activism 
endogenously leads to higher retail investors’ attention and subsequent participation, 
this study uses the endogenous treatment effect regression method (Wooldridge, 
2010). The model is composed of an equation for the outcome 𝑦𝑗 (𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑗,𝑡) and an 
equation for the endogenous treatment 𝑡𝑗 (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑗,𝑡). The variables 𝑥𝑗 (including 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑠𝑎𝑙, 𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22], 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙 × 𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22], LM-tone, #News, Mcap, Advertising, 
TobinQ, Tangibility, InstOwn, 3yrReturns, #Employees, FirmAge, Analyst) are used to 
model the outcome. When there are no interactions between 𝑡𝑗 and 𝑥𝑗, the models 
are as follows: 
𝑦𝑗 = 𝑥𝑗𝛽 + 𝛿𝑡𝑗 + 𝜖𝑗                                      Equation 20 
𝑡𝑗 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑤𝑗𝛾 + 𝑢𝑗 > 0
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒         
                                   Equation 21 
where 𝑤𝑗 (Mcap, Advertising, TobinQ, Tangibility, InstOwn, 3yrReturns, #Employees, 
FirmAge, Analyst) are the covariates for the treatment assignment. The error terms 𝜖𝑗 
and 𝑢𝑗  are bivariate normal with the mean value of zero. The variance and correlation 
parameters are identical across treatment and control groups. The covariates of 𝑥𝑗 
and 𝑤𝑗 are unrelated to the error terms, implying that they are exogenous. One of 
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the outcome variable, 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙 × 𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22], is the interaction between treatment 
variable (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙 ) and outcome covariate (𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22]). The maximum likelihood 
method proposed by Maddala (1983) and Greene (2000)37 is used.  
The regression results are presented in Table 3.12. Columns (1) and (2) report the 
results for the full sample and the subsample of the less transparent firms, respectively. 
The key variable of interest is the interaction term 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙 × 𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22] , the 
estimates of which take the value of -0.270 and -0.344 in Columns (1) and (2) 
respectively, both statistically significant and negative at 1% level. These results further 
support Hypotheses 3a and 3b, suggesting that the main results are not driven by any 
endogeneity. 
  
                                                             
37 The etregress command in STATA is used to estimate the results. The etregress command estimates 
an average treatment effect (ATE) and the other parameters of a linear regression model augmented 




Table 3.12 High salience activism and participation: Endogenous treatment effect  
This table presents the results of the endogenous treatment effect regressions on the full 
sample and the subsample of the less transparent firms (Columns (1) and (2), respectively). 
Robust standard errors are provided below in the parentheses and are clustered at the firm 
level. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
    (1) (2) 
  NPR  NPR  
Variables  Full Sample Less Transparency 
Highsal ×CGASVI[22]  -0.270*** -0.344*** 
  (0.079) (0.110) 
Highsal  -0.161*** -0.247*** 
  (0.033) (0.070) 
CGASVI[22]  0.142** 0.239** 
  (0.068) (0.096) 
LM-Tone  -0.162 -0.063 
  (0.181) (0.265) 
#News  0.013*** 0.013** 
  (0.004) (0.006) 
Mcap  0.002 -0.010 
  (0.009) (0.013) 
Advertising  0.290 -0.193 
  (0.432) (0.600) 
TobinQ  -0.017 -0.037*** 
  (0.011) (0.014) 
InstOwn  -0.007*** -0.006*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility  0.162*** 0.270*** 
  (0.050) (0.072) 
3yrReturns  -0.001** -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
#Employees  -0.056*** -0.058*** 
  (0.010) (0.015) 
FirmAge  0.083*** 0.095*** 
  (0.011) (0.017) 
Analyst  -0.019** 0.015 
  (0.008) (0.010) 
Constant  1.279*** 1.425*** 
  (0.106) (0.154) 
    
Observations  4,022 2,107 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.4.7 Average treatment effects 
This study provides further evidence on the effect of retail investors’ attention on non-
participation rate by examining the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) on non-
participation rate between firms that receive specific types of high salience proposals 
and firms that receive all the remaining types of proposals 38 . The ATE provides 
information about the average difference of the non-participation rate between the 
target and control firms by comparing their absolute non-participation. It is important 
to mention here that all explanatory variables added in the ATE regressions are the 
same as in Table 3.10, but interactions among variables are avoided. The ATE is 
calculated as: 
𝐴𝑇𝐸 = 𝐸(𝑦1 − 𝑦0) = (1 − 𝑡)𝑦0 − 𝑡𝑦1                                Equation 22  
where 𝑡𝑖  denotes the treatment received. With 𝑋  presenting covariates of the 
outcome variables, 𝑦0  and 𝑦1 are calculated as:  
  𝑦0 = 𝑋𝛽0 + 𝜖0                                                Equation 23 
  𝑦1 = 𝑋𝛽1 + 𝜖1                                                Equation 24 
Table 3.13 reports ATE’s results and the percentage change of ATE between the target 
and control firms. As prior literature shows that the levels of institutional ownership 
make a significant difference in the relation between voting outcomes and firm-level 
transparency (Boone & White, 2015; Cvijanović et al., 2020; Prevost et al., 2016), as 
evident from Table 3.10, this study further divides the sample into above or below 
median institutional ownership. 
                                                             
38 Here, the control firms are firms that receive proposals other than the type of high salience proposals 
under investigation. To be more specific, in Panel (a), proposals of interest are all high salience 
proposals (including social and environment proposals, contentious corporate governance proposals 
and corporate governance proposals for firms in financial distress). All other types of types are 
considered as remaining types of proposals. Similarly, in Panel (b), proposals of interest are social and 
environmental proposals. Remaining proposals include contentious corporate governance proposals, 
corporate governance proposals for firms in financial distress and all other types of proposals. In Panel 
(c) and (d), proposals of interest are contentious corporate governance proposals and corporate 
governance proposals for firms in financial distress, respectively.  
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In Panel (a), the average non-participation rate for the firms that receive high salience 
proposals is 25.122%, while the average non-participation rate for the firms that 
receive other types of proposals is 28.820%. This indicates a 3.698% higher 
participation rate for firms that receive high salience proposals. This represents a 
significant decrease in the non-participation rate (12.831% by percentage change) if 
firms receive high salience proposals. These numbers are marginally different from 
what is reported in Table 3.10 due to the specification of the ATE regressions that there 
are no interactions among explanatory variables in equations. The decrease in the 
non-participation rate is more pronounced for firms with above median institutional 
ownership. The target firms experience a significantly lower non-participation rate 
(5.939% lower or 22.099% by percentage change) if their institutional ownership is 
above the median, while the target firms with below median institutional ownership 
do not witness a statistically significant decrease in the non-participation rate. 
Panels (b), (c), and (d) show the average treatment effect on the non-participation 
rates for the firms that receive specific types of high salience proposals. The non-
participation rate is 3.342% (12.091% by percentage change) lower if the firms receive 
social and environmental proposals. Similarly, the non-participation rate is 1% (3.701% 
by percentage change) lower if the firms receive contentious corporate governance 
proposals. These results provide supportive evidence to Hypothesis 3a, as reported in 
Table 3.10. Firms that receive specific types of proposals attract retail investors’ 
attention, and consequently, the non-participation rate decreases.  
In Panel (d), the average non-participation rate of financially distressed firms is 
statistically indifferent from the non-participation rate of remaining firms. The 
apparent insignificance in the ATE for financially distressed firms is reflected in the fact 
that the non-participation rate of the target firms is 4.966% lower with above median 
institutional ownership and 7.076% higher with below median institutional ownership, 
both of which are statistically significant at 1% level. Hence, the net effect on the non-
participation rate of the full sample of financially distressed firms becomes less 
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significant. The findings thus show a substantial role of institutional ownership in retail 
investors’ participation during the voting process: the higher the institutional 
ownership, the higher is the participation of retail investors. 
Table 3.13 Average Treatment Effects 
This table provides results of the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) on the non-participation rate. 
In each panel, the target firms are the firms that receive a specific type of high salience 
proposals based on various levels of institutional ownership. The control firms are firms that 
receive proposals other than the type of high salience proposals under investigation. All 
regressions include industry and year fixed effects. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th 








compared to other 
proposals 
Panel (a) High Salience Proposals 
  
 
Full Sample 25.122 28.820 -3.698*** -12.831*** 
InstOwn> Median 20.935 26.874 -5.939*** -22.099*** 
InstOwn< Median 29.812 30.169 -0.357 -1.183 
Panel (b) Proposals Social 
  
 
Full Sample 24.298 27.640 -3.342*** -12.091*** 
InstOwn> Median 20.505 25.036 -4.531*** -18.098*** 
InstOwn< Median 28.160 30.265 -2.105*** -6.955*** 
Panel (c) Proposals Close CG 
  
 
Full Sample 26.020 27.020 -1.000*** -3.701*** 
InstOwn> Median 20.624 24.962 -4.338*** -17.378*** 
InstOwn< Median 31.720 30.300 1.420** 4.686** 
Panel (d) Proposals Fin dis CG 
  
 
Full Sample 27.381 28.224 0.843 -2.987 
InstOwn> Median 20.130 25.096 -4.966*** -19.788*** 
InstOwn< Median 36.796 29.720 7.076*** 23.809*** 
3.4.8 The impact of E-proxy on retail investors’ participation 
The last model explores the consequence of E-proxy on retail investors’ participation 
during high salience activism (Hypothesis 4). A dummy variable, E-proxy, is introduced 
in the model, which takes the value of one for the years after 2009 when the E-proxy 
was fully implemented, and zero otherwise. The regression model is shown as follows: 
𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙 × 𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22] × 𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦)𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙 × 𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22])𝑗,𝑡 +
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𝛽3(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙)𝑗,𝑡  + 𝛽4(𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦)𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22])𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽6(𝐿𝑀 − 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 )𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑋𝑗,𝑡  +
𝛿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝑒𝑗,𝑡                                                 Equation 25 
The key variable of interest is the coefficient 𝛽1, which reflects the impact of retail 
investors’ attention after the E-proxy is introduced in 2009 on retail investors’ 
participation during high salience activism. Following Hypothesis 4, 𝛽1 is expected to 
be negative, implying an incremental increase (decrease) in retail investors’ 
participation (non-participation) for high salience proposals after implementing E-
proxy. Moreover, when 𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 = 1 (namely after the full implementation of E-proxy), 
(𝛽1 + 𝛽2)  captures the total impact of retail investors’ attention on the non-
participation for high salience proposals. This study also runs the same regression 
using the subsample of firms with less information transparency to examine whether 
firm-level transparency would interact with the E-proxy during the voting process. 
Relevant results are reported in Table 3.14. 
Column (1) shows that the coefficient of 𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 is positively significant with a value 
of 0.105 and statistical significance at 5% level. It means that the introduction of E-
proxy has no direct impact in decreasing the non-participation of the retail investors. 
To better understand these results, it is notable that E-proxy does not change how 
institutional investors receive their proxy documents, most of whom use paid 
platforms, while the E-proxy experiment does facilitate retail investors’ search for 
information. However, although there have been innovations in voting methods since 
the implementation of E-proxy, there are little changes on retail investors’ 
participation. This aligns with the findings of Geoffroy (2018). However, the estimate 
of 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙  is -0.088 with statistical significance at 1% level, implying that the 
participation associated with high salience proposals has increased by around 8.8%. 
More importantly, the coefficient of the interaction term 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙 × 𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22] ×
𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦, is negative with a value of -0.210 and statistical significance at 1% level. It 
means that after the full implementation of E-proxy, retail investors’ attention has 
resulted in a significant decrease (increase) in the non-participation (participation) rate 
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during high salience activism. More specifically, after the implementation of E-proxy 
(i.e. 𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 = 1), the estimates of coefficients (𝛽1 + 𝛽2) equal -0.163 (F-stat = 4.25 
and p-value = 0.04). This implies a significant overall decrease (increase) in the non-
participation (participation) rate of firms during high salience activism with an increase 
in retail investors’ attention. In other words, the retail investors’ participation would 
have been even lower overall without the implementation of E-proxy.  
In Column (2), for firms with lower information transparency, the incremental effect of 
E-proxy on retail investors’ participation is also significant with a negative value of -
0.199 and statistical significance at 10% level. This indicates that the introduction of E-
proxy is also relevant for less transparent firms. The incremental effect is less 
pronounced than the findings in Column (1), as both the (absolute) value of the 
coefficient and the significance level drop. However, this provides evidence that E-
proxy, as a representative of information technology, improves firms’ information flow, 





Table 3.14 E-proxy and non-participation rate 
This table reports the results of Hypothesis 4, which examines the impact of E-proxy on the 
non-participation rate. Column (1) reports the regression based on the regression: 𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑗𝑡 =
 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙 × 𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22] × 𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦)𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙 × 𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22])𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛽3(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙)𝑗,𝑡  + 𝛽4(𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦)𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22])𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽6(𝐿𝑀 − 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 )𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑋𝑗,𝑡  + 𝛿𝑡 +
𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝑒𝑗,𝑡, where Eproxy is the dummy variable that takes the value of one for years after 2009 
when the E-proxy was fully implemented, and zero otherwise. The key variable of interest is 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙 × 𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22] × 𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦, which captures the incremental effect of E-proxy on retail 
investors’ participation during high salience activism. LM-tone is the sentiment revealed in the 
proxy statements. 𝑋𝑗,𝑡  represents a set of control variables, including market capitalization, 
advertising expenses, Tobin’s Q, institutional ownership, tangibility ratio, three-year stock 
returns, and the number of employees. The variable definitions are provided in Table 3.2. 
Column (2) provides the regression for the subsample of the less transparent firms. Robust 
standard errors are provided below in the parentheses and are clustered at the firm level. All 
variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
 NRP NRP 
 Full Sample Less Transparency 
HighSal×CGASVI[22]×Eproxy -0.210*** -0.199* 
 (0.078) (0.110) 
HighSal×CGASVI[22] 0.047 0.067 
 (0.078) (0.109) 
Highsal -0.088*** -0.100*** 
 (0.020) (0.028) 
Eproxy 0.105** 0.090 
 (0.046) (0.074) 
CGASVI[22] 0.051 0.051 
 (0.059) (0.085) 
LM-Tone -0.355* -0.227 
 (0.212) (0.357) 
#News 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.010) (0.013) 
Advertising -0.376 -0.519 
 (0.791) (1.127) 
Mcap -0.027 -0.032 
 (0.019) (0.025) 
TobinQ -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.015) (0.022) 
InstOwn -0.007*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility 0.094 0.118 
 (0.121) (0.147) 
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3yrReturns -0.002*** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
#Employees -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.020) (0.027) 
FirmAge 0.009 0.036 
 (0.025) (0.031) 
AnalystX 0.256 -0.036 
 (1.319) (1.752) 
Constant 1.518*** 1.498*** 
 (0.177) (0.222) 
   
Observations 4,022 2,107 
R-squared 0.116 0.131 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3.5 Robustness checks 
Several robustness tests are conducted in this essay and incorporated alternative 
specifications. Firstly, instead of the Drake et al. (2012) measure of GASVI, this study 
uses an alternative proxy for retail investors’ attention as proposed in Da et al. (2011). 
Following Da et al. (2011), GASVI is calculated as the difference between the logarithm 
of daily GSVI for firm “j” at time “t” and the logarithm of the median GSVI for firm “j” 
during the preceding eight weeks. This study re-examines all the hypotheses using Da 
et al.’s (2011) proxy for retail investors’ attention. Relevant results are reported in 
Tables 3.15 -3.18. 
Table 3.15 confirms the main findings that the target firms experience an increase in 
retail investors’ attention relative to their matched control firms before the annual 
general meetings (Hypothesis 1). Table 3.16 provides evidence that the negative 
sentiment in shareholder proposals attracts more retail investors’ attention 
(Hypothesis 2a), especially for less transparent firms (Hypothesis 2b). The increase in 
attention leads to higher retail investors’ participation during high salience activism 
(Hypothesis 3a), and this effect is also more pronounced for less transparent firms 
(Hypothesis 3b), as shown in Table 3.17. Table 3.18 supports the impact of E-proxy on 
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the increase of retail investors’ participation (decrease of non-participation) during 
high salience activism.  
Table 3.15 Retail investors’ attention during shareholder activism, Da et al. (2011) 
measure 
This table provides results on the incremental retail investors’ attention before the annual 
general meetings (Hypothesis 1), using the Da et al.’s (2011) measure of retail investors’ 
attention. The dependent variable, Google Abnormal Search Volume (Da_GASVI), is calculated 
as the difference between the logarithm of daily GSVI for firm “j” at time “t” and the logarithm 
of the median GSVI for firm “j” during the preceding eight weeks. The explanatory and control 
variables are the same as the main tests reported in Table 3.7. The variable definitions are 
provided in Table 3.2. Robust standard errors are provided below in the parentheses and are 
clustered at the firm level. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * 
represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 All firms 
High salience 
firms 
Firms with no earning 
announcements 
  Da_GASVI Da_GASVI Da_GASVI 
Pre[22]×Target 0.009** 0.009* 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Pre[22] 0.003 0.006 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Target -0.007 -0.008 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Mcap -0.006*** -0.005** -0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Advertising 0.134 0.102 0.039 
 (0.090) (0.120) (0.158) 
TobinQ 0.001 0.003* 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
InstOwn 0.042*** 0.055*** 0.061*** 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.016) 
Tangibility -0.003 -0.004 -0.012 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
3yrReturns -0.001 -0.004 -0.014 
 (0.0087) (0.012) (0.012) 
#Employees -0.008** -0.008** -0.006 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
FirmAge -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 0.072*** 0.051** 0.071*** 




   
Observations 338,202 185,473 135,021 
R-squared 0.011 0.013 0.015 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 




Table 3.16 Impact of proxy sentiments and transparency on attention, Da et al. (2011) 
measure 
This table shows the robustness results of Hypotheses 2a and 2b, using Da et al.’s (2011) 
measure of retail investors’ attention. Column (1) reports the impact of proxy sentiments on 
retail investors’ attention. Column (2) provides the incremental effect of information 
transparency (represented by LMSW) on the changes of retail investors’ attention. The 
explanatory and control variables are the same as the main tests reported in Table 3.8. The 
variable definitions are provided in Table 3.2. Robust standard errors are provided below in 
the parentheses and are clustered at the firm level. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th 
percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
 Full Sample Less Transparency 
 Da_GASVI Da_GASVI 
Pre[22]×LMSW  0.015* 
  (0.008) 
Pre[22] 0.018*** 0.010* 
 (0.004) (0.006) 
LM-Tone -0.082** -0.083** 
 (0.033) (0.033) 
LMSW  -0.002 
  (0.003) 
#News -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Mcap -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Advertising -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.063) (0.063) 
TobinQ 0.003* 0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
InstOwnX 0.020** 0.020** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Tangibility 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
3yrReturnsX 0.009 0.009 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
#Employees -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
FirmAge 0.003 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Analyst -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
AbsRet -0.077 -0.076 
 (0.123) (0.123) 
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AbTV 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Spread 0.061 0.062 
 (0.094) (0.094) 
Constant -0.037** -0.036** 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
   
Observations 233,871 233,871 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 





Table 3.17 Retail investors’ attention and non-participation, Da et al. (2011) measure 
This table shows the robustness results of Hypotheses 3a and 3b, using Da et al.’s (2011) 
measure of retail investors’ attention. Column (1) provides the effect of retail investors’ 
attention on non-participation rates during high salience activism. Column (2) provides the 
incremental effect of information transparency on the changes in the non-participation rate. 
The explanatory and control variables are the same as the main tests reported in Table 3.10. 
The variable definitions are provided in Table 3.2. Robust standard errors are provided below 
in the parentheses and are clustered at the firm level. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 
99th percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
 NPR NPR 
Variables Full Sample Less Transparency 
HighSal×DA_CGASVI[22] -0.031*** -0.021** 
 (0.008) (0.010) 
Highsal×Tone -0.836 -0.722 
 (0.581) (0.893) 
Highsal -0.237*** -0.211* 
 (0.075) (0.109) 
DA_CGASVI[22] 0.012 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.010) 
LM-Tone 0.230 0.272 
 (0.586) (0.879) 
#News 0.012 0.014 
 (0.008) (0.012) 
Mcap -0.002 -0.020 
 (0.014) (0.019) 
Advertising 0.365 -0.173 
 (0.660) (1.094) 
TobinQ -0.015 -0.030 
 (0.017) (0.021) 
InstOwn -0.007*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Tangibility 0.149* 0.250** 
 (0.089) (0.127) 
3yrReturns -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
#Employees -0.058*** -0.057** 
 (0.016) (0.023) 
FirmAge 0.081*** 0.096*** 
 (0.018) (0.028) 
Analyst -0.020 0.016 
 (0.014) (0.017) 
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Constant 1.492*** 1.607*** 
 (0.185) (0.262) 
   
Observations 4,022 2,107 
R-squared 0.165 0.172 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 





Table 3.18 E-proxy and non-participation rate, Da et al. (2011) measure 
This table shows the robustness results of Hypothesis 4, using Da et al.’s (2011) measure of 
retail investors’ attention. Column (1) reports the impact of E-proxy on the non-participation 
rate during high salience activism. Column (2) provides the regression for the subsample of 
the less transparent firms. The explanatory and control variables are the same as the main 
tests reported in Table 3.14. The variable definitions are provided in Table 3.2. Robust standard 
errors are provided below in the parentheses and are clustered at the firm level. All variables 
are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
 NPR NPR 
Variables Full Sample Less Transparency 
HighSal×DA_CGASVI[22]×Eproxy -0.012** -0.015* 
 (0.005) (0.008) 
HighSal×DA_CGASVI[22] -0.003 -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.008) 
Highsal -0.091*** -0.101*** 
 (0.020) (0.028) 
Eproxy 0.098** 0.082 
 (0.047) (0.075) 
DA_CGASVI[22] 0.004 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.007) 
LM-Tone -0.379* -0.232 
 (0.212) (0.353) 
#News 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.010) (0.013) 
Advertising -0.306 -0.494 
 (0.791) (1.125) 
Mcap -0.029 -0.033 
 (0.019) (0.025) 
TobinQ 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.015) (0.022) 
InstOwn -0.007*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility 0.085 0.114 
 (0.121) (0.147) 
3yrReturns -0.002*** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
#Employees -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.020) (0.027) 
FirmAge 0.011 0.035 
 (0.025) (0.031) 
Analyst 0.002 -0.001 
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 (0.013) (0.017) 
Constant 1.520*** 1.504*** 
 (0.177) (0.223) 
   
Observations 4,022 2,107 
R-squared 0.124 0.133 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Secondly, instead of using the 22-day window preceding the annual general meetings, 
this study employs several other event windows, including 19-day, 20-day, 21-day, 23-
day, and 24-day windows. This robustness check expects to ensure that the selection 
of event windows does not bias against the results. Results for all the hypotheses are 
reported in Tables 3.19-3.22. These robustness results confirm that the selection of 
event windows does not affect the results of the underlying hypotheses. Different 
event windows all provide consistent evidence on the increase in retail investors’ 
attention preceding the annual general meetings, leading to higher participation 




Table 3.19 Retail investors’ attention during shareholder activism, various event 
windows 
This table provides results on the incremental retail investors’ attention before the annual 
general meetings (Hypothesis 1), based on various event windows. The dependent variable is 
GASVI using the Drake et al.’s (2012) measure. The control variables are included in the 
regressions, as the main tests reported in Table 3.7. Robust standard errors are provided below 
in the parentheses and are clustered at the firm level. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 
99th percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 GASVI GASVI GASVI GASVI GASVI 
Variables Pre[19] Pre[20] Pre[21] Pre[23] Pre[24] 
Time x Treatment 0.013* 0.014* 0.015** 0.014* 0.014* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Time -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Target -0.007 -0.007* -0.008* -0.008* -0.008* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.132*** -0.132*** -0.132*** -0.132*** -0.132*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
      
Observations 405,747 405,747 405,747 405,747 405,747 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 3.20 Impact of proxy sentiments and transparency on attention, various event windows 
This table shows the robustness results of Hypotheses 2a and 2b, based on various event windows. Columns (1)-(5) report the results on the impact of proxy 
sentiments on retail investors’ attention (Hypotheses 2a), and Columns (6)-(10) report the incremental effect of information transparency on the changes of 
retail investors’ attention (Hypotheses 2b). The dependent variable is GASVI using the Drake et al.’s (2012) measure. The control variables are included in the 
regressions, as the main tests reported in Table 3.8. Robust standard errors are provided below in the parentheses and are clustered at the firm level. All 
variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 GASVI GASVI GASVI GASVI GASVI GASVI GASVI GASVI GASVI GASVI 
Variables Pre[19] Pre[20] Pre[21] Pre[23] Pre[24] Pre[19] Pre[20] Pre[21] Pre[23] Pre[24] 
Time 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
LM-Tone -0.137** -0.137** -0.137** -0.137** -0.137** -0.134** -0.134** -0.134** -0.134** -0.134** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Time x LMSW      0.023* 0.024** 0.025** 0.026** 0.023** 
      (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
LMSW      -0.009 -0.009* -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* 
      (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.027 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
           
Observations 209,432 209,432 209,432 209,432 209,432 209,432 209,432 209,432 209,432 209,432 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.21 Retail investors’ attention and non-participation rate, various event 
windows 
This table shows the robustness results of Hypothesis 3a on the impact of retail investors’ 
attention on their participation during high salience activism, based on various event windows. 
The dependent variable is the non-participation rate (NPR) during high salience activism. The 
control variables are included in the regressions, as the main tests reported in Table 3.10. 
Robust standard errors are provided below in the parentheses and are clustered at the firm 
level. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 NPR NPR NPR NPR NPR 
Variables CGASVI[19] CGASVI[20] CGASVI[21] CGASVI[23] CGASVI[24] 
Time x Highsal -0.262** -0.267** -0.264** -0.257** -0.272** 
 (0.106) (0.104) (0.108) (0.118) (0.120) 
Time 0.141 0.137 0.123 0.115 0.123 
 (0.094) (0.091) (0.095) (0.106) (0.107) 
Highsal×Tone -0.841 -0.833 -0.829 -0.820 -0.824 
 (0.586) (0.586) (0.587) (0.589) (0.589) 
Highsal -0.233*** -0.232*** -0.232*** -0.231*** -0.231*** 
 (0.075) (0.076) (0.076) (0.075) (0.075) 
LM-Tone 0.295 0.287 0.281 0.278 0.280 
 (0.589) (0.589) (0.590) (0.593) (0.592) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.463*** 1.465*** 1.468*** 1.467*** 1.468*** 
 (0.187) (0.187) (0.187) (0.186) (0.186) 
      
Observations 4,022 4,022 4,022 4,022 4,022 
R-squared 0.157 0.157 0.156 0.156 0.156 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 3.22 E-proxy and non-participation rate, various event windows 
This table shows the robustness results of Hypothesis 4 on the incremental impact of E-proxy 
on retail investor’ participation, based on various event windows. The dependent variable is 
the non-participation rate (NPR) during high salience activism. The control variables are 
included in the regressions, as the main tests reported in Table 3.15. Robust standard errors 
are provided below in the parentheses and are clustered at the firm level. All variables are 
winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 NPR NPR NPR NPR NPR 
Variables CGASVI[19] CGASVI[20] CGASVI[21] CGASVI[23] CGASVI[24] 
Time x Highsal x Eproxy -0.171** -0.165** -0.171** -0.245*** -0.230*** 
 (0.072) (0.074) (0.079) (0.082) (0.081) 
Time x Highsal 0.039 0.016 0.012 0.088 0.070 
 (0.076) (0.075) (0.077) (0.085) (0.083) 
Time 0.037 0.047 0.047 0.034 0.040 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.061) (0.063) 
Highsal -0.088*** -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.089*** -0.088*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Eproxy 0.104** 0.104** 0.103** 0.105** 0.106** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) 
LM-Tone -0.356* -0.356* -0.357* -0.357* -0.355* 
 (0.213) (0.212) (0.212) (0.212) (0.213) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.519*** 1.520*** 1.520*** 1.519*** 1.520*** 
 (0.177) (0.177) (0.177) (0.177) (0.176) 
      
Observations 4,022 4,022 4,022 4,022 4,022 
R-squared 0.116 0.117 0.116 0.116 0.116 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Thirdly, as discussed in Subsection 3.3.2.1, there is an overlap for the first two days of 
the annual general meetings (i.e. day 0 and day 1). As a robustness check, this study 
calculates GASVI over the period [-14 week, -4 week] prior to the annual general 
meetings. This makes sure that there is no overlap in the “abnormal” estimation 
window and the “normal” performance period. Cumulative Abnormal Search Volume 












                            Equation 27   
Hence, as a robustness check, this study re-examines Equations 14 and 17 using the 
new GASVI and CGASVI proxies. Relevant results are reported in Table 3.23 and Table 
3.24. The results are consistent with the main results and provide evidence to 
Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b. 
Table 3.23 Retail investors’ attention during shareholder activism, new estimation 
windows for GASVI 
This table provides the incremental retail investors’ attention before the annual general 
meetings compared to a set of control firms (Hypothesis 1). The dependent variable is Google 
Abnormal Search Volume (GASVI) calculated over the period [-14 week, -4 week] prior to the 
annual general meetings. The variable definitions are provided in Table 3.2. Robust standard 
errors are provided below in the parentheses and are clustered at the firm level. All variables 
are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 All firms High salience firms 
Firms with no earning 
announcements 
Variables GASVI_2 GASVI_2 GASVI_ 
Pre[22]×Target 0.015** 0.019** 0.023* 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) 
Pre[22] -0.003 -0.001 -0.008 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
Target -0.008* -0.008 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Mcap 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Advertising -0.035 -0.116 -0.001 
 (0.118) (0.143) (0.177) 
TobinQ -0.002** -0.004*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
InstOwnX 0.0662*** 0.0718*** 0.0512*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0183) (0.0170) 
Tangibility 0.023 0.032** 0.006 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) 
3yrReturnsX -0.00519 -0.0185 0.0144 
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 (0.0132) (0.0182) (0.0147) 
#Employees -0.005 -0.009** 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
FirmAge -0.001 0.005 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant -0.133*** -0.154*** -0.091*** 
 (0.025) (0.035) (0.028) 
 
   
Observations 405,747 212,145 163,739 
R-squared 0.003 0.004 0.002 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3.24 Retail investors’ attention and non-participation rate, new estimation 
windows for CGASVI 
This table provides the robustness results of Hypotheses 3a and 3b. 𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼[22]  is the 
Cumulative Abnormal Google Search Volume based on the Google Abnormal Search Volume 
(GASVI), which is calculated over the period [-14 week, -4 week] prior to the annual general 
meetings. The variable definitions are provided in Table 3.2. Column (2) provides the 
regression estimated for the sub-sample of less transparent firms. Robust standard errors are 
provided below in the parentheses and are clustered at the firm level. All variables are 
winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
 NPR NPR 
Variables Full Sample Less Transparency 
HighSal×CGASVI_2[22] -0.295** -0.337** 
 (0.124) (0.170) 
Highsal×Tone -0.579 -0.034 
 (0.573) (0.892) 
Highsal -0.182** -0.112 
 (0.073) (0.106) 
CGASVI_[22] 0.190* 0.282* 
 (0.109) (0.146) 
LM-Tone 0.056 -0.315 
 (0.561) (0.848) 
#News 0.017** 0.017 
 (0.009) (0.013) 
McapX 0.003 -0.029 
 (0.014) (0.018) 
Advertising 0.979* 1.201 
 (0.529) (0.782) 
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TobinQ -0.018 -0.023 
 (0.015) (0.020) 
InstOwn -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility 0.152* 0.208* 
 (0.092) (0.126) 
3yrReturnsX -0.099 -0.031 
 (0.095) (0.136) 
#Employees -0.050*** -0.048** 
 (0.016) (0.022) 
FirmAge 0.078*** 0.100*** 
 (0.019) (0.028) 
Analyst -0.023 0.018 
 (0.014) (0.016) 
Constant 1.375*** 1.595*** 
 (0.196) (0.259) 
   
Observations 4,022 2,107 
R-squared 0.150 0.182 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In addition to the results reported above, there are several untabulated results 
including various fixed effects (year or industry) and clustering the standard errors on 
various dimensions (meeting, firm, or industry). These tests all show quantitatively 
similar and statistically significant results to the main findings 39 . With the above 
robustness results, I am now confident with the hypotheses of this study that 
information technology helps mitigate retail investors’ apathy issues during 
shareholder activism. 
3.6 Conclusions 
This study explores the dynamics of retail investors’ attention during shareholder 
activism and its impact on retail investors’ participation in the wake of the digital age 
(when accessibility to the internet has extended enormously). Examining the U.S. 
                                                             
39 Owing to the amount of tables and high consistence of the results, these results are not reported in 
the dissertation. Relevant results are available upon request. 
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sample of all shareholder activism events covering the period 2005-2016, this study 
finds that retail investors’ attention of the target firms significantly increases before 
the annual general meetings during which a shareholder proposal is to be voted. This 
increase in attention is not driven by earnings announcements and is more 
pronounced for firms with less information transparency. This study also finds a 
positive impact of retail shareholders’ attention on their participation during high 
salience activism, which resonates with their preferences and interests. Retail 
investors are also more likely to participate in the voting process if the target firms 
have a higher institutional ownership level. Finally, this study documents that the 
introduction of E-proxy has generated higher sentiment that has facilitated retail 
investors’ participation in high salience activism.  
This study has several important contributions and implications. It is the first study to 
examine the relationship between retail investors’ attention and participation. It is also 
the first study to document retail investors’ preferences during shareholder activism. 
The empirical results provide evidence on the role of information technology in 
mitigating investors’ apathy problems, which might provide a new insight for attracting 
retail investors. Consistent with the suggestions of the SEC roundtable, this study 
provides practical implications that information technology should be well 
incorporated in proxy voting process, which helps retail investors make informed 
decisions. 
 
Chapter Four: Essay Two: Hedge fund activism and firm risk-
taking  
This chapter presents the second essay of the thesis, which examines the link between 
hedge fund activism and firm risk-taking. This study also considers the impact of the 
information environment and managements’ response to activism on activism 
outcomes. Section 4.1 presents a brief introduction to this study. Section 4.2 provides 
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an overview of relevant literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes 
the data sources, key variables, and models used in this study. Section 4.4 reports the 
core findings. Section 4.5 illustrates various robustness checks. Section 4.6 concludes 









Hedge funds have emerged as both the most promising and the most controversial 
type of activist. This essay examines how firm risk-taking is affected by the presence 
of hedge fund activism. Using a sample of hedge fund activism events in the U.S., this 
study provides evidence that firms targeted by activists experience a significant 
reduction in risk-taking over the five-year period following hedge fund interventions. 
This post-intervention risk reduction is more pronounced for firms with myopic 
management or lower information transparency. These results suggest that target 
firms become more risk-averse post interventions, which indicates hedge funds’ 
potential engagement in short-termism. In addition, this study shows that 
management’s hostile resistance to activism would offset the initial effect of hedge 
fund activism on target firms. Overall, this study highlights a negative consequence of 
activist hedge funds’ investment in firms, which provides implications for policymakers 
and corporate management.  






Hedge funds as the latest activist investor entered the activism scene in late 1990s. 
Over the past two decades, hedge funds have overtaken all other institutional 
investors, such as pension funds and mutual funds, and become the most prevalent 
activist investor (Denes, Karpoff, & McWillians, 2017). According to a Reuters news 
article, in the activist sector hedge funds had $12 billion at their disposal in 2003, 
which had increased to $146 billion in 2018 (Herbst-Bayliss, 2019). Firms targeted by 
activist hedge funds have also increased in both number (Tang, 2020) and size (Moyer, 
2017), exposing a large number of firms to further activism threats. The rising 
popularity of hedge fund activism and its increased influence on corporate governance 
have raised various concerns. The debate over hedge fund activism among academic 
circles, policymakers and corporate management has led to rigorous research in order 
to understand both short-run and long-term economic effects of hedge fund activism. 
In absence of any universally accepted definition of hedge funds, a roundtable on 
hedge funds organized by SEC identified the following characteristics. Firstly, hedge 
funds are pooled, privately organized investment vehicles. Secondly, they are 
administered by professional investment managers, who have performance-based 
compensation and invest significantly in the fund. Thirdly, they are not widely available 
to the public. Fourthly, they are exempted from securities regulation and registration 
requirements (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, & Thomas, 2008). These unique characteristics are 
supposed to influence the effectiveness of activist hedge funds in pursuing 
shareholder activism (Goranova & Ryan, 2014). 
Hedge fund activism has been considered within agency theory and the shareholder 
primacy model. In contrast to other “rationally apathetic” shareholders, hedge funds 
have been considered as an active monitoring entity that reduces agency costs 
inherent in publicly held companies. Kahan and Rock (2007) suggest that activist hedge 
funds have better incentives to monitor and have fewer conflicts of interest than other 
institutional investors. There has been growing empirical literature that identifies a 
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significant improvement in shareholder wealth and corporate governance with the 
announcement of activism (Brav et al., 2008; Clifford, 2008; Klein & Zur, 2009; 
Greenwood & Schor, 2009). This has been attributed to improved firm productivity or 
the increased possibility of takeovers (Greenwood & Schor, 2009; Brav, Jiang, & Kim, 
2015; Boyson, Gantchev, & Shivdasani, 2017).  
However, opponents of hedge fund activism argue that this emerging activist raises 
various concerns. There have been increasing discussions regarding the motives of 
such activism that can be labeled as “short-termism”. Hedge funds seek short-term 
gains from interventions disregarding the long-term consequences, which induces 
firms to cut research and development (R&D), capital expenditure, operating expenses, 
and employees (Klein & Zur, 2009; DesJardine & Durand, 2020). Khurana, Li, and Wang 
(2018) find evidence that hedge fund activism is positively related to firms’ earnings 
management, which is also an indicator of short-termism. Such issues raise concerns 
about whether hedge fund activism creates or destructs shareholder wealth in the 
long-term, especially when empirical evidence shows a negative long-term impact of 
hedge fund activism on firm value (e.g., Clifford, 2008; deHaan, Larcker, & McClure, 
2019). 
The situation might be further exacerbated because little is known about how hedge 
fund activism influences firm risk-taking behaviors. In theory, unlike other institutional 
investors that improve firm performance through reforms in corporate governance, 
activist hedge funds have a relatively short investment horizon, and are more likely to 
seek a more direct and immediate gain on share prices. Target firms are likely to 
become more risk-averse post activism by decreasing capital and R&D expenditures 
(Greenwood & Schor, 2009; Brav, Jiang, Ma, & Tian, 2018), resulting in high likelihood 
of underinvestment (Singh, Deb, & Singh, 2020). However, there is no direct empirical 
evidence on the changes of firm risk-taking post activism. The level of firm risk-taking 
is associated with the principle of value-maximization. Prior studies show that 
managers might avoid value-enhancing risk-taking due to the career concerns (Amihud 
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& Lev, 1981; Hirshleifer & Thakor, 1992; Holmstrom & Costa, 1986). The ownership 
structure and the separation of control and cash flow rights can also have impact on 
firm risk-taking (Rajan & Zingales, 2003; Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005; Stulz, 
2005). John, Litov, and Yeung (2008) find that firms that rely on bank financing and 
firms with higher unionization tend to be less risk-taking in corporate investments.         
This study explores how hedge fund activism affects firm risk-taking post activism in 
the U.S. Empirical results show that firms targeted by activist hedge funds experience 
a 1.07% reduction in risk-taking (as proxied by the industry-adjusted standard 
deviation of ROA) relative to their matched peers over the five years following hedge 
fund interventions. Interestingly, activist hedge funds significantly reduce firm-level 
risk-taking even though the activists have no publicly disclosed demands. These results 
indicate that firms targeted by activists invest more conservatively in the long-term, 
consistent with the argument of short-termism. 
This study further examines whether firm-level characteristics such as myopic 
management and information environment make a difference in post-intervention 
reduction in risk-taking. Empirical results indicate that myopic firms experience a more 
pronounced reduction in firm risk-taking relative to their matched peers. A possible 
explanation is that the incentives of myopic managers and activist hedge funds align 
in terms of short-termism. The reduction in risk-taking is also more pronounced for 
opaque firms. This is consistent with Bourveau and Schoenfeld (2017) that activist 
hedge funds are more likely to target opaque firms, whose values are mispriced. 
Additional tests provide evidence that the effect on risk reduction is less pronounced 
if management mounts hostile resistance to activism. This is consistent with Boyson 
and Pichler (2019), implying that the resistance from the management would offset 
hedge fund activism’s initial effect on target firms. 
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Firstly, to the best of 
the author’s knowledge, this is the first study that explores the link between hedge 
fund activism and firm risk-taking. Notably, this study overcomes the shortcoming of 
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prior literature on hedge fund activism; i.e. the empirical tests of post-activism 
changes in firm performance fail to take into account the pre-activism performance 
trends between target and control groups (Penman, 1991; deHaan et al., 2019). This 
study adequately matches pre-activism trends and traces the same peers over time. 
Empirical findings provide direct evidence on a significant reduction in firm risk-taking 
up to five years following hedge fund activism, indicating that target firms become 
more risk-averse post interventions. More importantly, this provides evidence that 
activist hedge funds potentially engage in short-termism. This is consistent with Boo 
and Kim (2020) that institutional investors with short-term investment horizons tend 
to maximize firms’ near-term returns and reduce long-term investments.  
Secondly, this study adds to the literature on myopic management, and this is the first 
paper to document how myopic actions of management interact with activists’ short-
termism. Empirical evidence indicates that management’s myopia and activists’ short-
termism combined exaggerate the negative impact on firms’ strategic and risk-taking 
behaviors. Moreover, this study relates to work on corporate disclosure and 
information flow (Lorek, Stone, & Willinger, 1999; Bourveau & Schoenfeld, 2017). 
Consistent with the short-termism nature of hedge fund activism, activist hedge funds 
are likely to withhold information with intentions to seek more profits from the 
mispriced opaque target firms. 
Thirdly, this study is amongst the few studies that examine the impact of target firms’ 
response on activism outcomes, and it documents whether management’s resistance 
would affect firms’ risk-taking behaviors. This study provides new evidence that 
management’s hostile resistance to activism would offset hedge fund activism’s initial 
impact, leading to a less pronounced reduction in firm risk-taking.  
Overall, this study provides implications for policymakers and corporate management 
by highlighting short-termism nature of activist hedge funds. This serves as a potential 
negative consequence of activists’ investment in firms, providing counterbalance to 
the numerous positive consequences documented in prior literature on hedge fund 
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activism. More importantly, this study provides imperative implications for 
policymakers and corporate management that activist hedge funds might fail to serve 
as a useful monitoring tool for corporate governance.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews relevant literature 
and develops the hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes the data, key variables, and 
methodology. Section 4.4 reports the core results, and Section 4.5 provides robustness 
results. Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
4.2.1 Hedge funds and hedge fund activism 
Following the classical question “who will monitor the monitor” by Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972), the shirking problem, which is now popularly known as the agency 
problem, has become a core focus in corporate governance research. Agency conflict, 
arising from conflicting interests and incentives between management and 
shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), is particularly acute in large-scale 
corporations. The risk-taking behavior is also influenced by agency conflict in that 
managers might pursue different objectives from shareholders. Specifically, 
shareholders are considered to be risk neutral in an individual firm, as they are able to 
diversify their shareholdings across multiple firms. On the contrary, managers tend to 
be risk averse in decisions in order to lower their personal risk in wealth. Proper 
corporate governance is helpful in aligning the risk orientation between shareholders 
and managers (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). In recent years, shareholder activism 
arising from the agency problem has become a dynamic force in reshaping corporate 
governance. 
Since the 1980s, institutional investors, labor unions, individuals, public pension funds, 
mutual funds, and other groups have engaged in shareholder activism. This coincides 
with the rapid increase of institutional investor holdings, from around one-quarter of 
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U.S. shares outstanding in 1980 to two-third in 2019 (ProxyPulse, 2019). However, 
earlier studies show as activists, the traditional institutional investors, particularly 
mutual funds and pension funds, failed to achieve significant changes to firms’ 
corporate governance structures or create measurable values (Karpoff, 2001; Gillan & 
Starks, 2007), since the monitoring from institutional investors is generally plagued by 
regulatory and structural barriers (Brav et al., 2008). In addition, there is evidence that 
traditional institutional investors may face potential conflicts of interest in their 
monitoring role, especially when activists in business relations with corporations 
(Gillan & Starks, 2007). 
The latest actor, hedge funds, entered the activism stage in the late 1990s, which has 
rapidly emerged as the most promising and the most controversial form of the activism 
in the market (Greenwood & Schor, 2009; Goranova & Ryan, 2014). Similar to previous 
forms of activism, activist hedge funds also influence firm performance, management, 
governance, or strategy. In addition, rather being passive, hedge funds are promised 
to be “active shareholders” (Kahan & Rock, 2007). This is a result of rapid expansions 
of the hedge fund industry over the years. The value of assets managed by hedge funds 
worldwide has grown from $118 billion in 1997 to $3.1 trillion in 2019 (Rudden, 2020), 
and this sizeable pool of investment has set the stage for more hedge fund activism. 
The rise in hedge fund activism is also facilitated by the exemption 40  from the 
Investment Company Act of 1940. The expansion and strength of such unique type of 
activism has resulted in both positive and negative effects. 
On the positive side, hedge fund activism offers to be more effective compared to 
other institutional investors41 (Gillan & Starks, 2007; Goranova & Ryan, 2014) due to 
several reasons. Hedge funds are largely unregulated, which allows them to enjoy 
significant economies of scale, use leverage, and invest in derivatives. This enables 
                                                             
40 Hedge funds are allowed to use short selling and invest in derivatives. These exemptions enable 
hedge funds to use complex trading strategies.  
41 During the past decades, activist hedge funds have been successful in launching proxy fights, filing 
and winning lawsuits, pressuring firms’ boards through the media, overcoming anti-takeover defenses, 
and replacing board members (Briggs, 2006) 
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them to take positions that are much larger than those of other traditional institutional 
investors. Hence, activist hedge funds can influence corporate boards and 
managements by employing sophisticated tactics. Moreover, hedge fund managers 
have strong financial incentives, as they not only collect management fees on the 
assets they manage, but also receive 10%-20% or more of the profits that the fund 
makes (Brav et al., 2008; Bebchuk, Brav, & Jiang, 2015; Heaton, 2019). It is generally 
believed that these powerful financial incentives would lead activist hedge funds to 
focus on generating positive and absolute returns. This is also supported by prior 
studies that document a significant increase in short-term value of the firm post hedge 
fund activism (Brav et al., 2008; Klein & Zur, 2009, 2011).  
On the dark side, there are four major concerns regarding hedge fund activism, namely, 
short-termism, aggressiveness, control seeking, and equity decoupling (Katelouzou, 
2013). Activist hedge funds are usually criticized to pursue aggressive actions and seek 
changes in the control of target firms. According to Cheffins and Armour (2011), 
activist hedge funds are generally not protecting pre-existing stakes. Instead, they are 
“offensive shareholders” that aim to make changes to target firms by building up a 
sizeable stake “offensively.” This sometimes leads to the use of voting power to force 
management to address activists’ demands, in contrast to “defensive” activism of 
other institutional investors (Kahan & Rock, 2007; Cheffins & Armour, 2011). 
Specifically, even though activist hedge funds hold a relatively small stake in target 
firms42, other investors can follow when hedge funds announce a 5% or 10% position 
in a company, forming a “wolf pack” (Kulpa & Long, 2005). Such “wolf pack” sometimes 
gain enough voting power to force management to address activists’ demands, 
generally without even a public disclosure (Hu & Black, 2007). This is in contrast with 
other institutional investors as “defensive” activism (Kahan & Rock, 2007; Cheffins & 
Armour, 2011). 
In addition, there are raising questions about whether hedge fund activism creates, 
                                                             
42 On average, activist hedge funds hold about 6% shares, as reported in Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2009). 
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captures, or destroys corporate value. Activist hedge funds are generally considered 
to pursue a “profit-making strategy” (Kahan & Rock, 2007), and the ultimate goal of 
hedge fund activism is to provide absolute or real returns for their shareholders. 
Staying in target firms for only a short period, it is likely that activist hedge funds would 
seek to squeeze immediate value from target firms. In other words, activist hedge 
funds are criticized to engage in short-termism. This is also documented in prior 
empirical studies that fail to find the improvement in firms’ long-term performance 
post hedge fund activism (Clifford, 2008; Cremers, Giambona, Sepe & Wang, 2015; 
deHaan et al., 2019; Bebchuk, Brav, Jiang, &, Keusch, 2020). Boyson et al. (2017) argue 
that the improvement in firms’ long-term performance is actually driven by mergers 
and acquisitions, while Agrawal and Lim (2018) argue that hedge funds create value 
through transferring wealth from stakeholders to shareholders.  
To conclude, as the latest breed of activists, activist hedge funds have enjoyed 
extraordinary success compared to all other activist investors. Prior literature 
documents more than 60% settlement rate of hedge fund activism (Brav et al., 2008; 
Boyson & Mooradian, 2015; Bebchuk et al., 2020), compared to a 31% success rate for 
pension funds (Wahal, 1996). Such extraordinary success rate raises the question on 
the pivotal role of hedge fund activism in value creation in the long-run, while the 
objective of their activism is rooted in short-termism. 
4.2.2 Hedge fund activism, corporate governance, and firm risk-taking 
In the backdrop of the ever-present dilemma, hedge fund activism is especially 
controversial in pursuing the short-term strategy. As documented in DesJardine and 
Durand (2020), “[Hedge] fund managers almost exclusively prefer shorter-term gains, 
which are more certain and controllable than longer-term returns.” This investment 
strategy of activist hedge funds would also affect firm risk-taking behaviors.  
Building on existing literature, this study tries to establish the association between 
hedge fund activism and firm risk-taking in the long-term. Although very limited 
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empirical studies address the association between hedge fund activism and firm risk-
taking, anecdotal evidence indicates that activists have noticed the importance of firm 
risk-taking during hedge fund campaigns.  
For instance, in a 2007 campaign between the activist hedge fund Thesis Capital 
Management LLC and the target company Orange 21, a beneficial shareholder claimed 
that the former management team focused on “low-return, high-risk growth projects.” 
In a 2015 campaign, in which the activist Voce Capital Management LLC targeted Air 
Methods Corporation, Voce outlined that the firm strategy “increased the volatile 
nature of Air Methods’ earnings while obscuring visibility into its performance, with its 
quarterly results becoming wildly unpredictable.” Similarly, in another 2010 campaign 
between the activist Ramius LLC and the target company Cypress Bioscience, the 
Cypress Boards were criticized to “destroy shareholder value by making increasingly 
risky investments with shareholder money.” All the anecdotal evidence suggests that 
activist hedge funds identify risk-taking as an essential factor during activism. 
Theoretically, this study builds the hypotheses on agency theory, hedge fund takeover, 
and portfolio diversification. Firstly, from the agency perspective, managers tend to 
avoid risk-taking due to their career concerns, as they are not able to diversify their 
unemployment risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Hirsheifer & Thakor, 1992). Prior literature 
also supports that insiders tend to avoid some value-enhancing but risky projects to 
preserve their private benefits (John, Litov, & Yeung, 2008). This issue is critical as 
insufficient risk-taking is likely to lower firm value (Low, 2009). There is also evidence 
that firm risk-taking is associated with long-term economic growth (Barro, 1991; De 
Long & Summers, 1991). 
As basic tenets, shareholders (principals) need to monitor and provide incentives to 
managers (agents), so that they can maximize shareholder value (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, unlike other forms of activist institutional 
investors who seek to improve firm performance through reshaping corporate 
governance structures, activist hedge funds are more likely to seek more direct and 
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immediate increase in share prices (Bratton, 2008; Cheffins & Armour, 2011). In this 
sense, hedge funds are more likely to pursue short-term actions that create immediate 
gains at the expense of corporate policies that are beneficial and sustainable in the 
long-term (Lipton & Savitt, 2007; Clifford, 2008; Katelouzou, 2013). The phenomenon 
of short-termism is more evident if a firm has a higher portion of transient institutional 
investors in its ownership structure (Boo & Kim, 2020), in which activist action is a 
typical example (David, Hitt, & Gimeno, 2001). This is also supported by several 
empirical studies that capital expenditures or R&D expenditures of target firms drop 
significantly post hedge fund activism (Greenwood & Schor, 2009; Brav et al., 2015; 
Coffee & Palia, 2015; Brav et al., 2018). In this context, this study argues that target 
firms would reduce risk-taking post activism. 
Secondly, there is also evidence that hedge fund activism creates shareholder value 
primarily by influencing takeover outcomes for target firms. Firms targeted by hedge 
fund activism are more likely to face subsequent takeovers (Becht, Franks, & Grant, 
2015; Boyson et al., 2017). Additionally, activism mergers with third-party bidders 
create higher values relative to non-activism mergers (Boyson et al., 2017), and 
evidence shows that acquiring a less risky firm is associated with higher post-
acquisition accounting returns (Schneider & Spalt, 2017). In this sense, conservative 
firms serve as a more attractive target for activist hedge funds. Combined with short-
termism argument, this study expects target firms to be more conservative post 
activism.  
Thirdly, the degree of portfolio diversification across large shareholders has a 
significant impact on firm risk-taking. According to Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (2011), 
firms controlled by non-diversified large shareholders tend to invest more 
conservatively than firms controlled by well-diversified shareholders. They provide 
evidence that the risk-taking behaviors decline significantly following shocks to large 
shareholders’ portfolios (i.e. becoming less diversified). In similar context, hedge funds 
are generally less diversified compared to other forms of institutional investors 
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(Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, & Yang, 2013), it is expected that hedge fund activism would 
lead to risk-averse behavior in target firms post activism.  
Consequently, hedge fund activism is expected to have a significant influence on firm 
risk-taking behaviors. With the ultimate goal of seeking value creation, activist hedge 
funds are expected to take direct but sometimes short-term actions on target firms. In 
this context, this study hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms targeted by activist hedge funds become more risk-averse post 
activism. 
4.2.3 Hedge fund activism, myopic management, and risk-taking 
Corporate managers would face various alternative strategies, which generate 
different cash flow streams. Effective management is expected to maintain a long-term 
focus on strategies that maximize the sum of expected discounted future profits. 
However, the agency conflict arise when managers focus on short-term goals that 
overemphasize immediate payoffs at the expense of superior but more distant payoffs 
(Mizik, 2010). In other words, they engage in myopic management. 
Myopic management exists via two mechanisms, namely hidden actions and hidden 
information (Grant, King, & Polak, 1996). Under imperfect market conditions, 
managers can take steps when shareholders cannot observe perfectly (Narayanan, 
1985; Stein, 1989). Additionally, managers are usually better informed than 
shareholders, and their incentives might also deviate from shareholders’ objectives. 
Given that achieving the earning and stock price target is of high priority for 
management, myopic managers might have incentives to take advantage and 
manipulate performance and accounting-based earnings management (Healy & 
Wahlen, 1999). Furthermore, managers can manipulate financial reporting, for 
example, accelerating recognition of revenues, or capitalizing rather than expensing 
some costs. More importantly, myopic management also has the incentives to shift 
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future income to the present at certain costs (Laverty, 1996, 2004), typically via the 
underinvestment in R&D, advertising, and employee training for the purpose of 
inflating current-period earnings. In other words, management might have the ability 
and incentives to manipulate real activities and discretionary accruals activities.  
Such myopic practices, although do not affect the foundations of a firm’s performance, 
would tamper with market perceptions when uncovered (Brandenburger & Polak, 
1996; DuCharme, Malatesta, & Sefcik, 2004). A McKinsey report indicates that firms 
with short-term targets exhibit a less strong financial performance and market 
capitalization over time (McKinsey & Company, 2017). Prior empirical studies also 
report that firms cannot be properly valued as a consequence of myopia (Mizik, 2010). 
Garel (2017) further argues that market myopia encourages managerial myopia, 
especially when managers cater to market pricing. 
Putting into the context of hedge fund activism, this study expects that management 
myopia interacts with the impact of hedge fund activism on firm risk-taking. This study 
posits that management myopia would further reduce firms’ post-activism risk-taking 
behaviors from the perspectives of both activists and targets. On one hand, anecdotal 
and empirical evidence shows that U.S. firms have been experiencing an increasing 
level of management myopia over the past decades (McKinsey & Company, 2017). 
Managers and scholars voice their concerns that the U.S. equity market seems to force 
corporate managers to behave myopically. Two characteristics of the U.S. market might 
be responsible for such myopic practices, namely the prevalence of an active market 
for corporate control and the concentration of shares in the hands of institutional 
investors with short-term investment horizons (Wahal & McConnell, 2000). Activist 
hedge funds fulfil both characteristics. Unlike other institutional investors that are 
more passive, activist hedge funds tend to take up managerial roles (McCahery, 
Sautner, & Starks, 2016). In this sense, it is expected that hedge fund activism would 
further contribute to management myopia. This is also supported by the evidence that 
target firms are more likely to engage in real earnings management following hedge 
119 
 
fund interventions by temporarily boosting sales, overproducing inventory to reduce 
the cost of goods sold, or cutting discretionary expenses (Khurana et al., 2018).  
On the other hand, target firms would also choose their investment strategy based on 
their investment horizons (Brocket, Loumioti, & Serafeim, 2015). As discussed, myopic 
managed firms might find it optimal to undertake short-term investment that boosts 
short-term performance or secures external financing. This coincides with the hedge 
fund’s short-termism. In this context, it is expected that activist hedge funds might find 
it easier to pursue short-term strategies in myopic target firms. This is consistent with 
the evidence that institutional investors with short investment horizons, including 
hedge funds, tend to shift their portfolios to short-term holding strategies, which is 
more likely to maximize near-term returns and reduce long-term investment (Bushee, 
1998; Boo & Kim, 2020). In other words, myopic target firms are likely to become more 
conservative in investment post activism. 
Consequently, this study argues that myopic managed firms are more like to 
experience a more significant reduction in risk-taking following hedge fund 
interventions. In this context, this study hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 2: Target firms with myopic management experience a more pronounced 
reduction in risk-taking post hedge fund activism. 
4.2.4 Hedge fund activism, information environment, and risk-taking 
The flow of information in an efficient capital market is essential to make informed 
decisions. The information asymmetry between management and shareholders is a 
primary cause of agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The access to 
information is a necessary condition for corporate transparency, and more corporate 
disclosure improves transparency (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
Information transparency plays a fundamental role in corporate governance, whereas 
the level of transparency varies across firms. Transparent firms tend to disclose reliable 
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information voluntarily, leading to less adverse selection and reduced demand for 
monitoring (Ma, Shang, & Wang, 2017). Firms with higher institutional ownership and 
greater management disclosure also experience lower information asymmetry (Boone 
& White, 2015). On the contrary, firms with a lower level of transparency have a limited 
supply of firm-specific information (Hutton, Marcus, & Tehranian, 2009). The 
informational mismatch between managers and outsiders restricts the ability of 
external stakeholders in firm valuation. 
Corporate disclosure plays a vital role in the setting of hedge fund activism. Prior 
studies find that shareholder activism drives significant changes in firms’ existing 
management, resulting in lower CEO compensation, higher CEO turnover, or less 
managerial control over the firm (Brav et al., 2008; Ertimur, Ferri, & Muslu, 2011). 
Accordingly, managers might have a strong incentive to pre-empt activism at their 
firms. Specifically, in more transparent firms, disclosure serves as a complement of 
private information, while this eliminates arbitrage opportunities by converging stock 
price to its fair value (Kim & Verrecchia, 1994). This makes transparent firms less 
attractive to activist hedge funds, who usually target mispriced firms and make a quick 
profit. In other words, activist hedge funds are more likely to target relatively opaque 
firms (Bourveau & Schoenfeld, 2017).  
Building on existing literature, this study argues that firm-level transparency plays a 
significant role in the relation between hedge fund activism and the reduction in risk-
taking. Unlike other types of activist institutional investors that improve information 
flow and make additional information available to externals (Prevost, Wongchoti, & 
Marshall, 2016), activist hedge funds have a negative impact on firms’ disclosure. 
Target firms cease providing information subsequent to hedge fund activism (Chen & 
Jung, 2016). Specifically, prior studies show that short-horizon institutional investors 
tend to provide managers with implicit and explicit short-term incentives, making 
managers take myopic disclosure strategies, such as withholding more bad news from 
market participants (Stein, 1989; Bourveau & Schoenfeld, 2017). This makes it a more 
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favorable target during activism mergers. In addition, managers tend to inflate 
earnings (at least temporarily) via earnings management strategies that produce and 
convey positive information regarding firms’ financial conditions (Stein, 1989; Khurana 
et al., 2018). In this sense, this study expects that it is easier for activist hedge funds 
to manipulate information flow in opaque firms (Lorek et al., 1999). 
Consequently, this study expects firms with a lower level of information transparency 
are more likely to experience a more pronounced reduction in risk-taking post hedge 
fund activism. In this context, this study hypothesizes that:  
Hypothesis 3: The post-intervention reduction in firm risk-taking is associated with 
firm-level transparency, and the effect is more pronounced for less transparent firms. 
4.2.5 Hedge fund activism, hostile resistance, and risk-taking 
During hedge fund activism, activist hedge funds tend to seek changes in corporate 
control, management, board composition, or governance. When facing activists, 
management of target firms has options to ignore, negotiate with, or resist the 
activists. George and Lorsch (2014) report that corporate managers spend significant 
funds and other resources in resisting activism. Corporate managers have strong 
private incentives to resist activism, owing to the concerns about job security, 
reputational damages, changes of board seats, or probability of a takeover. This is 
consistent with the “managerial welfare hypothesis” (Amihud & Lev, 1981). Managers 
might also resist the activists because they believe activism might harm firm value, 
which is consistent with the “shareholder welfare hypothesis” (Walking & Long, 1984). 
In response to this resistance, activists usually counter-resist by initiating a proxy 
contest, filing a lawsuit, or making a tender offer (Boyson & Pichler, 2019).  
There is limited empirical evidence of management’s resistance during hedge fund 
activism. This study is trying to establish how management’s response affects firms’ 
risk-taking behaviors post hedge fund interventions. Prior empirical studies have well 
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established that the market reacts positively around the announcement of activist 
campaigns (e.g., Clifford, 2008; Klein & Zur, 2009; Brav et al., 2009). However, the 
market would react negatively subsequent to hostile resistance, which even reduces 
the initial positive market reaction to the announcement of activism (Boyson & Pichler, 
2019). Target firms with hostile resistance, unless hedge funds counter-resist, would 
experience faster activist exit or fewer mergers. Brav et al. (2015) also argue that post-
intervention changes of target firms might not agree with planned strategies during 
hostile activism, which is usually proof of management’s resistance. This is consistent 
with management’s concerns about activism. In addition, in a recent working paper, 
Singh et al. (2020) provides evidence that hostile resistance tends to decrease 
overinvestment in target firms. In other words, management’s resistance would offset 
the initial effect of hedge fund activism on target firms.  
Putting into the context of firm risk-taking, this study argues that the change in firm 
risk-taking would be less (more) pronounced if management has (does not have) 
hostile resistance to hedge fund activism. In this context, this study hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 4: Target firms’ response plays an essential role in the consequence of 
hedge fund activism, and firms with no hostile resistance would experience a more 
pronounced reduction in post-intervention risk-taking. 
4.3 Data, variable descriptions, and model designs 
4.3.1 Data and sample descriptions 
The sample consists of hedge fund activism events in the U.S., covering the period of 
2000-2016. The information of the sample activism events is collected from the 





Table 4.1 Overview of hedge fund activism 
The table provides details about hedge fund activism events in the sample, covering 2000-
2016. The information of the sample activism events is collected from the FactSet 
SharkRepellent database. Panel A provides information about the sample size. Panel B 
provides the temporal distribution of hedge fund activism. Panel C provides information about 
the types of demands from activist shareholders, and Panel D reports the industrial 
distribution of the targeted firms following the Fama-French 17 industry classifications 
Panel A Sample size  
Sample description  Number of events 
Total hedge fund activism events (2000-2016) 3,374 
M&A, bankruptcy, and business reorganization events 366 
Financial firm and utilities  736 
Missing CRSP or COMPUSTAT data 705 
Final hedge fund activism events 1,567 






















Panel C Types of activist demands  
Types of demands  Number of events 
Board representation 516 
Maximize shareholder value 472 
No publicly disclosed activism 244 
Board control 127 
Vote for a stockholder proposal 46 
Enhance corporate governance 45 
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Vote against a management proposal 33 
Support dissident group in a proxy fight 23 
Public short position/bear raid 22 
Remove director(s), no dissident nominee to fill a vacancy 16 
Vote for a management proposal/support management 12 
Remove officer(s) 11 
Total 1,567 






Construction and construction materials 37 
Consumer durables 54 
Drugs, soap, perfumes, tobacco 62 
Fabricated products 9 
Food 23 
Machinery and business equipment 222 
Mining and minerals 25 
Oil and petroleum products 64 
Other 752 
Retail stores 167 
Steelworks etc. 7 
Textiles, apparel & footwear 29 
Transportation 48 
Total 1,567 
Panel A of Table 4.1 reports the information on sample description. There are a total 
of 3,374 activism events during the sample period, of which 366 events are related to 
M&A, bankruptcy, or reorganization of a business, and 736 events are related to 
financial firms or utilities. These activism events are excluded from the sample due to 
their direct impacts on risk-taking or the difference in regulatory and reporting 
requirements. This study requires firms’ coverage in COMPUSTAT and CRSP datasets, 
which leads to an exclusion of another 705 activism events. The final sample 
constitutes 1,567, firm-year activism events. Panel B reports the number of activism 
events for each year during 2000-2016. The number of events increased from 2000-
2007, peaking in 2007. The number dropped significantly in 2009, which gradually 
increased afterward. The number of activism events has some pro-cyclical 
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characteristics. Panel C reports the types of demands the activist hedge funds made. 
Among the events, board representation (516 events or 32.93%), maximization of 
shareholder values (472 events or 30.12%), and board control (127 events or 8.10%) 
are the top three activist demands43. Panel D shows the industrial distribution of target 
firms, following the Fama-French 17 industry classifications. In general, machinery and 
business equipment and retail industries receive the most activist campaigns.  
4.3.2 Variables descriptions 
4.3.2.1 Firm risk-taking 
This study examines both the book-based and market-based risk-taking measures, 
which capture the post-activism risk-taking. Different proxies for risk-taking, together 
with other control variables, are reported in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2 Variables descriptions 
This table lists the variables used in this study, together with their definitions. This study uses 
four book-based proxies and five market-based proxies for firms’ risk-taking. The book-based 
measures include standard deviation or range of ROA and industry-adjusted standard 
deviation or range of ROA. The standard deviation or range of ROA is calculated over 3-year or 
5-year rolling windows, respectively. The market-based measures include total risk, 
idiosyncratic risk, market-adjusted total risk, industry-adjusted total risk, and industry-
adjusted idiosyncratic risk. A set of control variables are also included. 
 Variables  Description  
Mcap 
Market capitalization, which is calculated as the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization; data extracted from COMPUSTAT. 
ROA 
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization scaled 
by lagged total assets; data extracted from COMPUSTAT. 
SD_ROA[-3, -1] 
Standard deviation of ROA, which is calculated from three years prior 
to hedge fund activism; data extracted from COMPUSTAT. 
Leverage 
Short-term debt plus long-term debt scaled by total assets; data 
extracted from COMPUSTAT. 
TobinQ 
Tobin’s Q, Calculated as (Total Assets + Market Capitalization - 
Ordinary Equity)/Total Asset; data extracted from COMPUSTAT. 
Tangibility 
The ratio of tangible assets to total assets; data extracted from 
COMPUSTAT. 
                                                             
43 Sometimes the 13D filers do not disclose the specific demands of the hedge fund activism. This 




Age of the firm at the time of activism, which is calculated as the 
difference between the time of the activism and when CRSP first 
started reporting the firm’s stock prices. 
Dividends 
Total dividend payments scaled by total assets; data extracted from 
COMPUSTAT. 
Slack  
Sum of cash and short term investment scaled by total assets; data 
extracted from COMPUSTAT.  
Target 
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm is targeted by 
hedge funds, and zero otherwise. 
Post  
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the target firm 
(matched control firm) is within [t + 1, t + 5] years post the activism 
event year, and zero otherwise. 
3-year risk-taking 
𝐵𝑅1 
𝐵𝑅1  is defined as industry-adjusted (following Fama-French 17 
industry classifications) standard deviation of ROA over [t + 1, t + 3] 
years post hedge fund activism 
𝐵𝑅2 
𝐵𝑅2  is defined as industry-adjusted (following Fama-French 17 
industry classifications) range of ROA over [t + 1, t + 3] years post 
hedge fund activism 
𝐵𝑅3 
𝐵𝑅3 is defined as the standard deviation of ROA over [t + 1, t + 3] 
years post hedge fund activism 
𝐵𝑅4 
𝐵𝑅4 is defined as the range of ROA over [t + 1, t + 3] years post hedge 
fund activism 
𝑀𝑅1 
𝑀𝑅1 is defined as standard deviation of stock return over [t + 1, t + 3] 
years post hedge fund activism  
𝑀𝑅2 
𝑀𝑅2 is defined as the standard deviation of residuals from Carhart 
four-factor model over [t + 1, t + 3] years post hedge fund activism 
𝑀𝑅3 
𝑀𝑅3 is defined as the market-adjusted standard deviation of stock 
return over [t + 1, t + 3] years post hedge fund activism 
𝑀𝑅4 
𝑀𝑅4 is defined as industry-adjusted (following the Fama-French 17 
industry classifications) standard deviation of stock return over [t + 1, 
t + 3] years post hedge fund activism 
𝑀𝑅5 
𝑀𝑅5 is defined as industry-adjusted (following the Fama-French 17 
industry classifications) standard deviation of residuals from Carhart 
four-factor model over [t + 1, t + 3] years post hedge fund activism 
5-year risk taking  
𝐵𝑅5 
𝐵𝑅5 is defined as industry-adjusted (following the Fama-French 17 
industry classifications) standard deviation of ROA over [t + 1, t + 5] 
years post hedge fund activism 
𝐵𝑅6 
𝐵𝑅6 is defined as industry-adjusted (following the Fama-French 17 
industry classifications) range of ROA over [t + 1, t + 5] years post 
hedge fund activism 
𝐵𝑅7 
𝐵𝑅7 is defined as the standard deviation of ROA over [t + 1, t + 5] 




𝐵𝑅8 is defined as the range of ROA over [t + 1, t + 5] years post hedge 
fund activism 
This study uses four book-based measures following Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar 
(2013), Faccio et al. (2011) and John et al. (2008). The four book-based measures are 
industry-adjusted standard deviation (𝐵𝑅1), industry-adjusted range of ROA (𝐵𝑅2), the 
standard deviation of ROA, (𝐵𝑅3), and range of ROA (𝐵𝑅4). For the main tests, this 
study uses the industry-adjusted standard deviation or range of ROA (i.e. 𝐵𝑅1 and 
𝐵𝑅2) over a 3-year rolling window, as it takes into account industrial average in the 
measure. Alternatively, standard deviation or range of ROA (i.e. 𝐵𝑅3 and 𝐵𝑅4) over a 
3-year rolling window are used as robustness measures. Notably, with the 3-year 
rolling window used for calculation, this paper examines the long-term effect of hedge 
fund activism on firm risk-taking, extending to the year 2019 at the latest. Moreover, 
this study also calculates the (industry-adjusted) standard deviation or range of ROA 
over a 5-year rolling window44 for a robustness check (referred to as 𝐵𝑅5, 𝐵𝑅6, 𝐵𝑅7, 
and 𝐵𝑅8).  
Additionally, five proxies for market-based measures are used45, including total risk 
(𝑀𝑅1), idiosyncratic risk (𝑀𝑅2), market-adjusted total risk (𝑀𝑅3), industry-adjusted 
total risk (𝑀𝑅4), and industry-adjusted idiosyncratic risk (𝑀𝑅5). Mathematically, total 
risk (as well as industry-adjusted total risk and market-adjusted total risk) is calculated 
as the standard deviation of firms’ stock returns over 3-year windows post hedge fund 
activism events. Idiosyncratic risk is calculated as the residuals from the Fama-French 
4-factor model.  
4.3.2.2 Myopic management measure 
This study identifies potentially myopic firms following Mizik (2010). According to 
                                                             
44 When the 5-year rolling windows are used for calculation, the number of observations and hedge 
fund activism events drop. However, this study still examines the impact on firm risk-taking till the latest 
available data.  
45 Following relevant literature, the market-based measures are used for robustness checks, as the 
market-based measures might be noisier (Kodor, Pafka, & Nagy, 2007). 
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Mizik (2010), myopic managed firms tend to decrease their marketing and R&D 
expenditures intended to inflate reported earnings. In order to measure myopia, 
following Mizik (2010) what is first needed is to determine the “normal” or expected 
level of profitability, marketing, and R&D intensity for each firm-year. For this, fixed-
effects autoregressive panel data forecast regressions are used to estimate normal 
levels of firms’ earnings, marketing, and R&D intensity for the next period with two 
period lags. 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑟𝑜𝑎,𝑖 + ∅𝑟𝑜𝑎 × 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2 + ∑ 𝛿𝑟𝑜𝑎,𝑡 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 + ∑ 𝜆𝑟𝑜𝑎,𝑠𝑖𝑐 ×
𝑆𝐼𝐶𝑠𝑖𝑐 + 𝑟𝑜𝑎,𝑖𝑡                                               Equation 28 
𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑖 + ∅𝑚𝑘𝑡 × 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑖,𝑡−2 + ∑ 𝛿𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 + ∑ 𝜆𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑠𝑖𝑐 ×
𝑆𝐼𝐶𝑠𝑖𝑐 + 𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑖𝑡                                               Equation 29 
𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑟&𝑑,𝑖 + ∅𝑟&𝑑 × 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑟&𝑑𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2 + ∑ 𝛿𝑟&𝑑,𝑡 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 + ∑ 𝜆𝑟&𝑑,𝑠𝑖𝑐 ×
𝑆𝐼𝐶𝑠𝑖𝑐 + 𝑟&𝑑,𝑖𝑡                                               Equation 30 
where 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑖,𝑡, and 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡 represent the actual levels of ROA, marketing, and 
R&D intensity, respectively, for each firm 𝑖  in the current period 𝑡 . 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 , 
𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1, and 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 are their one-period lagged values, and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑖,𝑡−2, 
and 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2 are their two-period lagged values, respectively. 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 is a set of year 
dummy variables. 𝛼𝑟𝑜𝑎,𝑖, 𝛼𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑖, and 𝛼𝑟&𝑑,𝑖  are the firm-specific intercepts. ∅𝑟𝑜𝑎, 
∅𝑚𝑘𝑡 , and ∅𝑟&𝑑  are the respective estimates of persistence. This study further 
controls for each dependent value using their lags in two periods. 𝑖,𝑡  is the error 
term. To reduce the bias of omitted variables, time fixed effect (𝛿𝑡) and industry fixed 
effects (𝜆𝑠𝑖𝑐) are controlled.  
The generalized system model of moments (GMM) estimation approach is employed 
for Equations 28-30. According to Arellano & Bond (1991), Arellano & Bover (1995), 
and Blundell & Bond (1998), dynamic panel data estimators are efficient, especially in 
the following situations. Firstly, there are fewer periods than cross-sections. Secondly, 
the dependent variable dynamic, and it depends on its previous values. Lastly, the 
functional relationship is linear. Following these studies, the GMM approach is 
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advantageous in the calculation of myopia, because the calculation involves regressing 
the left-hand side variable on its lags, while there are also more cross-sections than 
time periods. 
The forecast errors in the models provide the estimates of the deviation of the series 
from the “normal” level in each period. In other words, 𝑟𝑜𝑎,𝑖𝑡 = (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1̂ ), 
𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑖𝑡 = (𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1̂ ), and 𝑟&𝑑,𝑖𝑡 = (𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1̂ ). These values are 
used to identify firms as myopic and non-myopic. Based on Mizik’s (2010) classification, 
firm 𝑖 is identified as myopic in year 𝑡 if 𝑟𝑜𝑎,𝑖𝑡 > 0, 𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑖𝑡 < 0, and 𝑟&𝑑,𝑖𝑡 < 0 
4.3.2.3 Firm-level transparency 
Three proxies for firm-level transparency are used, namely transparency measure 
proposed in Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang’s (2002) model (LMSW hereafter), the 
earnings management measure, and 8K-based disclosure measures. These three 
measures cover the market-based, book-based, and regulatory perspectives of firm-
level opacity.  
Firstly, following Llorente et al.’s (2002) model, this study uses stock return 
autocorrelation conditional on trading volume as a proxy for firm-level transparency. 
Specifically, this measure is constructed from the following regression estimated for 
each firm-year: 
𝒓𝒋,𝒕 =  𝜶𝒋 + 𝜸𝒋𝒓𝒋,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝝑𝒚𝒓𝒋,𝒕−𝟏𝑽𝒋,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝒆𝒋,𝒕                         Equation 31                                                    
where 𝑟𝑗,𝑡  and 𝑟𝑗,𝑡−1 are the contemporaneous and lagged weekly stock returns, 
respectively. 𝑉𝑗,𝑡−1 is the lagged log turnover detrended by subtracting the moving 
average of the log turnover over the prior 26 weeks. The key estimate is the coefficient 
of the interaction term 𝜗𝑦, which reflects the amount of information-based trading.  
According to Llorente et al. (2002), firms with less transparency should have a positive 
value of 𝜗𝑦  due to partial adjustments to the prices, whereas firms with higher 
transparency should have a negative 𝜗𝑦  due to return reversal. This study creates 
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subsamples based on the positive or negative values of 𝜗𝑦 for the sample firms.  
Secondly, following Jones (1991) and Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), this study 
uses a cross-sectional model of discretionary accruals to measure accrual-based 













+ 𝑖𝑡          Equation 32     
where 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 is the total assets for firm 𝑖 at the beginning of year 𝑡. 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 is 
total accruals for firm 𝑖  during the year 𝑡 , which is calculated as income before 
extraordinary items minus cash flow from operating activities adjusted for 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations. ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the change in revenues 
for firm 𝑖  during the year 𝑡 . 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡  is the gross value of property, plant, and 
equipment for firm 𝑖 at the end of year 𝑡. 
The coefficient estimates from Equation 32 are used to estimate the firm-specific 










              Equation 33 
where ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the change in accounts receivable for firm 𝑖 during the year 𝑡. ?̂?𝑖𝑡, 
?̂?2, and ?̂?3 are the estimated coefficients from Equation 32. Following Cohen, Dey, 
and Lys (2008), this study calculates discretionary accruals as the difference between 
total accruals and the fitted normal accruals. It is notable that accruals reverse over 
time. Hence, the second proxy for firm-level transparency, namely accrual-based 
earnings management, is measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals, as 
defined in the following equation:  
𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝐵𝑆[(𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) − 𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡]                         Equation 34 
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Thirdly, in order to provide a level playing field for all investors, the SEC has 
implemented the rule Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) since 2000. According to Reg 
FD, the SEC requires listed firms to make public any material events 46  that 
shareholders should know. Some information reported in 8K filings is clearly required 
by SEC, such as material events that happen to a firm or events that it participates in 
(namely mandatory disclosure), while sometimes firms provide additional information 
in 8Ks beyond the mandatory requirements (Carter & Soo, 1999; Lerman & Livnat, 
2010). With more 8K filings disclosed, it is expected that the firms are more 
informationally transparent. 
Various measures based on 8K filings are widely used as an indicator of firm-level 
disclosure (e.g., Guay, Samuels, & Taylor, 2016; Bourveau, Lou, & Wang, 2018). This 
study uses the total number of 8Ks firm files (All_8K) as the third proxy for firm-level 
transparency. The 8K filings are downloaded from the SEC EDGAR website. 
4.3.2.4 Other control variables 
A comprehensive set of control variables known in prior literature is included in this 
study47. Mcap is expressed as the natural logarithm of a firm’s market capitalization. 
ROA is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization to total assets. SD_ROA[-3, -1] is the standard deviation of ROA calculated 
over a 3-year window prior to hedge fund activism events. Leverage is defined as the 
ratio of debt (short-term and long-term) to total assets. TobinsQ is calculated as (Total 
Assets + Market Capitalization - Ordinary Equity)/Total Asset. Tangibility is the ratio of 
tangible assets to total assets. FirmAge is the age of a firm at the time of activism, 
which is calculated as the difference between the time of hedge fund activism and 
when COMPUSTAT first reported the firm’s annual data. Dividends are defined as total 
dividend payments scaled by the firm’s total assets. Slack is defined as the sum of cash 
and short-term investment scaled by the firm’s total assets. Target is a dummy variable 
                                                             
46  The SEC defines a “material” event as one that is expected to influence investors’ investment 
decision-making.  
47 Also refer to Table 4.2 for more information. 
132 
 
that takes the value of one if the firm is targeted by hedge funds, and zero otherwise. 
Post is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the years after the activism 
event year, and zero otherwise.  
Stock returns and turnover data are collected from CRSP. The data for all the remaining 
control variables are gathered from COMPUSTAT. The information of hedge fund 
activism, including the relevant types and hedge fund filings, is provided by the FactSet 
SharkRepellent database. The 8K filings are downloaded from the SEC EDGAR website. 
4.3.2.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical 
investigations. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. The 
average firm risk-taking is 0.0197 and 0.0625 when it is proxied by the industry-
adjusted standard deviation of ROA (𝐵𝑅1) or industry-adjusted range of ROA (𝐵𝑅2) 
respectively. The distribution of firm risk-taking proxied by 𝐵𝑅3  and 𝐵𝑅4  is also 
identical, although 𝐵𝑅3  and 𝐵𝑅4  are higher in values compared to the industry-
adjusted risk-taking measures. For the firm transparency measurement, LMSW has a 
positive mean (median) value of 0.0230 (0.0259). The positive values indicate that 
most of the firms are less informationally transparent. This is consistent with Bourveau 
and Schoenfeld (2017) that activist hedge funds are more likely to target less 
transparent firms. 
Table 4.4 reports the Pearson correlation matrix48. The correlations among variables 
are normally low, except for a few cases. The standard deviation of ROA prior to hedge 
fund activism (SD_ROA[-3, -1]) is a relatively high correlation with the risk-taking 
proxies post the activism. 
  
                                                             
48 The reported risk-taking measures are all book-based measures calculated over the 3-year windows. 
The correlations using other risk-taking measures are also within reasonable range, and the correlation 
matrix is available upon request. 
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Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics 
This table provides descriptive statistics of the variables. The sample covers all the hedge fund 
activism events during the period 2000-2016. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th 
percent. The variable definitions are provided in Table 4.2. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables N Mean Std.dev. p25 p50 p75 
3-year book-based risk-taking     
𝐵𝑅1 13,848  0.0197 0.0966 -0.0249 -0.0076 0.0242 
𝐵𝑅2 13,848  0.0625 0.0979 0.0150 0.0309 0.0661 
𝐵𝑅3 13,848  0.0367 0.1808 -0.0478 -0.0145 0.0458 
𝐵𝑅4 13,848  0.1188 0.1851 0.0285 0.0594 0.1256 
Firm transparency      
LMSW 11,115  0.0230 0.1941 -0.0822 0.0259 0.1325 
EM 13,677 0.6356 1.1634 0.0712 0.2500 0.6859 
Log(All_8K) 11,849  2.3878 0.6223 2.0794 2.3979 2.7726 
Control variables       
Mcap 13,848  5.8038 2.3126 4.2022 5.7767 7.3202 
ROA 13,848  0.0703 0.2049 0.0290 0.1032 0.1686 
Tobin’s Q 13,848  1.6191 3.0712 0.8193 1.1468 1.7272 
SD_ROA[-3, -1] 13,848  0.0729 0.1165 0.0175 0.0357 0.0761 
Leverage 13,848  0.2336 0.3335 0.0058 0.1700 0.3437 
Tangibility 13,848  0.2497 0.2381 0.0642 0.1630 0.3779 
FirmAge 13,848  2.9133 0.5946 2.4849 2.8904 3.3322 
Slack 13,848  0.2081 0.2255 0.0399 0.1212 0.3027 
5-year book-based risk-taking     
𝐵𝑅5 10,824  0.0230 0.1127 -0.0275 -0.0077 0.0271 
𝐵𝑅6 10,824  0.0757 0.1135 0.0215 0.0407 0.0784 
𝐵𝑅7 10,824  0.0561 0.2722 -0.0666 -0.0186 0.0668 
𝐵𝑅8 10,824  0.1848 0.2741 0.0523 0.0997 0.1924 
3-year market-based risk-taking     
𝑀𝑅1 10,343  0.5050 0.2464 0.3330 0.4475 0.6108 
𝑀𝑅2 10,343  0.4637 0.2546 0.2914 0.4022 0.5603 
𝑀𝑅3 10,343  0.4682 0.2513 0.2950 0.4094 0.5693 
𝑀𝑅4 10,343  0.5049 0.2463 0.3330 0.4475 0.6107 
𝑀𝑅5 10,343  0.4600 0.2545 0.2872 0.3977 0.5566 
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Table 4.4 Correlation matrix 
This table provides correlations for all firm-specific variables. The sample covers all the hedge fund activism events during the period 2000-2016. 
All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. The variable definitions are provided in Table 4.2. 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) 𝐵𝑅1 1 
   
           
(2) 𝐵𝑅2 1.00 1 
  
           
(3) 𝐵𝑅3 0.99 0.98 1 
 
           
(4) 𝐵𝑅4 0.99 0.99 1.00 1            
(5) LMSW 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 1           
(6) EM 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 -0.01 1          
(7) Log(All_8K) -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 1         
(8) Mcap -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -0.10 -0.11 0.33 1        
(9) ROA -0.49 -0.50 -0.51 -0.51 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.38 1       
(10) Tobin’s Q 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 -0.02 0.09 -0.03 0.01 -0.20 1      
(11) SD_ROA[-3, -1] 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.46 -0.02 0.05 -0.06 -0.26 -0.42 0.24 1     
(12) Leverage 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 -0.03 0.10 0.05 -0.02 -0.08 0.25 0.07 1    
(13) Tangibility -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.03 0.16 0.07 0.13 0.20 -0.07 -0.14 0.21 1   
(14) FirmAge -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 0.01 -0.03 0.07 0.23 0.12 -0.05 -0.19 -0.01 0.06 1  




4.3.3 Propensity Score Matching 
This study first identifies matched control firms that are not targeted by hedge funds 
using the Propensity Score Matching. The control sample is formed by matching each 
event firm to a non-event firm from the same year and the same industry with the 
closest propensity score. Following Brav et al. (2018), the Propensity Score Matching 
is estimated based on the firm-level characteristics including market capitalization, 
Tobin’s Q, ROA and past risk-taking through standard deviation of ROA measured for 
the years [t-3, t-1]. All the variables are lagged for one period. Mathematically, the 
following regression equation is used: 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐷_𝑅𝑂𝐴[−3, −1]𝑗,𝑡−1 +
𝛿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝑒𝑗,𝑡                                                Equation 35 
where 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 takes the value of one if hedge funds target the firm in a particular 
year, and zero otherwise. 𝛿𝑡 and 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑 are year and industry fixed effects. Table 4.5 
reports the balance test of the Propensity Score Matching. Panel A reports the 
comparison for the matching criteria used in the Propensity Score Matching model. All 
these firm-level characteristics are identical between the target and matched control 
firms, with statistically indifferent p-values. Moreover, the target and matched firms 
are also indistinguishable for most of the firm-level characteristics, with the only 
exceptions of firm age and the total number of 8Ks a firm files, as reported in Panel B 
of Table 4.5. This indicates that the target firms and matched firms are similar in both 
risk-taking inputs and outputs in the year of hedge fund activism, despite the fact that 




Table 4.5 Balance test of Propensity Score Matching 
This table provides the balance test of Propensity Score Matching. The control sample is 
formed by matching each event firm to the non-event control firm from the same year and 
the same industry (following the Fama-French 17 industry classifications) with the closest 
propensity score. The propensity score is estimated based on firms’ market capitalization, 
Tobin’s Q, ROA, and past risk-taking through the standard deviation of ROA measured between 
years [t-3] and [t-1]. The variable definitions are provided in Table 4.2. 





Panel A: Propensity Score Matching 
Mcap  5.6148 5.5240 -0.0908 0.3166  1,304  1,304  
ROA 0.0575 0.0650 0.0075 0.3824  1,304  1,304  
SD_ROA[-3, -1] 0.0756 0.0727 -0.0029 0.5453  1,304  1,304  
TobinQ 1.5949 1.5690 -0.0259 0.8937  1,304  1,304  
Panel B : Remaining variables 
Firm-level variables     
Leverage 0.2457 0.2573 0.0116 0.4276  1,304  1,304  
Tangibility 0.2358 0.2509 0.0151 0.1109  1,304  1,304  
FirmAge 2.9235 2.8337 -0.0898 0.0001***  1,304  1,304  
Slack 0.2113 0.2008 -0.0105 0.2630  1,304  1,304  
3-year book-based risk-taking     
𝐵𝑅1 0.0239 0.0184 -0.0054 0.2679  1,037  879  
𝐵𝑅2 0.0671 0.0610 -0.0061 0.2162  1,037  879  
𝐵𝑅3 0.0444 0.0340 -0.0105 0.2523  1,037  879  
𝐵𝑅4 0.1278 0.1160 -0.0117 0.2088  1,037  879  
Transparency and disclosure     
LMSW 0.0289 0.0264 -0.0025 0.7547  1,220  1,213  
EM 0.6179 0.6432 0.0253 0.6128 1,117 1,122 
Log(All_8K) 2.5864 2.3076 -0.2789 0.0000***  1,022  1,264  
5-year book-based risk-taking     
𝐵𝑅5 0.0262 0.0269 0.0007 0.9214  722  573  
𝐵𝑅6 0.0778 0.0787 0.0010 0.8861  722  573  
𝐵𝑅7 0.0638 0.0647 0.0009 0.9560  722  573  
𝐵𝑅8 0.1896 0.1911 0.0016 0.9255  722  573  
3-year market-based risk-taking     
𝑀𝑅1 0.5386 0.5214 -0.0171 0.2375  764  727  
𝑀𝑅2 0.4974 0.4781 -0.0193 0.1976  764  727  
𝑀𝑅3 0.5024 0.4818 -0.0206 0.1624  764  727  
𝑀𝑅4 0.5385 0.5213 -0.0171 0.2373  764  727  
𝑀𝑅5 0.4941 0.4747 -0.0195 0.1933  764  727  
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4.3.4 Model specification 
In order to explore the impact of hedge fund activism on firm’s risk-taking behaviors, 
the difference-in-difference model is used, as shown in the following equation: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝑘 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝐸 + 𝑖,𝑡                                                         
Equation 36 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 is the book-based proxies (or market-based proxies in the robustness 
checks) for firms’ risk-taking. 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the firm is targeted by hedge fund activism in a certain year, and zero otherwise. 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the dummy variable that takes the value of one within [t+1, t+5] years after 
the activism event year49. The variable of interest is the interaction term 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ×
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡, which indicates the incremental effect on the risk-taking of the target firms post 
activism. Based on Hypothesis 1, 𝛽1 is expected to be negative, implying that the 
target firms have a more significant reduction in risk-taking post activism compared to 
the control firms. A series of control variables (𝑋𝑖,𝑡) are included in the regression 
equation, as explained in Table 4.2. 𝛿𝑡 is year fixed effects. This study also controls 
for firm fixed years (𝛿𝐹𝐸) in most of the main tests
50. 
A key identifying assumption in a difference-in-differences model is the parallel trend, 
which requires the target and control firms to exhibit the same trend in outcomes (i.e. 
risk-taking in this paper) prior to the treatment (Roberts & Whited, 2012). To confirm 
the accuracy of the results, this study conducts a parallel trend test by running a 
regression on the 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 dummy variable interacted with three-time dummies (pre-
target, target year, and post-target). This regression model allows me to check the 
difference between target and control samples over the periods examined (Boubaker, 
                                                             
49 This study follows Brav et al. (2018) to restrict observations to five years prior to the event year 
through five years afterwards. The results are robust if the three-year window following interventions 
is used. Relevant results are available upon request. 
50 The results with industry fixed effects are reported as the robustness checks. 
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Saffar, & Sassi, 2018). The results on the parallel trends are reported in Table 4.6.  
Table 4.6 Parallel trend test of difference-in-difference model 
This table report the parallel trends of the control and matched sample firms. Columns (1)-(4) 
use different dependent variables, which are the four book-based risk measures as defined in 
Table 4.2. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 𝑩𝑹𝟏 𝑩𝑹𝟐 𝑩𝑹𝟑 𝑩𝑹𝟒 
Target_Pre -0.0009 -0.0003 -0.0016 -0.0005 
  (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0046) (0.0046) 
Target_year -0.0050 -0.0043 -0.0092 -0.0078 
  (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0060) (0.0061) 
Target_Post -0.0074** -0.0073** -0.0137** -0.0138** 
  (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0060) (0.0061) 
Mcap -0.0081*** -0.0080*** -0.0151*** -0.0152*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0038) (0.0038) 
ROA -0.0496*** -0.0493*** -0.0906*** -0.0910*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0283) (0.0287) 
TobinQ 0.0028*** 0.0028*** 0.0050*** 0.0051*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
SD_ROA[-3, -1] -0.0850*** -0.0858*** -0.1560*** -0.1605*** 
 (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0484) (0.0493) 
Leverage 0.0080 0.0084 0.0160 0.0169 
 (0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0159) (0.0161) 
Tangibility 0.0251 0.0250 0.0448 0.0454 
 (0.0243) (0.0246) (0.0447) (0.0460) 
FirmAge 0.0007 0.0010 0.0012 0.0018 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Slack 0.0199 0.0201 0.0375 0.0383 
 (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0295) (0.0301) 
Constant 0.0295 0.0739*** 0.0570 0.1427*** 
 (0.0242) (0.0244) (0.0441) (0.0448) 
     
Observations 13,813 13,813 13,813 13,813 
R-squared 0.6974 0.7034 0.6990 0.7046 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
As reported, it is obvious that the coefficients on the interaction term, (𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_ 𝑃𝑟𝑒) 
is not statistically significant before the hedge fund activism events, suggesting that 
the target and control firms behave similarly before the activism. The difference in firm 
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risk-taking is observed starting from the year of hedge fund activism, although it is not 
very significant in the target year (𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟). The difference becomes significantly 
negative post the activism (𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡). Overall, these results suggest that there are 
no pre-trends present for firm risk-taking. 
4.4 Core results 
4.4.1 Does hedge fund activism reduce the risk-taking of target firms? 
The empirical analyses begin with an examination of the relation between hedge fund 
activism events and firm risk-taking. Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 first plot the trends of 
the two book-based risk-measures, BR1 (industry-adjusted standard deviation of ROA) 
and BR2 (industry-adjusted range of ROA), for target and matched firms over the [-5, 
+5] window around hedge fund interventions. Both figures show that target firms 
experience a greater reduction in risk-taking compared to matched firms post the 
intervention of hedge fund activism. 
 
Figure 4.1 Trends of BR1 around hedge fund interventions 
This figure plots the trends of BR1, industry-adjusted standard deviation of ROA, for 





Figure 4.2 Trends of BR2 around hedge fund interventions 
This figure plots the trends of BR2, industry-adjusted range of ROA, for target and 
matched firms over the [-5, +5] window around hedge fund interventions. 
This study further uses the difference-in-differences model as defined in Equation 36. 
Table 4.7 reports the results of Hypothesis 1. The dependent variables are industry-
adjusted standard deviation or range of ROA over the three-year window (𝐵𝑅1 and 
𝐵𝑅2 respectively). Columns (1) and (2) report the results based on firm fixed effects, 
and Columns (3) and (4) report the results based on industry fixed effects. 
The key estimate is the coefficient of the interaction term 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ×  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 , which 
reflects the incremental change in risk-taking post the hedge fund activism events. 
Evidently, although the risk-taking has increased for all firms post activism, as indicated 
by the positively significant estimates of the variable 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡, the risk-taking of the target 
firms has decreased significantly relative to their matched control peers three years 
post activism, irrespectively of whether firm fixed effects or industry fixed effects are 
used. Taking the result in Column (1) as an example, the coefficient of 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ×  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 
is negatively and statistically significant at 1%, with the value of -0.0107. This indicates 
that the risk-taking of the target firms (when it is proxied by the industry-adjusted 
standard deviation of ROA) reduces significantly by 1.07% post activism relative to the 
changes incurred by the control firms. These results are consistent using various book-
based proxies for risk-taking and across different fixed effects. In general, the 
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association between hedge fund activism and firms’ risk-taking is more significant 
when controlling for firm fixed effects, as shown in Columns (1) and (2). These results 
provide evidence for Hypothesis 1 that the target firms become more risk-averse and 
reduce their risk-taking post hedge fund activism.  
Table 4.7 Hedge fund activism and firm risk-taking 
The table provides regression results of the risk-taking behaviors of the target firms post hedge 
fund activism. The dependent variables of different columns are industry-adjusted standard 
deviation or range of ROA (i.e. 𝐵𝑅1 and 𝐵𝑅2) over the 3-year rolling window, as defined in 
Table 2. Columns (1) and (2) report the results based on firm fixed effects, and Columns (3) 
and (4) report the results based on industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are provided 
below in the parentheses. The variable definitions are provided in Table 4.2. All variables are 
winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 𝑩𝑹𝟏 𝑩𝑹𝟐 𝑩𝑹𝟏 𝑩𝑹𝟐 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 -0.0107*** -0.0200*** -0.0055* -0.0104* 
  (0.0041) (0.0077) (0.0033) (0.0062) 
post 0.0067** 0.0128** 0.0060*** 0.0113*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0059) (0.0023) (0.0043) 
target -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0042** 0.0078** 
 (0.0026) (0.0049) (0.0019) (0.0036) 
Mcap -0.0080*** -0.0149*** -0.0055*** -0.0104*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0038) (0.0006) (0.0011) 
ROA -0.0488*** -0.0890*** -0.0910*** -0.1732*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0282) (0.0083) (0.0157) 
TobinQ 0.0028*** 0.0050*** 0.0033*** 0.0062*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0008) (0.0016) 
SD_ROA[-3, -1] -0.0866*** -0.1590*** 0.1542*** 0.2925*** 
 (0.0263) (0.0488) (0.0139) (0.0266) 
Leverage 0.0081 0.0162 0.0078** 0.0141* 
 (0.0086) (0.0159) (0.0040) (0.0075) 
Tangibility 0.0248 0.0442 0.0005 0.0009 
 (0.0244) (0.0448) (0.0051) (0.0097) 
FirmAge -0.0142 -0.0274 -0.0006 -0.0012 
 (0.0129) (0.0240) (0.0017) (0.0032) 
Slack 0.0184 0.0347 0.0466*** 0.0892*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0298) (0.0067) (0.0128) 
Constant 0.0740** 0.1405** 0.0122* 0.0236* 
 (0.0364) (0.0676) (0.0069) (0.0131) 
     
Observations 13,813 13,813 13,813 13,813 
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R-squared 0.6977 0.6993 0.3722 0.3729 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes No No 
Industry Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
For control variables, firms’ market capitalization (Mcap) and ROA have significantly 
negative impacts on firms’ post-intervention risk-taking. Tobin’s Q (TobinQ) is 
positively related to firms’ future risk-taking. The standard deviation of ROA over the 
past three years (SD_ROA[-3, -1]) is negatively associated with post-intervention risk-
taking, indicating that firms with higher risk-taking in the past three years would have 
a more significant reduction in future risk-taking. An implication is that activist hedge 
funds tend to target a riskier firm. 
In addition, Greenwood and Schor (2009) argue that different types of demands by 
activists conveys material information about the course of actions that firm should 
take. Brav et al. (2008) and Boyson and Pichler (2019) also consider that activists’ 
demands have significant implications for target firms. This study also explores the 
consequences of different types of hedge fund demands (as provided by the FactSet 
SharkRepellent database). Hence, this study examines whether different types of 
hedge fund demands make a difference in firm risk-taking behaviors post interventions. 
The hedge fund activism events are distinguished into three subsamples, namely 
activism with corporate governance related demands, activism with value 
enhancement related demands, and activism without explicit demands. The types of 
hedge fund demands are provided by the FactSet SharkRepellent database. 
Relevant results are reported in Table 4.8. Industry-adjusted standard deviation of ROA 
(𝐵𝑅1) and industry-adjusted range of ROA (𝐵𝑅2) are used as the book-based proxies 
for firm risk-taking. Columns (1) and (2) report the results based on corporate 
governance-related demands. Columns (3) and (4) report the results based on value 
enhancement related demands. Columns (5) and (6) report the results based on hedge 
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fund activism without explicit demands. This test controls for firm fixed effects and 
year fixed effects.  
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Table 4.8 Impact of types of hedge fund demands on firm risk-taking 
The table provides regression results of firm risk-taking post hedge fund activism, based on different types of hedge fund demands. The dependent variables 
of different columns are 𝐵𝑅1 and 𝐵𝑅2 as defined in Table 4.2. Columns (1) and (2) report the results using the subsample that hedge funds target corporate 
governance-related issues, and Columns (3) and (4) report the results using the subsample that hedge funds target value enhancement issues. Columns (5) 
and (6) report the results that hedge funds do not have explicit demands. Robust standard errors are provided below in the parentheses. The variable 
definitions are provided in Table 4.2. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
  CG Related  Value Enhancement Related  No Explicit Demands 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Variables 𝐵𝑅1 𝐵𝑅2 
 𝐵𝑅1 𝐵𝑅2 
 𝐵𝑅1 𝐵𝑅2 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 -0.0099* -0.0184*  -0.0122* -0.0233*  -0.0143** -0.0266** 
 (0.0060) (0.0111) 
 (0.0066) (0.0123)  (0.0062) (0.0117) 
post 0.0036 0.0071  0.0055 0.0106  0.0119*** 0.0225*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0097) 
 (0.0052) (0.0097)  (0.0045) (0.0083) 
target -0.0016 -0.0031  0.0024 0.0047  0.0019 0.0039 
 (0.0046) (0.0085) 
 (0.0067) (0.0125)  (0.0044) (0.0086) 
Mcap -0.0099*** -0.0185***  -0.0067** -0.0124**  -0.0075*** -0.0144*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0054) 
 (0.0029) (0.0053)  (0.0028) (0.0053) 
ROA -0.0301* -0.0548*  -0.0414* -0.0763*  -0.0598** -0.1078** 
 (0.0166) (0.0313) 
 (0.0213) (0.0399)  (0.0271) (0.0509) 
TobinQ 0.0050** 0.0091**  0.0023** 0.0041*  0.0022** 0.0039** 
 (0.0024) (0.0045) 
 (0.0011) (0.0021)  (0.0011) (0.0020) 
SD_ROA[-3, -1] -0.0922*** -0.1697***  -0.1119*** -0.2067***  -0.0725* -0.1318* 
 (0.0280) (0.0519) 
 (0.0411) (0.0759)  (0.0405) (0.0761) 
Leverage -0.0012 0.0013  -0.0018 -0.0030  0.0164 0.0313 
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 (0.0126) (0.0229) 
 (0.0162) (0.0294)  (0.0112) (0.0208) 
Tangibility 0.0146 0.0272  0.0288 0.0522  -0.0137 -0.0301 
 (0.0342) (0.0625) 
 (0.0367) (0.0679)  (0.0324) (0.0612) 
FirmAge -0.0064 -0.0121  -0.0220 -0.0430  -0.0094 -0.0181 
 (0.0195) (0.0358) 
 (0.0223) (0.0411)  (0.0193) (0.0363) 
Slack 0.0051 0.0106  0.0101 0.0200  0.0299 0.0556 
 (0.0236) (0.0432) 
 (0.0219) (0.0404)  (0.0254) (0.0476) 
Constant 0.0661 0.1206  0.1433 0.2725  0.0704 0.1361 
 (0.0523) (0.0960) 
 (0.0928) (0.1703)  (0.0501) (0.0942) 
 
        
Observations 7,508 7,508  5,410 5,410  4,337 4,337 
R-squared 0.6983 0.7009  0.6818 0.6825  0.7469 0.7468 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 





Table 4.8 provides supportive evidence that the target firms experience a significant 
reduction in risk-taking post hedge fund activism no matter the types of hedge fund 
demands, as indicated by the negative estimates of the coefficient of 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ×  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 
across all columns. Specifically, the post-intervention risk-taking of the target firms 
proxied by industry-adjusted standard deviation of ROA (𝐵𝑅1) is 0.99% lower relative 
to their matched control firms during the three-year window when hedge funds target 
corporate governance related issues (Column (1)). The risk-taking of the target firms is 
1.22% lower relative to their matched control firms post the activism if hedge funds 
target value enhancement related issues (Column (3)). The statistical significance of 
the coefficient of 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ×  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 in both columns is 10%. Alternatively, the risk-taking 
of the target firms is 1.43% lower than the control firms if hedge fund activism does 
not have explicit demands, which is statistically significant at 5% level.  
An implication from these results is that firms targeted by activist hedge funds 
experience a reduction in risk-taking in the long-term, even if hedge funds do not have 
explicit demands. In other words, the target firms tend to become more conservative 
in the long-term.  
4.4.2 Hedge fund activism and risk-taking: Myopic management 
To examine the Hypothesis 2, this study creates subsamples based on the myopic 
management measure described in Subsection 4.3.2.2, and classifies firms into myopic 
and non-myopic firms. Following this, it re-estimates Equation 36 based on different 
subsamples. Industry-adjusted standard deviation and range of ROA (𝐵𝑅1 and 𝐵𝑅2 
respectively) are used as the proxies for firm risk-taking. This study also controls for 
firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. According to Hypothesis 2, it is expected that 
the myopic subsample would have a negative value of 𝛽1 . Relevant results are 
reported in Table 4.9. Columns (1) and (2) provide results based on the myopic 




Table 4.9 Hedge fund activism and risk-taking: Myopic management 
The table provides regression results of firm risk-taking post hedge fund activism, based on 
subsamples of myopic and non-myopic firms. The dependent variables of different columns 
are 𝐵𝑅1 and 𝐵𝑅2 as defined in Table 4.2. Columns (1) and (2) report the results using the 
subsample of the myopic firms, and Columns (3) and (4) report the results using the subsample 
of the non-myopic firms. Following Mizik (2010), myopia is measured by comparing a firm’s 
current levels of earnings, marketing, and R&D expenditures and its “normal” or expected 
levels. Firms with increasing ROA and decreasing marketing and R&D expenditures are 
classified as myopic firms. Robust standard errors are provided below in the parentheses. The 
variable definitions are provided in Table 4.2. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Myopic Firms  Non-Myopic Firms 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Variables 𝑩𝑹𝟏 𝑩𝑹𝟐 
 𝑩𝑹𝟏 𝑩𝑹𝟐 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 -0.0125*** -0.0240***  -0.0096 -0.0179 
 (0.0039) (0.0073)  (0.0077) (0.0145) 
post 0.0069** 0.0133**  0.0065 0.0122 
 (0.0031) (0.0057)  (0.0059) (0.0111) 
target 0.0062*** 0.0118***  -0.0035 -0.0061 
 (0.0023) (0.0043)  (0.0043) (0.0080) 
Mcap -0.0084*** -0.0155***  -0.0101*** -0.0189*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0052)  (0.0032) (0.0059) 
ROA -0.0047 -0.0077  -0.0633*** -0.1150*** 
 (0.0255) (0.0478)  (0.0219) (0.0411) 
TobinQ 0.0154*** 0.0287***  0.0027*** 0.0048*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0068)  (0.0008) (0.0015) 
SD_ROA[-3, -1] -0.0687** -0.1242**  -0.0995*** -0.1817*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0507)  (0.0365) (0.0674) 
Leverage -0.0234* -0.0415  0.0127 0.0244 
 (0.0137) (0.0264)  (0.0092) (0.0163) 
Tangibility 0.0294 0.0541  0.0297 0.0520 
 (0.0270) (0.0499)  (0.0361) (0.0670) 
FirmAge -0.0029 -0.0059  -0.0007 -0.0033 
 (0.0103) (0.0191)  (0.0239) (0.0447) 
Slack 0.0187 0.0328  0.0163 0.0320 
 (0.0192) (0.0358)  (0.0223) (0.0410) 
Constant 0.0168 0.0290  0.0629 0.1235 
 (0.0328) (0.0611)  (0.0641) (0.1194) 
      
Observations 7,301 7,301  6,512 6,512 
R-squared 0.6795 0.6817  0.7371 0.7380 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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It is notable that myopic and non-myopic target firms display different risk-taking 
behaviors post activism. Columns (1) and (2) report negative and significant estimates 
of the coefficient of the interaction term 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ×  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡, with the values of -0.0125 
and -0.0240, respectively. This indicates that myopic target firms experience 1.25% (or 
2.40% if measured by 𝐵𝑅2) lower in risk-taking post hedge fund activism relative to 
their control peers. Alternatively, as shown in Columns (3) and (4), non-myopic 
managed target firms also tend to reduce risk-taking post intervention relative to their 
control peers, while the reduction is insignificant, as shown by the negative (but 
insignificant) coefficient of the interaction term 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ×  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 in Columns (3) and 
(4), with the values of -0.0096 and -0.0179 respectively.  
Overall, these results provide supportive evidence for Hypothesis 2 that myopic firms 
tend to have a more pronounced reduction in risk-taking post hedge fund 
interventions. This is associated with the argument of short-termism that myopic 
managed firms and activist hedge funds both tend to prioritize short-term high returns 
to investors rather than long-term investment in capabilities, for instance, by 
decreasing marketing or R&D expenditures (Mizik, 2010). This finding provides a 
potential explanation for the negative long-term impact of hedge fund activism on firm 
value (Clifford, 2008). 
4.4.3 Hedge fund activism and risk-taking: Information transparency 
To examine the Hypothesis 3, this study further creates subsamples based on the 
information transparency of the target firms, as discussed in Subsection 3.2.3. This 
helps isolate the impact of the information quality on the change of firm risk-taking 
post hedge fund activism. 𝐵𝑅1  and 𝐵𝑅2  serves as the proxies for firm risk-taking. 
Following this, it re-estimates Equation 36 based on different subsamples. Hypothesis 
3 implies a negative value of 𝛽1 for the subsample of firms with lower information 
transparency. Table 4.10 reports results based on firm-level information transparency. 
Columns (1)-(4) show results based on the LMSW proxy, and Columns (5)-(8) show 
results based on the 8K filings proxy. A negative LMSW indicates higher information 
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transparency, and the subsample that discloses more 8K filings is also considered as 
more informationally transparent. Hence, Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) are results 
based on firms with lower information transparency, and Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) 
are results based on firms with higher information transparency. 
Both the LMSW and 8K proxies indicate that only the target firms with less information 
transparency significantly lower their risk-taking relative to their matched control firms 
post activism. This is indicated by the significantly negative coefficient of the 
interaction term 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ×  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 in Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6), with the negative 
values of -0.0114, -0.0213, -0.0153, and -0.0283 respectively, which are statistically 
significant at 5% level. Alternatively, if the firms have higher information transparency, 
the target firms also tend to reduce their risk-taking relative to the control firms, while 
the difference in post-intervention risk-taking is insignificant. This is indicated by the 
negative (but insignificant) values of the coefficient of the interaction term 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ×
 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 in Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8). This confirms Hypothesis 3 that hedge fund 
activism has a more pronounced impact on risk-taking for less transparent firms. These 
results provide new evidence to Lorek et al. (1999) that it is easier to manipulate the 
information flow in opaque firms. 
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Table 4.10 Hedge fund activism and risk-taking: Information transparency 
The table provides the results on the effect of information transparency on the risk reduction post hedge fund activism. The dependent variables of different 
columns are 𝐵𝑅1 and 𝐵𝑅2 as defined in Table 4.2. Information transparency is measured by either Llorente et al.’s (2002) model (LMSW proxy) or a total 
number of 8K filings. A negative LMSW indicates higher information transparency, and firms that disclose more 8K filings are also more transparent. This study 
creates subsamples depending on the firm-level information transparency. Columns (1)-(4) show results based on the LMSW proxy, and Columns (5)-(8) show 
results based on the 8K filings proxy. Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) are results of firms with less transparency, and Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) are results of 
firms with higher transparency. Robust standard errors are provided below in the parentheses. The variable definitions are provided in Table 4.2. All variables 
are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  LMSW (Above Zero)   LMSW (Below Zero)   All_8K (Below Median)   All_8K (Above Median) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Variables 𝐵𝑅1 𝐵𝑅2  𝐵𝑅1 𝐵𝑅2  𝐵𝑅1 𝐵𝑅2  𝐵𝑅1 𝐵𝑅2 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 -0.0114** -0.0213**  -0.0071 -0.0138  -0.0153** -0.0283**  -0.0069 -0.0125 
 (0.0056) (0.0106)  (0.0056) (0.0105)  (0.0064) (0.0119)  (0.0055) (0.0102) 
post 0.0085* 0.0160**  0.0018 0.0040  0.0074 0.0140  0.0028 0.0052 
 (0.0043) (0.0081)  (0.0039) (0.0073)  (0.0058) (0.0108)  (0.0044) (0.0081) 
target -0.0002 -0.0003  0.0008 0.0016  0.0025 0.0048  -0.0015 -0.0025 
 (0.0032) (0.0060)  (0.0036) (0.0068)  (0.0039) (0.0072)  (0.0035) (0.0065) 
Mcap -0.0077*** -0.0144***  -0.0139*** -0.0265***  -0.0088** -0.0165**  -0.0118*** -0.0219*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0044)  (0.0049) (0.0090)  (0.0036) (0.0066)  (0.0037) (0.0069) 
ROA -0.0649*** -0.1202***  -0.0035 0.0003  -0.0731*** -0.1366***  -0.0120 -0.0186 
 (0.0200) (0.0373)  (0.0244) (0.0453)  (0.0243) (0.0448)  (0.0232) (0.0431) 
TobinQ 0.0022*** 0.0040***  0.0117*** 0.0221***  0.0016*** 0.0029**  0.0175*** 0.0316*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0014)  (0.0040) (0.0075)  (0.0006) (0.0011)  (0.0035) (0.0064) 
SD_ROA[-3, -1] -0.0693** -0.1262**  -0.1261*** -0.2341***  -0.1037** -0.1911**  -0.0974** -0.1840** 
 (0.0302) (0.0560)  (0.0482) (0.0905)  (0.0419) (0.0774)  (0.0438) (0.0811) 
151 
 
Leverage 0.0164 0.0317  -0.0289** -0.0515**  0.0059 0.0112  -0.0049 -0.0054 
 (0.0105) (0.0197)  (0.0134) (0.0247)  (0.0115) (0.0213)  (0.0172) (0.0288) 
Tangibility 0.0176 0.0313  0.0349 0.0607  0.0278 0.0508  0.0192 0.0327 
 (0.0316) (0.0581)  (0.0340) (0.0633)  (0.0485) (0.0888)  (0.0339) (0.0622) 
FirmAge -0.0183 -0.0342  0.0025 0.0037  -0.0177 -0.0374  0.0078 0.0162 
 (0.0189) (0.0349)  (0.0149) (0.0282)  (0.0199) (0.0372)  (0.0170) (0.0316) 
Slack 0.0120 0.0226  0.0139 0.0283  0.0724*** 0.1331***  -0.0062 -0.0047 
 (0.0199) (0.0366)  (0.0289) (0.0533)  (0.0252) (0.0462)  (0.0255) (0.0474) 
Constant 0.0771 0.1438  0.0803 0.1533  0.0806 0.1627  0.0175 0.0285 
 (0.0519) (0.0960)  (0.0508) (0.0949)  (0.0585) (0.1089)  (0.0560) (0.1040) 
            
Observations 9,042 9,042  4,771 4,771  5,098 5,098  5,130 5,130 
R-squared 0.7253 0.7269  0.7022 0.7048  0.7670 0.7691  0.7806 0.7807 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 




Following Lang, Lins and Maffet (2012), this study divides the sample based on the 
degree of the firms’ earnings management, as an additional test of Hypothesis 351. 
Relevant results are reported in Table 4.11. Columns (1) and (2) report the results of 
firms with above median earnings management, which are firms with a lower level of 
information transparency. Columns (3) and (4) report the results of firms with below 
median earnings management, which are firms with a higher level of information 
transparency. 
Consistent with the findings in Table 4.10, Table 4.11 also reports a more pronounced 
reduction in risk-taking for the subsample with less information transparency. This is 
indicated by the significantly negative coefficient of the interaction term 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ×
 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡  in Columns (1) and (2), with the negative values of -0.0084 and -0.0162, 
respectively, statistically significant at 10% level. Alternatively, if the firms have a 
higher level of transparency, i.e. below median earnings management, the post-
intervention reduction in risk-taking is statistically indifferent between the target and 
control firms. This is indicated by the negative (but insignificant) values of the 
coefficient of 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ×  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 in Columns (3) and (4). This additional test confirms 
Hypothesis 3 that less transparent firms would experience a more pronounced 
reduction in risk-taking post hedge fund activism. 
 
  
                                                             
51 This study does not use the estimates of accrual-based earnings management directly. Instead, this 
study indirectly use this proxy for information transparency, and divides the full sample into subsamples 
based on whether the target firm’s level of earnings management is above or below median. Hence, 
the results using the proxy of earnings management is reported as an additional test in Table 4.11. This 
follows the study by Lang et al. (2012). 
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Table 4.11 Hedge fund activism and risk-taking: Earnings management 
The table provides the results on the effect of information transparency on the risk reduction 
post hedge fund activism. The dependent variables of different columns are 𝐵𝑅1 and 𝐵𝑅2 
as defined in Table 4.2. Information transparency is measured by accrual-based earnings 
management following Jones (1991) and Dechow et al. (1995). Columns (1) and (2) report the 
results of firms with above median earnings management, which are firms with a lower level 
of information transparency. Columns (3) and (4) report the results of firms with below median 
earnings management, which are firms with a higher level of information transparency. Robust 
standard errors are provided below in the parentheses. The variable definitions are provided 
in Table 4.2. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 High EM Firms  Low EM Firms 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Variables 𝑩𝑹𝟏 𝑩𝑹𝟐 
 𝑩𝑹𝟏 𝑩𝑹𝟐 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 -0.0084* -0.0162*  -0.0089 -0.0166 
 (0.0046) (0.0086)  (0.0058) (0.0110) 
post 0.0053 0.0102*  0.0068 0.0130 
 (0.0033) (0.0062)  (0.0043) (0.0081) 
target 0.0016 0.0030  0.0005 0.0011 
 (0.0030) (0.0056)  (0.0033) (0.0061) 
Mcap -0.0104*** -0.0192***  -0.0121*** -0.0228*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0055)  (0.0032) (0.0061) 
ROA -0.0501** -0.0896**  -0.0499** -0.0945** 
 (0.0212) (0.0394)  (0.0220) (0.0420) 
TobinQ 0.0026*** 0.0046***  0.0137*** 0.0251*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0017)  (0.0029) (0.0055) 
SD_ROA[-3, -1] -0.0636* -0.1141*  -0.1140*** -0.2108*** 
 (0.0348) (0.0645)  (0.0307) (0.0576) 
Leverage -0.0044 -0.0071  0.0061 0.0125 
 (0.0114) (0.0213)  (0.0101) (0.0179) 
Tangibility 0.0439 0.0839  -0.0057 -0.0193 
 (0.0386) (0.0714)  (0.0324) (0.0605) 
FirmAge -0.0130 -0.0269  -0.0159 -0.0277 
 (0.0157) (0.0294)  (0.0186) (0.0346) 
Slack 0.0378* 0.0705*  -0.0130 -0.0234 
 (0.0206) (0.0379)  (0.0221) (0.0412) 
Constant 0.0697 0.1342*  0.1025* 0.1892* 
 (0.0427) (0.0797)  (0.0546) (0.1018) 
      
Observations 6,715 6,715  7,098 7,098 
R-squared 0.7782 0.7784  0.6984 0.6997 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.4.4 Hedge fund activism and risk-taking: Hostile resistance 
To explore the Hypothesis 4, this study identifies the response of the target firms to 
hedge fund activism by going through 36,000 campaign filings of activist hedge funds 
and target firms provided by the FactSet SharkRepellent database. The activism events 
are classified as hostile resistance when the target firms disagree publicly to hedge 
fund demands. More specifically, following Boyson and Pichler (2019), this study 
identifies the following reactions of the target firms as hostile resistance: 
supermajority provisions for charter amendments or mergers, limits to shareholder 
bylaw amendments, classified boards, poison pills, and golden parachutes. Otherwise, 
activism events are classified as no resistance. This study re-estimates Equation 36 
based on the two subsamples of hostile resistance or no resistance, with results 
reported in Table 4.12. Columns (1) and (2) report the results that the target firms have 
hostile resistance to hedge fund demands, and Columns (3) and (4) report the results 
that the target firms have no public resistance to the activism. 𝐵𝑅1 and 𝐵𝑅2 serve as 
the proxies for firm risk-taking. 
It is notable that if the target firms resist to hedge fund activism, the post-intervention 
risk-taking is statistically indifferent between the target and control firms, as indicated 
by the insignificant values of the coefficient of 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ×  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 in Columns (1) and (2). 
In contrast, if the target firms do not have hostile resistance, the target firms 
experience significantly lower risk-taking post activism compared to their control peers, 
as indicated by the negative values of -0.0128 and -0.0236 in Columns (3) and (4) 
respectively, with statistically significant at 5% level. This represents a 1.28% (2.36% if 
measured by 𝐵𝑅2 in Column (4)) lower risk-taking for the target firms post hedge 
fund activism. These finding provides evidence for Hypothesis 4 that target firms 
without hostile resistance to hedge fund activism would experience a more 
pronounced reduction in risk-taking in the long-term. The results of Hypothesis 4 add 
to Boyson and Pichler’s (2019) findings that document that management’s hostile 
resistance to hedge fund activism helps offsets the consequences of activism.  
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Table 4.12 Target firms’ response to hedge fund activism 
The table provides the results how the target firms’ response to hedge fund activism affects 
post-intervention risk-taking. The dependent variables of different columns are 𝐵𝑅1  and 
𝐵𝑅2 as defined in Table 4.2. The full sample is divided into subsamples depending on whether 
target firms have hostile resistance to hedge fund activism. Columns (1) and (2) show results 
based on firms with hostile resistance to activism, and Columns (3) and (4) show results based 
on firms without resistance. Robust standard errors are provided below in the parentheses. 
The variable definitions are provided in Table 4.2. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th 
percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Hostile Resistance  No Resistance 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Variables 𝑩𝑹𝟏 𝑩𝑹𝟐  𝑩𝑹𝟏 𝑩𝑹𝟐 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 -0.0080 -0.0154  -0.0128** -0.0236** 
 (0.0051) (0.0097)  (0.0052) (0.0098) 
Post 0.0018 0.0034  0.0103*** 0.0193*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0076)  (0.0040) (0.0074) 
Target 0.0018 0.0028  -0.0023 -0.0046 
 (0.0045) (0.0084)  (0.0041) (0.0077) 
Mcap -0.0081*** -0.0157***  -0.0090*** -0.0166*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0042)  (0.0026) (0.0049) 
ROA -0.0134 -0.0264  -0.0517** -0.0935** 
 (0.0127) (0.0241)  (0.0227) (0.0422) 
TobinQ 0.0097*** 0.0180***  0.0020*** 0.0034*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0028)  (0.0007) (0.0012) 
SD_ROA[-3, -1] -0.0668*** -0.1249***  -0.0856* -0.1585* 
 (0.0182) (0.0351)  (0.0455) (0.0841) 
Leverage 0.0000 -0.0014  0.0109 0.0223 
 (0.0079) (0.0147)  (0.0097) (0.0181) 
Tangibility 0.0233 0.0422  0.0260 0.0474 
 (0.0297) (0.0547)  (0.0305) (0.0567) 
FirmAge -0.0167 -0.0323  -0.0102 -0.0199 
 (0.0143) (0.0269)  (0.0167) (0.0311) 
Slack -0.0032 -0.0059  0.0291 0.0552 
 (0.0179) (0.0336)  (0.0197) (0.0363) 
Constant 0.0632 0.1243*  0.0736 0.1384 
 (0.0405) (0.0755)  (0.0471) (0.0876) 
      
Observations 6,480 6,480  7,333 7,333 
R-squared 0.6959 0.6964  0.7139 0.7152 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.4.5 Hedge fund activism and risk-taking: Additional tests 
This study has several additional tests based on different subsamples, exploring 
whether specific subsamples react differently to hedge fund activism. Firstly, this study 
distinguishes whether hedge fund activism is successful or not. Target firms might take 
actions/settlement regarding the hedge fund demands, and relevant information on 
the actions is provided by the FactSet SharkRepellent database. The hedge fund 
activism is considered as “successful” if more than 50% demands are met. Two 
subsamples are classified, based on “successful” or “unsuccessful” hedge fund 
activism. Relevant results are reported in Table 4.13, with Columns (1) and (2) reported 
results of “successful” hedge fund activism, and Columns (3) and (4) reported results 
of “unsuccessful” hedge fund activism. 
As indicated in Columns (1) and (2), the reduction in the risk-taking of the target firms 
relative to the control firms is only statistically significant when hedge fund activism is 
successful and most of the hedge fund demands are met. More specifically, the post-
intervention risk-taking of the target firms is 1.40% (or 2.52% if measured by 𝐵𝑅2) 
lower than that of control firms, statistically significant at the 10% level. Alternatively, 
if hedge fund activism is unsuccessful and less than 50% of the hedge fund demands 
are met, the change in the risk-taking between the target and control firms is 




Table 4.13 Impact of the success of hedge fund activism 
The table provides the results whether the success of hedge fund activism affects post-
intervention risk-taking. The dependent variables of different columns are 𝐵𝑅1 and 𝐵𝑅2 as 
defined in Table 4.2. The full sample is divided into subsamples depending on whether the 
hedge fund activism is “successful” (i.e. more than 50% of demands are met) or not. Columns 
(1) and (2) show results of “successful” hedge fund activism, and Columns (3) and (4) show 
results of “unsuccessful” hedge fund activism. Robust standard errors are provided below in 
the parentheses. The variable definitions are provided in Table 4.2. All variables are winsorized 
at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
  Successful hedge fund activism  Unsuccessful hedge fund activism 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Variables 𝐵𝑅1 𝐵𝑅2 
 𝐵𝑅1 𝐵𝑅2 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 -0.0140* -0.0252*  -0.0048 -0.0100 
 (0.0083) (0.0188)  (0.0078) (0.0146) 
Post 0.0067 0.0129  0.0019 0.0039 
 (0.0089) (0.0166)  (0.0060) (0.0112) 
Target 0.0024 0.0041  0.0054 0.0106 
 (0.0074) (0.0140)  (0.0097) (0.0179) 
Mcap -0.0078* -0.0145*  -0.0068** -0.0124** 
 (0.0040) (0.0074)  (0.0030) (0.0056) 
ROA -0.0439 -0.0794  -0.0306 -0.0561 
 (0.0302) (0.0567)  (0.0210) (0.0389) 
TobinQ 0.0040 0.0069  0.0018** 0.0032* 
 (0.0031) (0.0057)  (0.0009) (0.0017) 
SD_ROA[-3, -1] -0.1218** -0.2245**  -0.1297*** -0.2394*** 
 (0.0553) (0.1029)  (0.0333) (0.0618) 
Leverage -0.0065 -0.0059  0.0044 0.0077 
 (0.0164) (0.0302)  (0.0151) (0.0269) 
Tangibility 0.0007 0.0003  0.0633 0.1174 
 (0.0311) (0.0593)  (0.0405) (0.0736) 
FirmAge -0.0158 -0.0283  -0.0358 -0.0690 
 (0.0252) (0.0471)  (0.0247) (0.0454) 
Slack -0.0011 0.0002  0.0175 0.0319 
 (0.0307) (0.0562)  (0.0270) (0.0495) 
Constant 0.1089 0.1983  0.1035 0.1943 
 (0.0751) (0.1398)  (0.0665) (0.1220) 
      
Observations 3,867 3,867  4,564 4,564 
R-squared 0.6781 0.6787  0.7242 0.7266 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Secondly, this study also classifies the subsamples by the number of demands in each 
of the hedge fund activism events. In this way, it explores the scope of hedge fund 
demands during activism. Two subsamples are identified, namely activism with more 
than two demands and activism with two demands or less. Hedge fund activism with 
no explicit demands is excluded from this subsample. Relevant results are reported in 
Table 4.14. Columns (1) and (2) are results based on the subsample with more than 
two hedge fund demands. Columns (3) and (4) are results based on the subsample 
with less than two hedge fund demands. 
As indicated, when activist hedge funds target on more than two demands, the target 
firms have a more pronounced reduction in risk-taking relative to the control firms, by 
2.34% (or 4.52% if measured by 𝐵𝑅2) more decrease in firm risk-taking post hedge 
fund activism. On the contrary, if activist hedge funds target on less than two demands, 
the reduction in firm risk-taking is statistically indifferent between the target and 




Table 4.14 Hedge fund activism and risk-taking: By the number of demands 
The table provides additional results based on the number of hedge fund demands. The 
dependent variables of different columns are 𝐵𝑅1 and 𝐵𝑅2 as defined in Table 4.2. The 
sample is divided into subsamples depending on whether activist hedge funds have more or 
less than two demands. Columns (1) and (2) show results that activist hedge funds have more 
than two demands, and Columns (3) and (4) show results that activist hedge funds have two 
demands or less. Robust standard errors are provided below in the parentheses. The variable 
definitions are provided in Table 4.2. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, 
**, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  More than two demands   Two demands or less 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Variables 𝐵𝑅1 𝐵𝑅2  𝐵𝑅1 𝐵𝑅2 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 -0.0234** -0.0452**  -0.0025 -0.0052 
 (0.0099) (0.0187)  (0.0065) (0.0123) 
Post 0.0139* 0.0262*  -0.0026 -0.0046 
 (0.0083) (0.0158)  (0.0047) (0.0087) 
Target -0.0016 -0.0025  -0.0064 -0.0118 
 (0.0113) (0.0210)  (0.0058) (0.0109) 
Mcap -0.0170*** -0.0320***  -0.0192*** -0.0361*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0088)  (0.0042) (0.0079) 
ROA -0.0374* -0.0710  -0.0221 -0.0402 
 (0.0227) (0.0440)  (0.0198) (0.0370) 
TobinQ 0.0220*** 0.0413***  0.0224*** 0.0412*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0089)  (0.0032) (0.0060) 
SD_ROA[-3, -1] -0.1166*** -0.2109***  -0.0954** -0.1806** 
 (0.0395) (0.0740)  (0.0392) (0.0735) 
Leverage -0.0248 -0.0452  0.0072 0.0138 
 (0.0257) (0.0476)  (0.0158) (0.0295) 
Tangibility 0.0344 0.0636  0.0011 0.0045 
 (0.0558) (0.1035)  (0.0268) (0.0499) 
FirmAge 0.0079 0.0138  0.0069* 0.0129* 
 (0.0100) (0.0178)  (0.0040) (0.0075) 
Slack -0.0203 -0.0367  0.0037 0.0085 
 (0.0344) (0.0644)  (0.0179) (0.0335) 
Constant 0.0087 0.0291  0.0650 0.1265 
 (0.1339) (0.2397)  (0.0615) (0.1156) 
      
Observations 3,166 3,166  5,921 5,921 
R-squared 0.6960 0.6953  0.7456 0.7465 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.5 Robustness checks 
This study conducts several robustness tests and incorporates alternative 
specifications. Firstly, instead of the industry-adjusted proxies for risk-taking, this study 
measures firm risk-taking based on the firm-level standard deviation or range of ROA 
over a 3-year rolling window (namely 𝐵𝑅3 and 𝐵𝑅4), as defined in Table 4.2. All the 
hypotheses are re-estimated based on 𝐵𝑅3 and 𝐵𝑅4. Relevant results are presented 
in Tables 4.15-4.18.  
In these tables, the signs and significance of the estimate of the coefficient of 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ×  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 are highly consistent with the main results as reported in Tables 4.7-
4.12. These results support the hypotheses. Specifically, the target firms experience a 
significant reduction in risk-taking post hedge fund activism by 1.09% (or 2.06% if 
measured by 𝐵𝑅4) relative to the control firms, as reported in Table 4.15 (Hypothesis 
1). This effect on the reduction in risk-taking is more pronounced for myopic managed 
firms (Hypothesis 2) or opaque firms (Hypothesis 3), as reported in Tables 4.16 and 
4.17, respectively. Table 4.18 confirms Hypothesis 4 that the target firms with hostile 
resistance to hedge fund activism would experience a less significant reduction in risk-




Table 4.15 Hedge fund activism and firm risk-taking, 𝑩𝑹𝟑 and 𝑩𝑹𝟒 
The table provides regression results of the risk-taking behaviors of the target firms post hedge 
fund activism. The dependent variables of different columns are standard deviation or range 
of ROA (i.e. 𝐵𝑅3 and 𝐵𝑅4) over a 3-year rolling window as defined in Table 4.2. Columns (1) 
and (2) report the results based on firm fixed effects, and Columns (3) and (4) report the results 
based on industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are provided below in the parentheses. 
The variable definitions are provided in Table 4.2. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th 
percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 𝑩𝑹𝟑 𝑩𝑹𝟒 𝑩𝑹𝟑 𝑩𝑹𝟒 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 -0.0109*** -0.0206*** -0.0061* -0.0114* 
  (0.0041) (0.0078) (0.0034) (0.0063) 
Post 0.0063** 0.0119** 0.0062*** 0.0116*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0059) (0.0023) (0.0044) 
Target 0.0004 0.0008 0.0046** 0.0086** 
 (0.0026) (0.0049) (0.0019) (0.0037) 
Mcap -0.0079*** -0.0151*** -0.0055*** -0.0105*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0038) (0.0006) (0.0011) 
ROA -0.0485*** -0.0895*** -0.0938*** -0.1777*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0286) (0.0084) (0.0160) 
TobinQ 0.0028*** 0.0051*** 0.0034*** 0.0065*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0009) (0.0016) 
SD_ROA[-3, -1] -0.0875*** -0.1637*** 0.1557*** 0.2947*** 
 (0.0264) (0.0497) (0.0141) (0.0267) 
Leverage 0.0085 0.0171 0.0087** 0.0156** 
 (0.0086) (0.0160) (0.0041) (0.0077) 
Tangibility 0.0247 0.0448 0.0009 0.0016 
 (0.0247) (0.0461) (0.0052) (0.0099) 
FirmAge -0.0145 -0.0279 -0.0005 -0.0010 
 (0.0129) (0.0242) (0.0018) (0.0033) 
Slack 0.0186 0.0355 0.0479*** 0.0916*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0303) (0.0068) (0.0129) 
Constant 0.1230*** 0.2348*** 0.0605*** 0.1157*** 
 (0.0365) (0.0684) (0.0070) (0.0133) 
     
Observations 13,813 13,813 13,813 13,813 
R-squared 0.7036 0.7049 0.3959 0.3961 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes   
Industry Fixed Effect     Yes Yes 




Table 4.16 Hedge fund activism and risk-taking: Myopic management, 𝑩𝑹𝟑  and 
𝑩𝑹𝟒 
The table provides regression results of firm risk-taking post hedge fund activism, based on 
myopic firms and non-myopic firms. The dependent variables of different columns are 𝐵𝑅3 
and 𝐵𝑅4 as defined in Table 4.2. Columns (1) and (2) report the results using the subsample 
of myopic firms, and Columns (3) and (4) report the results using the subsample of non-myopic 
firms. Following Mizik (2010), firms with increasing ROA and decreasing marketing and R&D 
expenditures are classified as myopic firms. Robust standard errors are provided below in the 
parentheses. The variable definitions are provided in Table 4.2. All variables are winsorized at 
1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 Myopic Firms  Non-Myopic Firms 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Variables 𝑩𝑹𝟑 𝑩𝑹𝟒 
 𝑩𝑹𝟑 𝑩𝑹𝟒 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 -0.0120*** -0.0231***  -0.0107 -0.0203 
 (0.0039) (0.0073)  (0.0077) (0.0146) 
post 0.0064** 0.0122**  0.0065 0.0121 
 (0.0031) (0.0057)  (0.0059) (0.0112) 
target 0.0060*** 0.0116***  -0.0024 -0.0042 
 (0.0023) (0.0043)  (0.0043) (0.0080) 
Mcap -0.0083*** -0.0155***  -0.0102*** -0.0194*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0053)  (0.0032) (0.0060) 
ROA -0.0051 -0.0071  -0.0634*** -0.1175*** 
 (0.0252) (0.0478)  (0.0218) (0.0415) 
TobinQ 0.0157*** 0.0293***  0.0027*** 0.0050*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0069)  (0.0008) (0.0016) 
SD_ROA[-3, -1] -0.0737*** -0.1355***  -0.0988*** -0.1844*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0518)  (0.0364) (0.0686) 
Leverage -0.0215 -0.0380  0.0129 0.0249 
 (0.0133) (0.0256)  (0.0092) (0.0167) 
Tangibility 0.0262 0.0490  0.0300 0.0538 
 (0.0274) (0.0510)  (0.0369) (0.0698) 
FirmAge -0.0022 -0.0042  -0.0015 -0.0049 
 (0.0104) (0.0192)  (0.0238) (0.0452) 
Slack 0.0179 0.0323  0.0167 0.0331 
 (0.0191) (0.0360)  (0.0224) (0.0419) 
Constant 0.0664** 0.1225**  0.1110* 0.2168* 
 (0.0329) (0.0616)  (0.0640) (0.1210) 
      
Observations 7,301 7,301  6,512 6,512 
R-squared 0.6884 0.6899  0.7438 0.7442 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.17 Hedge fund activism and risk-taking: Information transparency, 𝑩𝑹𝟑 and 𝑩𝑹𝟒 
The table provides the results on the effect of information transparency on the risk reduction post hedge fund activism. The dependent variables of different 
columns are 𝐵𝑅3 and 𝐵𝑅4, as defined in Table 4.2. Information transparency is measured by either Llorente et al.’s (2002) model (LMSW proxy) or a total 
number of 8K filings. A negative LMSW indicates higher information transparency, and firms that disclose more 8K filings are also more transparent. The full 
sample is divided into subsamples depending on the firm-level information transparency. Columns (1)-(4) show results based on the LMSW proxy, and Columns 
(5)-(8) show results based on the 8K filings proxy. Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) are results of the firms with less transparency, and Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) 
are results of the firms with higher transparency. Robust standard errors are provided below in the parentheses. The variable definitions are provided in Table 
4.2. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  LMSW (Above Zero)   LMSW (Below Zero)   All_8K (Below Median)   All_8K (Above Median) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Variables 𝑩𝑹𝟑 𝑩𝑹𝟒  𝑩𝑹𝟑 𝑩𝑹𝟒  𝑩𝑹𝟑 𝑩𝑹𝟒  𝑩𝑹𝟑 𝑩𝑹𝟒 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 -0.0118** -0.0224**  -0.0071 -0.0138  -0.0153** -0.0286**  -0.0072 -0.0131 
 (0.0056) (0.0106)  (0.0056) (0.0107)  (0.0064) (0.0121)  (0.0054) (0.0102) 
post 0.0081* 0.0152*  0.0014 0.0032  0.0072 0.0136  0.0022 0.0038 
 (0.0043) (0.0082)  (0.0039) (0.0074)  (0.0058) (0.0110)  (0.0042) (0.0079) 
target 0.0002 0.0004  0.0012 0.0025  0.0031 0.0060  -0.0009 -0.0017 
 (0.0032) (0.0061)  (0.0036) (0.0068)  (0.0039) (0.0073)  (0.0035) (0.0065) 
Mcap -0.0077*** -0.0147***  -0.0135*** -0.0260***  -0.0088** -0.0168**  -0.0118*** -0.0223*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0045)  (0.0049) (0.0091)  (0.0036) (0.0067)  (0.0036) (0.0069) 
ROA -0.0630*** -0.1183***  -0.0079 -0.0074  -0.0734*** -0.1389***  -0.0108 -0.0160 
 (0.0199) (0.0376)  (0.0246) (0.0463)  (0.0243) (0.0455)  (0.0229) (0.0431) 
TobinQ 0.0022*** 0.0040***  0.0117*** 0.0222***  0.0017*** 0.0030**  0.0171*** 0.0315*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0014)  (0.0040) (0.0075)  (0.0006) (0.0012)  (0.0034) (0.0063) 
SD_ROA[-3, -1] -0.0700** -0.1302**  -0.1288*** -0.2428***  -0.1033** -0.1940**  -0.1002** -0.1931** 
 (0.0302) (0.0570)  (0.0486) (0.0921)  (0.0419) (0.0792)  (0.0439) (0.0826) 
164 
 
Leverage 0.0168 0.0331*  -0.0281** -0.0518**  0.0060 0.0119  -0.0042 -0.0050 
 (0.0104) (0.0199)  (0.0133) (0.0248)  (0.0115) (0.0216)  (0.0171) (0.0301) 
Tangibility 0.0182 0.0333  0.0324 0.0568  0.0236 0.0453  0.0171 0.0282 
 (0.0320) (0.0597)  (0.0349) (0.0651)  (0.0486) (0.0903)  (0.0342) (0.0631) 
FirmAge -0.0195 -0.0366  0.0042 0.0072  -0.0176 -0.0359  0.0076 0.0143 
 (0.0188) (0.0353)  (0.0151) (0.0288)  (0.0202) (0.0381)  (0.0170) (0.0318) 
Slack 0.0123 0.0235  0.0154 0.0315  0.0718*** 0.1347***  -0.0063 -0.0067 
 (0.0199) (0.0373)  (0.0289) (0.0540)  (0.0252) (0.0473)  (0.0254) (0.0478) 
Constant 0.1279** 0.2416**  0.1226** 0.2364**  0.1306** 0.2545**  0.0608 0.1178 
 (0.0519) (0.0973)  (0.0508) (0.0958)  (0.0589) (0.1109)  (0.0566) (0.1054) 
            
Observations 9,042 9,042  4,771 4,771  5,098 5,098  5,130 5,130 
R-squared 0.7301 0.7315  0.7126 0.7140  0.7684 0.7702  0.7888 0.7890 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 






Table 4.18 Target firms’ response to hedge fund activism, 𝑩𝑹𝟑 and 𝑩𝑹𝟒 
The table provides the results how the target firms’ response to hedge fund activism affects 
post-intervention risk-taking. The dependent variables of different columns are 𝐵𝑅3  and 
𝐵𝑅4 as defined in Table 4.2. The full sample is divided into subsamples depending on whether 
the target firms have hostile resistance to hedge fund activism. Columns (1) and (2) show 
results based on the firms with hostile resistance to activism, and Columns (3) and (4) show 
results based on the firms without resistance. Robust standard errors are provided below in 
the parentheses. The variable definitions are provided in Table 4.2. All variables are winsorized 
at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
  Hostile Resistance   No Resistance 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Variables 𝑩𝑹𝟑 𝑩𝑹𝟒  𝑩𝑹𝟑 𝑩𝑹𝟒 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 -0.0081 -0.0156  -0.0134** -0.0248** 
 (0.0052) (0.0098)  (0.0052) (0.0099) 
post 0.0013 0.0027  0.0098** 0.0183** 
 (0.0041) (0.0077)  (0.0040) (0.0075) 
target 0.0021 0.0034  -0.0010 -0.0021 
 (0.0046) (0.0086)  (0.0041) (0.0078) 
Mcap -0.0083*** -0.0159***  -0.0089*** -0.0167*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0043)  (0.0026) (0.0049) 
ROA -0.0150 -0.0277  -0.0526** -0.0959** 
 (0.0130) (0.0245)  (0.0228) (0.0429) 
TobinQ 0.0100*** 0.0184***  0.0019*** 0.0035*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0028)  (0.0007) (0.0012) 
SD_ROA[-3, -1] -0.0681*** -0.1267***  -0.0878* -0.1654* 
 (0.0188) (0.0360)  (0.0456) (0.0860) 
Leverage -0.0000 -0.0019  0.0115 0.0237 
 (0.0082) (0.0152)  (0.0097) (0.0183) 
Tangibility 0.0245 0.0457  0.0236 0.0439 
 (0.0296) (0.0546)  (0.0316) (0.0598) 
FirmAge -0.0148 -0.0288  -0.0122 -0.0231 
 (0.0146) (0.0273)  (0.0169) (0.0318) 
Slack -0.0024 -0.0044  0.0274 0.0521 
 (0.0184) (0.0344)  (0.0198) (0.0372) 
Constant 0.1090*** 0.2111***  0.1259*** 0.2376*** 
 (0.0412) (0.0767)  (0.0476) (0.0895) 
      
Observations 6,480 6,480  7,333 7,333 
R-squared 0.7043 0.7047  0.7198 0.7208 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Secondly, instead of using the 3-year rolling window, this study uses a 5-year rolling 
window for the calculation of book-based risk-taking, namely industry-adjusted 
standard deviation of ROA (𝐵𝑅5), industry-adjusted range of ROA (𝐵𝑅6), the standard 
deviation of ROA (𝐵𝑅7), and range of ROA (𝐵𝑅8) all estimated over the 5-year window 
as defined in Table 4.2. This study re-examines Hypothesis 1 on the impact of hedge 
fund activism on firms’ risk-taking using the 5-year window. Relevant results are 
presented in Table 4.19.  
Table 4.19 shows significant and negative estimates of the coefficient of 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ×
 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 across all the four proxies, and with either firm fixed effects or industry fixed 
effects. The sign and significance of other variables also remain consistent with the 
main results. These results provide supportive evidence of Hypothesis 1 that firms 
targeted by activist hedge funds tend to reduce risk-taking post interventions. Results 
of the remaining hypotheses also remain robust when using the risk-taking proxies 




Table 4.19 Hedge fund activism and firm risk-taking, 5-year rolling windows 
The table provides regression results of the risk-taking behaviors of the target firms post hedge fund activism. The dependent variables of different columns 
are the four book-based proxies for risk-taking calculated over a five-year rolling window, namely 𝐵𝑅5, 𝐵𝑅6, 𝐵𝑅7, and 𝐵𝑅8 as defined in Table 4.2. Columns 
(1)-(4) report the results based on firm fixed effects, and Columns (5)-(8) report the results based on industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are provided 
below in the parentheses. The variable definitions are provided in Table 4.2. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 𝑩𝑹𝟓 𝑩𝑹𝟔 𝑩𝑹𝟕 𝑩𝑹𝟖 𝑩𝑹𝟓 𝑩𝑹𝟔 𝑩𝑹𝟕 𝑩𝑹𝟖 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 -0.0107* -0.0107* -0.0289** -0.0287** -0.0212* -0.0217* -0.0518* -0.0529* 
  (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0296) (0.0296) 
post 0.0081** 0.0076** 0.0211** 0.0201** 0.0074 0.0075 0.0198 0.0201 
 (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0095) (0.0094) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0231) (0.0231) 
target -0.0025 -0.0021 -0.0035 -0.0027 0.0051 0.0053 0.0132 0.0139 
 (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0213) (0.0213) 
Mcap -0.0100*** -0.0100*** -0.0241*** -0.0241*** -0.0146*** -0.0146*** -0.0348*** -0.0348*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0049) (0.0049) 
ROA -0.0336* -0.0326* -0.0716 -0.0693 -0.3838*** -0.3840*** -0.9139*** -0.9140*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0182) (0.0453) (0.0444) (0.0650) (0.0650) (0.1513) (0.1512) 
TobinQ 0.0020** 0.0020** 0.0046** 0.0045** 0.0306*** 0.0305*** 0.0709*** 0.0708*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
SD_ROA[-3, -1] -0.1068*** -0.1023*** -0.2470*** -0.2353*** 0.2321*** 0.2341*** 0.5712*** 0.5758*** 
 (0.0269) (0.0267) (0.0656) (0.0651) (0.0647) (0.0648) (0.1518) (0.1520) 
Leverage 0.0099 0.0099 0.0196 0.0195 0.0058 0.0061 0.0221 0.0232 
 (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0295) (0.0293) (0.0267) (0.0269) (0.0631) (0.0634) 
Tangibility 0.0121 0.0140 0.0283 0.0327 0.0155 0.0164 0.0371 0.0391 
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 (0.0321) (0.0323) (0.0744) (0.0751) (0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0407) (0.0408) 
FirmAge -0.0062 -0.0064 -0.0119 -0.0117 0.0153** 0.0153** 0.0352** 0.0351** 
 (0.0165) (0.0163) (0.0396) (0.0393) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0179) (0.0179) 
Slack 0.0263 0.0252 0.0634 0.0612 0.0210 0.0214 0.0602 0.0613 
 (0.0251) (0.0249) (0.0593) (0.0589) (0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0667) (0.0667) 
Constant 0.0766* 0.1395*** 0.1770* 0.3281*** 0.0080 0.0714*** 0.0187 0.1726*** 
 (0.0444) (0.0439) (0.1059) (0.1050) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0634) (0.0635) 
         
Observations 10,801 10,801 10,801 10,801 10,801 10,801 10,801 10,801 
R-squared 0.8042 0.8081 0.8041 0.8076 0.3043 0.3094 0.3102 0.3158 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes     
Industry Fixed Effect         Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Thirdly, instead of the book-based proxies for risk-taking, this study re-examines the 
risk-taking of the target firms based on the five market-based proxies for risk-taking, 
namely total risk (𝑀𝑅1), idiosyncratic risk (𝑀𝑅2), market-adjusted total risk (𝑀𝑅3), 
industry-adjusted total risk (𝑀𝑅4), and industry-adjusted idiosyncratic risk (𝑀𝑅5) as 
defined in Table 4.2. Relevant results are shown in Table 4.20. Columns (1)-(5) report 
the results based on firm fixed effects, and Columns (6)-(10) report the results based 
on industry fixed effects. 
As shown in Columns (6)-(10), the interaction term 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ×  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 is negative and at 
least statistically significant at 10% level when controlling for industry fixed effects, 
consistent with the main results that use book-based measures. However, the 
incremental effect of target firms’ risk-taking is insignificant when controlling for firm 
fixed effects.  
Overall, with all the results, it is confident to conclude that the target firms become 
more risk-averse post hedge fund activism. This impact is more pronounced for the 





Table 4.20 Hedge fund activism and firm risk-taking, market-based risk measures 
The table provides regression results of the risk-taking behaviors of the target firms post hedge fund activism. The dependent variables of different columns 
are the five market-based proxies for risk-taking, namely total risk (𝑀𝑅1), idiosyncratic risk (𝑀𝑅2), market-adjusted total risk (𝑀𝑅3), industry-adjusted total risk 
(𝑀𝑅4), and industry-adjusted idiosyncratic risk (𝑀𝑅5) as defined in Table 4.2. Columns (1)-(5) report the results based on firm fixed effects, and Columns (6)-
(10) report the results based on industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are provided below in the parentheses. The variable definitions are provided in 
Table 4.2. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Variables 𝑴𝑹𝟏 𝑴𝑹𝟐 𝑴𝑹𝟑 𝑴𝑹𝟒 𝑴𝑹𝟓 𝑴𝑹𝟏 𝑴𝑹𝟐 𝑴𝑹𝟑 𝑴𝑹𝟒 𝑴𝑹𝟓 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 -0.0015 -0.0007 -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0010 -0.0222** -0.0221* -0.0224** -0.0222** -0.0224* 
  (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0110) (0.0112) (0.0114) 
Post 0.0009 -0.0034 -0.0013 0.0010 -0.0031 0.0078 0.0071 0.0070 0.0078 0.0071 
 (0.0079) (0.0080) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0080) (0.0079) (0.0085) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0085) 
Target 0.0014 0.0037 0.0027 0.0014 0.0037 -0.0079 -0.0077 -0.0064 -0.0079 -0.0075 
 (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0080) (0.0081) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0082) 
Mcap -0.0328*** -0.0385*** -0.0362*** -0.0328*** -0.0380*** -0.0518*** -0.0609*** -0.0618*** -0.0518*** -0.0613*** 
 (0.0073) (0.0076) (0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0075) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0028) 
ROA -0.1560*** -0.1491*** -0.1546*** -0.1560*** -0.1503*** -0.3440*** -0.3436*** -0.3358*** -0.3439*** -0.3440*** 
 (0.0308) (0.0312) (0.0311) (0.0308) (0.0312) (0.0270) (0.0283) (0.0272) (0.0270) (0.0284) 
TobinQ 0.0035 0.0033 0.0025 0.0035 0.0032 0.0088*** 0.0092*** 0.0090*** 0.0088*** 0.0092*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0029) 
SD_ROA[-3,-1] -0.0384 -0.0365 -0.0454 -0.0384 -0.0355 0.2369*** 0.2460*** 0.2378*** 0.2369*** 0.2487*** 
 (0.0371) (0.0360) (0.0364) (0.0371) (0.0361) (0.0375) (0.0375) (0.0368) (0.0375) (0.0376) 
Leverage 0.0746*** 0.0711** 0.0728** 0.0745*** 0.0732*** 0.1108*** 0.0991*** 0.0999*** 0.1108*** 0.0998*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0281) (0.0283) (0.0287) (0.0283) (0.0231) (0.0238) (0.0230) (0.0231) (0.0238) 
Tangibility 0.0887 0.0891 0.0933 0.0888 0.0884 0.0434 0.0326 0.0366 0.0434 0.0323 
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 (0.0744) (0.0766) (0.0760) (0.0744) (0.0763) (0.0301) (0.0308) (0.0297) (0.0301) (0.0309) 
FirmAge -0.0949** -0.1121*** -0.0984** -0.0948** -0.1150*** -0.0322*** -0.0338*** -0.0298*** -0.0322*** -0.0341*** 
 (0.0415) (0.0415) (0.0410) (0.0415) (0.0416) (0.0074) (0.0075) (0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0075) 
Slack -0.0929*** -0.0959*** -0.0886*** -0.0930*** -0.0963*** -0.0275 -0.0296 -0.0235 -0.0275 -0.0296 
 (0.0325) (0.0321) (0.0327) (0.0325) (0.0321) (0.0252) (0.0253) (0.0248) (0.0252) (0.0254) 
Constant 0.9588*** 1.0095*** 0.9678*** 0.9587*** 1.0123*** 0.9140*** 0.9531*** 0.9521*** 0.9139*** 0.9542*** 
 (0.1075) (0.1083) (0.1064) (0.1075) (0.1086) (0.0308) (0.0313) (0.0304) (0.0308) (0.0313) 
 
          
Observations 10,313 10,310 10,313 10,313 10,310 10,313 10,310 10,313 10,313 10,310 
R-squared 0.7976 0.8072 0.8047 0.7976 0.8059 0.4874 0.4993 0.5074 0.4874 0.4959 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes      
Industry FE           Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





This study documents the impact of hedge fund activism on post-intervention risk-
taking. Based on the sample of hedge fund activism events in the U.S. during the 
period 2000-2016, this study finds that the target firms experience a significant 
reduction in risk-taking post hedge fund activism. This effect on risk reduction is more 
pronounced when the target firms have myopic management or lower information 
transparency. These findings suggest that activist hedge funds reduce firm risk-taking 
or strategic behaviors, which indicates hedge funds’ potential engagement in short-
termism. In addition, empirical tests also provide evidence that target firms experience 
a less pronounced risk reduction when the firms have hostile resistance to hedge fund 
activism. This is consistent with Boyson and Pichler (2019) that management’s hostile 
resistance to activism would offset the initial effect of hedge fund activism on target 
firms. 
This study contributes to the literature on hedge fund activism. It is the first study to 
examine how activist hedge funds affect the risk-taking of target firms. By applying 
various subsamples based on firm-specific characteristics, this study provides 
consistent evidence that target firms become more risk-averse post interventions. 
Overall, these empirical findings provide new insights to academics and regulators by 
adding to the debate on the costs and benefits of activism for the economy. The short-
termism nature of activist hedge funds provides important policy implications that 




Chapter Five: Conclusion 
The final chapter concludes the dissertation. It has three sections. Section 5.1 presents 
a brief summary of the main findings from the two essays and discusses the 
implications of these findings. Section 5.2 provides some limitations of this research, 
and further discusses potential areas for future research that are related to the thesis 
topics. 
5.1 A review of hypotheses, major findings, and implications 
The hypotheses and major findings in connection with the essays are summarized in 
Table 5.1, with relevant discussions in Subsections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2.  
Table 5.1 Hypotheses and conclusions for two essays 
This table presents a summary of research objectives and hypotheses for the two essays. All 
the hypotheses are supported by empirical studies. 
Research objective 1: To investigate the impact of information technology on retail 
investors’ attention and participation during shareholder activism 
Hypothesis 1: Retail investors’ attention increases for firms that receive 
shareholders’ proposals prior to the annual general meetings. 
Support 
Hypothesis 2a: Retail investors’ attention is positively related to a 
negative sentiment expressed in the proxy statements. 
Support 
Hypothesis 2b: The increase of retail investors’ attention is more 
pronounced for less transparent firms. 
Support 
Hypothesis 3a: Retail investors’ attention is positively associated with 
their participation during high salience activism that resonates with retail 
investors’ interests and preferences. 
 
Support 
Hypothesis 3b: The impact of retail investors’ attention on their 




Hypothesis 4: Retail investors’ participation during high salience activism 





Research objective 2: To investigate the link between hedge fund activism and firm 
risk-taking 
Hypothesis 1: Firms targeted by activist hedge funds become more 
risk-averse post activism. 
Support 
Hypothesis 2: Target firms with myopic management experience a 
more pronounced reduction in risk-taking post hedge fund activism. 
 
Support 
Hypothesis 3: The post-intervention reduction in firm risk-taking is 
associated with firm-level transparency, and the effect is more 
pronounced for less transparent firms. 
Support 
 
Hypothesis 4: Target firms’ response plays an essential role in the 
consequence of hedge fund activism, and firms with no hostile 




5.1.1 Essay One: Are retail investors really passive? Shareholder activism 
in the digital age 
In the wake of digital age, the advancement in information technology has provided 
retail investors with efficient access to information, reducing the time and cost of being 
informed and making an informed decision. This would make changes to the 
traditional view that retail investors are rationally apathetic towards corporate 
governance. Based on a sample of all shareholder activism events in the U.S. covering 
the period 2005-2016, this essay examines the dynamics of retail investors’ attention 
and retail investors’ participation during shareholder activism with the advent of 
internet search. Google Search Volume Index (GSVI) is used to capture retail investors’ 
“demand for information”. 
This essay finds new evidence on the role of internet in mitigating retail investors’ 
apathy problems. Retail investors’ attention for firms that receive a shareholder 
proposal increases significantly relative to their matched control firms prior to the 
annual general meetings. Specifically, the negative sentiment in proxy statements 
attracts higher retail investors’ attention. This increase in attention turns into higher 
retail investors’ participation in the voting process especially among proposals that 
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resonate with retail investors’ interests and preferences. 
Moreover, this essay highlights the impact of firm-level information transparency on 
retail investors’ attention and subsequent participation during shareholder activism. 
Less transparent firms experience a more pronounced increase in retail investors’ 
attention and participation. The introduction of E-proxy also facilitates retail investors 
in participation during high salience activism. 
Overall, this study provides new insights into retail investors’ behaviors and decision 
making in response to dissatisfaction with management. This is consistent with the 
suggestions of the SEC roundtable that highlights the importance of information 
technology in mitigation retail investors’ apathy issues during proxy voting process. 
5.1.2 Essay Two: Hedge fund activism and firm risk-taking 
This essay fills in the gap in recent literature on the impact of hedge fund activism on 
firm risk-taking. Using a sample of all hedge fund activism events in the U.S. during the 
period 2000-2016, this study provides evidence that target firms experience a 
significant reduction in risk-taking relative to their matched control peers post hedge 
fund interventions. This reduction in firm risk-taking is significant even though activist 
hedge funds do not have explicit demands. This reduction in risk-taking reflects the 
short-termism nature of activist hedge funds, which pursue short-term profits and 
reduce long-term investments.  
In addition, this essay highlights the role of firm-level characteristics of myopic 
management and information transparency in the association between hedge fund 
activism and firm risk-taking. Specifically, this essay provides evidence that myopic 
managed firms or opaque firms experience a more pronounced reduction in risk-
taking post interventions, providing further evidence on activists’ engagement in 
short-termism. This essay also adds new evidence to Boyson and Pichler (2019) that 
management’s hostile resistance to activism offsets its initial effects on target firms. 
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Overall, this essay is the first study that investigates the link between hedge fund 
activism and firm risk-taking. It highlights a negative consequence of activists’ 
interventions to target firms, which might negatively affect firm performance in the 
long-term. This essay provides important policy implications to the current debate on 
the efficacy of activist hedge funds, and the results support the critics of activist hedge 
funds, arguing that the hedge fund activism benefits are short-lived, at a long-term 
cost to shareholders. 
5.2 Limitations of this research and potential future research 
As with all research, there are some limitations in this thesis. For Essay One, an 
important caveat lies in the use of GSVI in the measurement of retail investors’ 
attention. According to Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) and Drake, Roulstone, and 
Thornock (2012), large institutional investors have access to better information 
sources, and hence, Google search is likely to measure the attention of retail investors, 
or “perhaps less sophisticated” investors. Consequently, GSVI does capture retail 
investors’ seeking of information. However, this study is not able to separate other 
types of market participant that might also use Google to search for information during 
shareholder activism. 
Secondly, Essay One measures retail investors’ participation indirectly by the use of 
the non-participation rate. This is the best proxy for retail investors’ participation 
based on the data availability of this research. However, it is possible to measure the 
participation rate more accurately if the voting data is directly available. This suggests 
a potential line of research in the future. 
For Essay Two, one limitation is the identification of hostile activism. Following Boyson 
and Pichler (2019), this study classifies activism as hostile resistance when target firms 
disagree publicly to hedge fund demands. However, there is also possible that 
management resists to activism behind the scene. This study is not able to identify 
such activism as hostile resistance.  
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Lastly, there is an interesting research question related to Essay Two, namely the link 
of risk-taking and M&A activities during hedge fund activism. According to Boyson, 
Gantchev, and Shivdasani (2017), activist hedge funds create shareholder value by 
influencing takeover outcomes for target firms. Hence, it is expected that M&A 
activities would have an impact on risk-taking during hedge fund activism. However, 
this study has not been able to investigate this question owing to the lack of data on 






Appendix A: Calculation of LM-tone, Essay One: Are retail investors really passive? 
Shareholder activism in the digital age 
This appendix provides the steps taken to process proxy statements before using 
McDonald and Loughran Dictionary. This study sources all the proxy materials from the 
SEC-EDGAR website, mainly DEF-14A or DEFA-14A for each firm-year, during which the 
firms receive a shareholder proposal. The procedures are as follows: 
1. The heading information that is contained between hSEC-HEADERi and h/SEC-
HEADERi is deleted. 
2. All the tables that begin with hTABLEi and end with h/TABLEi or the paragraphs 
that contain hSi or hCi are deleted because some firms use hSi and hCi tags to 
present tables.  
3. All the tags in the format of h...i and h&yi, which are used widely in documents 
in SEC HTML or XML format documents, are replaced with blanks. 
4. To ensure that all the tables, tabulated text, or financial statements are 
excluded, all the paragraphs with more than 50% of non-alphabetic characters 
(e.g., white spaces or numbers) were deleted. 
5. To make the analysis possible, the typical stop words such as “and,” “or,” or 
“the” are also removed 
After the editing, the files, the files are analyzed based on custom developed R codes. 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) financial dictionary is applied to calculate the typical 
text statistics, including the total, number of words, number of positive words, number 




Appendix B: Propensity Score Paradox, Essay One: Are retail investors really passive? 
Shareholder activism in the digital age 
King & Nielsen (2019) “discovered a serious problem that causes PSM, as commonly 
used, to act like random matching and degrade inferences, sometimes worse than the 
original data.” This appendix investigates the potential propensity score paradox in this 
dissertation. As presented in Chapter Three, Essay One has one-to-one match for each 
target and control firm for each industry and year to make more precise comparisons. 
Table 3.6 on page 61 seems to be an unbalanced panel. However, the targets and their 
matched peers are actually identical in all firm-level characteristics before taking GSVI 
into consideration, as shown Table 1A. 
Table Appendix 1: Balance test post PSM and before downloading SVI  
This table reports the balance test of Propensity Score Matching before downloading 
SVI. The target and matched firms are actually identical in all firm-level characteristics 
before taking GSVI into consideration.  
 Variables Target Matched Diff. 
Mcap 8.626 8.592 -0.034 
Advertising 0.012 0.013 0.001 
TobinQ 2.003 1.952 -0.051 
InstOwn 77.797 77.356 -0.441 
Tangibility 0.288 0.28 -0.008 
3yrReturns 8.174 7.428 -0.746 
#Employees 2.84 2.886 0.046 
FirmAge 3.249 3.246 -0.003 
N= 2,290 
The significant difference between the target and control firms arise due to missing 
SVI. Firms that did not receive shareholder proposals might attract low or even no 
attention from retail investors (i.e. zero GSVI), leading to the exclusion of more 
matched firms (than target firms) from the sample. Although it is possible to identify 
the search volume data of each individual firm when downloading the search volume 
data from the Google’s website, it is not likely to establish which firms have invalid 
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(zero) SVI for the relevant period ex-ante. Hence, it is hard to come up with an exact 
match.  
To address the Propensity Score Paradox, this study uses the previously calculated 
Propensity Scores to identify each pair of target and matched firms, and drop 
observations based on the p-score to achieve a better balance of covariates. The new 
balance is reported in Table 2A, and the Equation 14 is re-examined using the new PSM 
sample. Relevant results are reported in Table 3A. The coefficient of 𝑃𝑟𝑒[22] × 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 
is positively related to retail investors’ attention, statistically significant at 10% or 
below. These results confirm the main findings of Essay One. 
Table Appendix 2: New coerced balance matrix 
This table reports the balance test of the new coerced balance matrix. This study 
identifies each pair of target and matched firms based on their Propensity Scores, and 
drops observations to achieve a better balance of covariates. 
Variables Target Matched Diff. 
Mcap 8.779 8.774 -0.005 
Advertising 0.013 0.013 0.001 
TobinQ 1.969 2.02 0.051 
InstOwn 79.895 78.525 -1.370* 
Tangibility 0.263 0.262 -0.001 
3yrReturns 8.02 7.895 -0.125 
#Employees 2.942 3.01 0.068 





Table Appendix 3: Retail investors’ attention during shareholder activism, new PSM 
sample 
This table provides the incremental retail investors’ attention before the annual 
general meetings based on the new PSM sample. The definitions of all the variables 
are same as the main tests reported in Table 3.7. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 All firms High salience firms 
Firms with no earning 
announcements 
Variables GASVI GASVI GASVI 
Pre[22]×Target 0.011* 0.013** 0.018* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) 
Pre[22] 0.003 0.009 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
Target -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) 
Mcap 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
Advertising -0.203* -0.158 -0.087 
 (0.107) (0.140) (0.246) 
TobinQX 0.288 0.0146 -0.676 
 (0.262) (0.305) (0.583) 
InstOwnX 0.0474*** 0.0588*** 0.0340 
 (0.0165) (0.0215) (0.0289) 
Tangibility 0.025 0.031* -0.003 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.027) 
3yrReturnsX -0.0192 -0.0353 -0.0475 
 (0.0179) (0.0248) (0.0352) 
#Employees -0.003 -0.008* 0.017** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
FirmAge 0.001 0.009** 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
Constant -0.130*** -0.157*** -0.356*** 
 (0.031) (0.043) (0.053) 
    
Observations 259,744 138,784 102,566 
R-squared 0.001 0.002 0.018 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
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